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ABSTRACT 
 
Empirical evidence indicates that companies that reduce information asymmetry by 
increased voluntary disclosures achieve several benefits, such as lower cost of capital, 
improved pricing, and liquidity of their shares. Despite the possibility of such benefits, 
many studies report varying degrees of voluntary disclosure behaviour that is 
attributable to various factors. Recent studies indicate that investors’ investment 
horizon has a significant effect on actions taken by management. Companies with 
predominantly short-horizon investors spend less on research and development, invest 
in shorter-term projects that are less profitable than longer-term projects, and are more 
likely to manipulate earnings to meet short-term earnings expectations. This study 
investigates whether investors’ investment horizon has an effect on the quality of 
companies’ information environment.  
 
Long-horizon investors should be familiar with their investee company’s risks and 
rewards, using both their own internal information gathering processes and the 
cumulative information disclosed by management over time. Moreover, over the 
course of a long-term relationship, they can become familiar with management’s 
capability to deliver long-term sustainable returns. Long-horizon investors should 
therefore be less concerned with short-term fluctuations of earnings and 
management’s public explanations and disclosures thereof. I hypothesise that higher 
(lower) proportions of long-horizon investors are associated with lower (higher) quality 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
The shareholder familiarity hypothesis was tested in this study, using an ordinary least 
squares regression. Voluntary disclosures were observed via the channel of 
companies’ websites. A checklist was compiled of best practices for online investor 
relations, and content analyses were conducted on the websites of 205 companies 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Shareholder familiarity was proxied by 
shareholder stability, measured over nine years. The stability measure was lagged by 
one year to create a temporal difference between the shareholder profile and 
disclosure behaviour. I found that companies with a profile of unstable investors that 
are larger, younger, dual-listed and have a Big4 auditor have higher quality online 
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investor relations practices. The hypothesis of a negative association between 
shareholder familiarity and voluntary disclosure quality is therefore accepted.  
 
This study extends the theory on information asymmetry and voluntary disclosure by 
providing evidence supporting the argument that investor horizon is a predictor of 
voluntary disclosure quality. The dictum of more is better does not hold in all scenarios. 
It is important for financial directors and investor relations officers to establish the 
investment horizon profile of their respective companies’ shareholders before they 
embark on extensive disclosure programmes. 
 
Key terms: information asymmetry, voluntary disclosure, investor horizon, investor 
familiarity, investor relations, JSE, websites 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Long-term investors tend to be knowledgeable about the industry as well as the 
company’s management and strategy. Typically, they spend meaningful amounts 
of time analyzing and modeling the company before meeting with management. 
 (Focusing Capital on the Long Term, 2015:22) 
1.1. Background  
The ability to communicate verbally and non-verbally is one of the most important traits 
that distinguish human beings from animals. Laughlin (1995:78) states this implies both 
a “fundamental ability and necessity to use language to make public what we are doing 
and why we are doing it and, where we need to convince.” This basic ability can be 
used in specialised ways: Bloomfield (2008:433) proposes that natural languages are 
general-purpose tools that allow communication about any number of topics, but that 
accounting is a special-purpose tool for communicating about financial status and 
performance.  
 
The board of directors of every individual company, acting as agents of the legal 
owners, the shareholders, has traditionally communicated with company shareholders 
by means of printed annual financial statements (AFS) and the annual general meeting 
(AGM). The purpose of this communication is to account for the directors and 
managements’ fiduciary duties. This communication looks backward – it involves 
accounting for what has already taken place, and it is highly prescriptive about what 
the company has to report on. However, investors may not rely solely on historical 
information when they make capital allocation decisions. Investors therefore also need 
forward-looking information from management.  
 
As far back as 1994, the “Jenkins Report” by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) in the United States (US), Improving business reporting – A 
customer focus: Meeting the information needs of investors and creditors, proposed a 
comprehensive model for business reporting that included more forward-looking 
information and placed more emphasis on value drivers and non-financial measures 
(AICPA, 1994). The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) published a 
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detailed study of investors’ information requirements for annual reports, based on an 
extensive survey amongst preparers, private and institutional users, and auditors 
(Beattie & Pratt, 2002). Many items deemed ‘very useful’ by users can be classified as 
forward-looking information, for example, revenue growth, objectives and strategies, 
the duration of patents, capital investment plans, as well as research and development 
(R&D) expenditure. Companies began to disclose voluntary information in response to 
this pressure, in order to reduce the information asymmetry between management as 
insiders, and the capital market. Studies by Botosan (1997), Sengupta (1998) and 
Frankel, Johnson and Skinner (1999) found that companies experienced a reduction 
in the cost of capital (and an increase in share value) after they increased their level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
In the late 1990s, some companies set up specific investor relations (IR) departments 
and webpages, because they realised the importance of communicating specifically 
with their investors. The Investor Relations Society (IRS) of the United Kingdom (UK) 
defines IR as 
…the communication of information and insight between a company and the 
investment community. This process enables a full appreciation of the company’s 
business activities, strategy and prospects and allows the market to make an 
informed judgement about the fair value and appropriate ownership of a company. 
(IRS, 2013) 
 
In line with prior voluntary disclosure studies, Farragher, Kleiman and Bazaz (1994), 
Brennan and Tamarowski (2000), Chang, D’Anna, Watson and Wee (2008), Bushee 
and Miller (2012), and Vlittis and Charitou (2012) found that increasing IR quality 
reduces the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts and bid-ask spreads, increases 
the analyst following and investment by institutional investors, and improves trading 
volume and book-to-price ratios. Moreover, Agarwal, Taffler, Bellotti and Nash (2016) 
reported that companies with higher quality IR strategies (they considered companies 
nominated for Best Overall IR award) had significantly higher valuation multiples than 
companies that were not nominated. They also found that increasing the IR quality led 
to higher analyst following and to improvements in share liquidity. These findings 
applied to companies of all sizes, but were stronger for smaller companies. 
 
An important factor to bear in mind is that stock exchange regulators in both the US 
and South Africa have implemented measures to curb private value-relevant 
disclosures to institutional investors and analysts. The Securities and Exchange 
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Commission (SEC) in the US implemented Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 
2000 (SEC, 2000). The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) incorporated Sections 
3.4 to 3.8, which permit the use of companies’ websites for disseminating value-
relevant information simultaneously to all investors and other interested stakeholders, 
into its revised Listings Requirements in 2003 (JSE, 2003). These regulations gave 
additional impetus to developing online IR practices.  
  
Several studies, such as those by Hedlin (1999), Marston and Polei (2004), Bollen, 
Hassink and Bozic (2006), Abdelsalam, Bryant and Street (2007), Gandía (2008) and 
Pozniak (2013), have analysed the IR webpages of companies to identify how 
companies in different countries practise online IR. Standard deviations in the 
disclosure scores were large, so researchers used regression models to isolate factors 
that may be associated with disclosure quality. Their studies report conflicting evidence 
on the predictive power of the independent variables. Evidence of significance or 
insignificance, or positive association versus negative association, can be found for 
nearly every independent variable included in the regression models used in these 
prior studies.  
 
Thus far, research in South Africa by Venter (2002), Barac (2004), Nel (2004), and Nel 
and Baard (2007) on the use of the Internet for investor communication has identified 
the same preliminary trends as those found in international studies. These studies only 
reviewed the largest companies’ websites, for example, the top 40 or top 100 per 
market capitalisation. Over time, more of the large companies in South Africa began to 
use their websites for IR activities. However, thirteen years ago, after reviewing the top 
100 companies’ websites, Barac (2004:20) commented that South African companies 
did not yet fully use the technological benefits that the Internet has to offer for 
communicating with investors and that many companies just used their website as an 
electronic bulletin board.  
 
When one compares the information and economic environment of South Africa to 
those that prevail in other countries, important differences emerge, as Table 1.1 shows. 
South Africa’s stock exchange, the JSE, operates in a hybrid environment that shares 
some characteristics with the sophisticated US, UK and European markets (green 
highlighting), but also has some characteristics in common with markets in some 
emerging and developing countries (blue highlighting). 
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Table 1.1: Comparisons between economies and equity markets 
US, UK and Europe South Africa Middle East, South Asia, 
China, South America and 
Egypt 
Developed economies  Developing economy Emerging and developing 
economies 
Highly liquid  Illiquid  Illiquid 
Dispersed ownership, even 
in presence of institutional 
and blockholdings 
Ownership concentration –
large institutional holdings 
Ownership concentration – 
including large family and 
government holdings 
Strong legal rights for 
minority shareholders and 
high reporting standards 
Strong legal rights for 
minority shareholders and 
high reporting standards 
Weak legal rights for 
minority shareholders and 
low reporting standards 
Source: Author 
 
It can therefore not be assumed that voluntary disclosure and trading behaviour 
observed in other domains, as well as explanations for that behaviour, would apply 
equally to South African companies and the JSE.  
1.2. Investment horizon and familiarity 
A recent area of research investigates the effects of institutional investors’ investment 
horizons (how long they are invested in the investee) on the behaviour of companies. 
Bushee (1998) has identified three types of institutional investors, based on their 
investment patterns relating to portfolio turnover, diversification and momentum trading 
(Bushee, 1998:310-311): 
 ‘Transient’ institutional owners hold small numbers of shares in a large number of 
companies and frequently trade in and out of these companies. Trading activity is 
mostly induced by short-term signals, such as current earnings.  
 ‘Dedicated’ institutional owners hold large numbers of shares over the long term in 
only a few companies. They evaluate management’s long-term performance and 
use a more complete set of information for that purpose. 
 ‘Quasi-indexers’ invest in indexes or buy-and-hold strategies. Their portfolios are 
highly diversified (directly or indirectly via the index invested in), but their turnover 
is low. 
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Areas of research involving institutional investor horizons as an explanatory variable 
are the following: R&D spending (Bushee, 1998), mergers and acquisitions (Gaspar, 
Massa & Matos, 2005), cost of equity (Attig, Cleary, El Ghoul & Guedhami, 2013), 
investments and how they are financed (Huang & Petkevich, 2016) and future share 
returns (Yan & Zhang, 2009). 
 
Souder, Reilly, Bromiley and Mitchell (2016) used a different measure of investor 
horizon than Bushee (1998), which they call ‘capital patience’ (proxied by a reverse-
coded share turnover measure). Their capital patience measure differs from the 
measures used by the other authors above, in that the investor horizon is calculated 
based on all shares traded, and not only on the trading activity of institutional 
shareholders (although institutional shareholders’ trading activity probably constituted 
the largest portion of total trading activity). Souder et al. (2016:1212) found that 
companies with lower than industry average investment horizons (proxied by the 
expected useful lives of property, plant and equipment) tend to have a lower return on 
assets. This is exacerbated when the companies’ investors have low capital patience 
(there is frequent trading in the companies’ shares). 
 
Employing a different research design to the ones described above, Bushee and Noe 
(2000) used the investor horizon as the dependent variable, and disclosure quality as 
the independent variable. In their study, disclosure quality was positively associated 
with transient and quasi-indexer institutions, but insignificant for dedicated long-horizon 
investors (Bushee & Noe, 2000:185). When they ran the regressions on changes in 
disclosure quality, it affected the holdings of transient and quasi-indexers. However, 
regarding dedicated investors, they remark: 
Finally, consistent with the levels analysis, there are no significant associations 
between changes in dedicated institutional ownership and changes in AIMR 
[Association for Investment and Management Research] disclosure rankings. Both 
sets of results imply that the large, stable ownership positions of dedicated 
institutions likely provide them direct channels of information from firms and limit 
any benefit of public disclosure. (Bushee & Noe 2000:190) 
 
However, in the post-Reg FD regime, Serafeim (2015:41) found that long-horizon 
investors are associated with integrated reporting quality. This contradicts the findings 
of Bushee and Noe (2000) that long-horizon investors are neutral to disclosure quality. 
Both these studies used disclosure quality as the independent variable and assessed 
the level of institutional shareholding as the dependent variable.  
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In a disclosure environment where private value-relevant disclosures are prohibited 
(for example, in South Africa, where Sections 3.4 to 3.8 of the JSE Listings 
Requirements have been in force since 1 September 2003, or in the US, where Reg 
FD of the SEC has been applied since 1 October 2000), one would assume that long-
term shareholders would pressure management for more public disclosure, since their 
private channels have been blocked. Alternatively, long-term shareholders might be 
satisfied with the current level of public disclosure if they still have access to private 
information from management, or they have superior information processing 
capabilities to make sense of the information publicly disclosed, as well as their own 
research into industry trends, markets, etc. Given the high ranking South Africa 
received for the protection of minority shareholder rights by the World Economic Forum 
(WEF, 2012), I assume that JSE-listed companies do not provide private disclosures 
of value-relevant information to institutional shareholders and that all shareholder types 
only have access to the same public information provided by company management.  
 
I would like to posit another reason why long-term shareholders may be satisfied with 
a poorer public disclosure environment: they are probably familiar with the investee 
company’s risks and rewards, and management’s achievement record over the long 
period of the investment relationship. They therefore do not require extensive voluntary 
disclosure. Long-horizon investors’ information environment therefore consists of their 
own information, gathered over time (Focusing Capital on the Long Term, 2015; Huang 
& Petkevich, 2016), plus information cumulatively provided publicly by the investee 
company.  
 
This study therefore hypothesises that shareholder familiarity (operationalised by a 
lagged measure of ownership stability averaged over a period of nine years, indicative 
of an investment horizon) is associated with the quality of the online IR practices of 
JSE-listed companies. This argument can also be supported from a signalling theory 
perspective: company management would have little incentive to increase voluntary 
public disclosure or to invest in best practice IR if it faces the same shareholder 
identities period after period, as trust has already been established. Another argument 
in support of this hypothesis is that a poorer public information environment allows 
long-horizon investors to capitalise on their substantial in-house information-gathering 
 Chapter 1 – Introduction 7 
and industry analysis expertise. Investee company management would therefore cater 
to the long-horizon investors’ low(er) demand for public voluntary disclosure. 
1.3. Research problems 
There are a number of gaps in our knowledge. These are the following: 
 The quality of the IR practices of middle-tier and smaller companies in South Africa 
is unknown. 
 Download speeds for South Africa averaged 1,16 Mbps (megabits per second) in 
January 2008, after the last prior study by Nel and Baard (2007), versus 3,22 Mbps 
in June 2012 (Ookla, 2014), and 5.6 Mbps for South Africa in the second quarter of 
2016 (Akamai, 2016:40). The growth in bandwidth and the number of online users 
implies that companies can now reach a wider audience of retail investors with their 
online IR programmes. Companies will increasingly be able to use bandwidth-
intensive technologies such as videos, online conference calls with analysts, 
webcasts of presentations and interactive stock charting. They will be able to use 
such media more widely and efficiently as bandwidth capacity increases for both 
companies and private investors. These are low-hanging fruit in the quest to reduce 
information asymmetry for the benefit of private (retail) investors. However, we do 
not know whether companies took advantage of faster broadband speeds. 
 Empirical studies report that reductions in cost of capital, improvements in liquidity 
and increased analyst following are associated with higher quality IR. However, the 
evidence of prior studies on online IR practised by JSE companies indicates that 
even amongst large companies, best practices for online IR are largely ignored. We 
do not know what factors are present in the South African context that explains the 
lack of uptake of best practices regarding online IR (based on prior research). 
 Prior research on explanatory variables has focused mainly on the US, the UK, 
Europe, China, countries in the Middle East, South Asia, or South America, or on 
Egypt. It is not clear whether the models developed in these other domains would 
sufficiently explain the online IR behaviour of JSE-listed companies. 
1.4. Research objectives 
This study has two primary objectives: 
 to determine the quality of the voluntary communications of JSE-listed companies 
as manifested by their online IR practices. 
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o as a secondary objective, to reach a conclusion regarding the stage of 
development of South African online IR (using Hedlin’s model); and 
 
 to develop a regression model that explains the quality of the online IR practices of 
JSE-listed companies and to test the thesis hypothesis. 
1.5. Research hypothesis 
Based on the literature, I propose the following hypothesis in the null format: 
H0 =  There is no association between voluntary communications quality (proxied by 
online IR quality) and shareholder familiarity (proxied by shareholder stability). 
1.6. Research design and methodology 
1.6.1. Research paradigm 
This study aims to make observations about the real world by collecting data and 
analysing it statistically. The researcher is detached from the subjects examined. It can 
therefore be classified as a positivist study. 
1.6.2. Literature review 
The investigation started with a literature search, based on the following key words: 
 “Voluntary disclosure” 
 “Internet reporting”  
 “Online reporting”  
 “Voluntary reporting” 
 “Investors relations” 
 “Investment horizon” 
 
The theory behind increased voluntary disclosure and the benefits that may arise from 
it are discussed. Developments in financial reporting practices and IR are highlighted. 
The role of investment horizon was investigated. A second round of searches was 
executed before finalising the thesis in order to update the literature. 
1.6.3. Empirical investigation 
The dual primary objectives of the study were achieved by the following means: 
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 Content analyses were carried out on the websites of JSE-listed companies to 
ascertain what information was disclosed, what technologies were employed on the 
website and to what extent usability features were incorporated into the website. 
 A regression model was developed to explain cross-sectional differences between 
the online IR practices of JSE-listed companies. 
1.6.3.1 Timeframe of content analyses 
Two factors determined the timing of the content analyses. The first was the fact that 
the South African disclosure environment experienced a systemic shock. The second 
was the availability of funding for carrying out the content analyses. The systemic 
shock came with the implementation of the King III Code, developed by the Institute of 
Directors (IoD), which required that an integrated report be produced for all financial 
years beginning on or after 1 March 2010 on an apply-or-explain basis  (IoD, 2009). 
Companies that already disclosed extensively via their websites and/or annual reports 
before 2010 would benefit from their archive of information in preparing their first 
integrated report. On the other hand, for companies that had limited pre-2010 voluntary 
disclosures, I assumed that IR departments would leverage the information generating 
process for their integrated report and communicate the same information (as a 
minimum) on the companies’ IR webpages. As with any new process, it takes time to 
improve compliance. I decided that 2011 would be too soon after this regulatory 
change to investigate the online IR practices of the JSE-listed companies. 
 
Prior studies in South Africa (Venter, 2002; Barac, 2004; Nel & Baard, 2006, 2007) 
limited their studies to the largest 40 or 100 companies. In the present study, I wanted 
to capture behaviour across companies of different sizes. Secondly, to increase the 
strength of the regression analyses, a much larger sample was required. However, for 
comparative purposes, the websites’ content analyses had to take place in as short a 
time as possible. Given the extensive checklist, this required that more than one person 
would be required to conduct the content analyses. The progress of the study was 
therefore delayed until funding could be obtained. In 2012, funding was received from 
Unisa’s Master and Doctoral Support Programme. The content analyses therefore took 
place from July 2012 to mid-September 2012. 
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1.6.3.2 Sample selection 
The sample frame was all companies listed on the JSE Main Board. To measure the 
stability in the shareholder profiles of the companies, and to avoid noise due to the 
2008 financial crises, a ten-year period for trading activity was selected, namely July 
2002 to June 2012. This requirement determined the first tranche of the sample: 
companies that were listed at least ten years before the start of the fieldwork (the 
content analyses). The first selection criterion resulted in 188 companies. 
 
In order to compare the results of this study with those of prior South African studies 
of online IR practices, the sample included the top 100 companies, based on market 
capitalisation. This constituted the second tranche of the sample, and added 25 
companies. 
 
To eliminate between-industry differences, the model was also estimated for one 
complete sector of the JSE. A limitation is the relatively small number of companies 
listed on the JSE Main Board (about 330). For the model to have coefficient stability, 
given a large number of variables, meant that the largest sector (in terms of the number 
of listed companies) should be selected, namely the basic resources sector. However, 
the basic resources sector was still relatively small, so I decided to combine the 
consumer goods and services sectors. This constitutes the third tranche of the sample, 
and added ten companies.  
 
The final sample consisted of 205 companies, after excluding seven pure holding 
companies, two dual-listed companies (the South African share was already included), 
six smaller companies that did not have websites, and two companies whose websites 
were unavailable during the period under review.  
1.6.3.3 Measurement instrument 
A disclosure checklist was compiled from the guidelines for effective online IR provided 
by Loranger and Nielsen (2009). The 2003 edition of these guidelines was used in the 
study by Abdelsalam et al. (2007). The guidelines were crosschecked against similar 
guidelines provided on the website of the Investor Relations Society of the UK. Lastly, 
I compared the information items to the higher-level items in the ICAS study (Beattie 
& Pratt, 2002) on what users (private and institutional) want to see in annual reports. 
Comparing Loranger and Nielsen’s (2009) guidelines to checklists published in the 
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prior literature confirmed that the present study contains at least the same checklist 
items and more. This confirms the external validity of the checklist. 
 
The guidelines were broken down into specifics items. For example, prior studies 
checked whether a PDF of annual financial statements was present on the websites 
under review. This constitutes an information item. Loranger and Nielsen’s (2009) 
guidelines are more specific and focus more on usability features, which are intended 
to ensure that users do not abandon their search; for example, the size of the file 
should be indicated in megabytes; large files should be split into smaller files; and the 
latest year’s document should be listed first. Specificity reduces uncertainty for the 
assessor. Every checklist item for information content was coded dichotomously: if it 
was present, a value of ‘1’ was awarded; if it was absent, a value of ‘0’ was awarded.  
 
A technology focus was taken to assist in reaching the secondary objective, namely to 
determine the stage of Internet adoption for financial communication (Hedlin, 1999). 
Hedlin (1999) proposed progressively higher usage of advanced Internet technologies 
for communicating with investors. To that end, some presentation formats were 
weighted. This weighting toward technology items is consistent with Bollen et al. 
(2006), Abdelsalam et al. (2007), Chang et al. (2008) and Cormier et al. (2009). The 
use of specific Internet features that cannot be replicated by a printed report, was 
scored as ‘2’; for example, an archived webcast of a conference call for results 
announcements. Posting only the press announcement was scored ‘1’, and the 
absence of any information regarding the earnings announcement was scored as zero. 
There were no Likert-scale items. The checklist was programmed in LimeSurvey to 
enhance the quality of the data collection. The dichotomous coding, the absence of 
Likert-scale ‘opinion’ items and use of LimeSurvey enhanced the internal validity of the 
checklist.  
1.6.3.4 Variables and analyses 
A disclosure score was calculated from the checklist of best practices in online IR. This 
satisfied the first primary objective of the study, namely to determine the quality of 
online IR practices. Various descriptive statistics are presented in Chapters 6 and 7 to 
highlight the different practices and characteristics of the sample of JSE-listed 
companies. The disclosure score became the dependent variable in the second part 
of the study. 
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To satisfy the second primary objective, a regression model was developed in which 
the independent variables were company characteristics, for example market 
capitalisation and profitability, that prior literature indicated might have a bearing on a 
company’s disclosure score. Information on company variables was obtained from 
INETBFA and Bureau van Dijk. Data patterns were analysed to ensure compliance 
with the requirements for ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Continuous data 
were transformed to improve normality of the variables’ distribution. The Breusch-
Pagan test for heteroscedasticity of the residuals indicated that the null hypothesis of 
constant variance of the residuals could be accepted. Collinearity was not an issue as 
the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for the independent variables were all below 2.5. 
Finally, scatterplots of the standardized residuals plotted against the standardized 
predicted values visually confirmed that there were no further observable relationships 
between the variables in the regression model. The output of the regression analyses 
were used in particular to test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
the two proxies, shareholder stability and online IR quality. Additional robustness tests 
were performed. These results are presented in Chapter 7. 
1.7. Ethical clearance 
The ethical risk of this project was very low. The primary data (the disclosure score) 
were compiled from publicly available information on companies’ websites. The 
secondary data were obtained from a reputable public database. Nevertheless, ethical 
approval was obtained from the College of Accounting Sciences’ Research Ethics 
Review Committee. Approval for the study was granted under number 2014/CAS/0007 
(see Appendix A for the Certificate). 
1.8. Contribution 
1.8.1. Contribution to the theory and literature 
The study contributes to new knowledge in the growing area of research into the 
influence of investors’ investment horizons on companies’ behaviour. An association 
between investors’ investment horizons and other areas of company behaviour (R&D, 
takeovers, investment in certain assets, and investment in shorter-term projects) has 
been found by prior studies. However, this is the first study that investigated the 
association between long-horizon investors and companies’ voluntary disclosure 
behaviour, as measured by their online IR practices. Bushee and Noe (2000) argue 
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that dedicated long-horizon investors are neutral to information quality, due to private 
channel access. However, their findings apply to the pre-Reg FD period, when it was 
common practice for institutional shareholders to be given private access to investee 
management, and there were delays in value-relevant information’s filtering through to 
retail or private investors. I assumed that private value-relevant disclosures are not 
permitted in the post-Reg FD period. This assumption also applies to the South African 
context, where measures similar to that of Reg FD are in place in the strict regulatory 
environment of the JSE (this assumption is corroborated by consistently high WEF 
rankings for the operation of the JSE equity market, reporting standards, the protection 
of minority shareholders, and corporate governance). I therefore argue that long-
horizon investors in South Africa are content with a low(er) quality disclosure 
environment from investee companies because of their familiarity with the investee 
company over time. Furthermore, long-horizon investors may want to protect their own 
superior information-gathering and processing capabilities (if all investors and potential 
investors had access to the same detailed, high-quality information provided by the 
investee management, the long-horizon investors would have to work much harder for 
arbitrage opportunities, based on their incremental knowledge of the investee). 
Managers of investee companies in South Africa cater to the low(er) demand by their 
long-horizon investors for extensive voluntary information.  
 
The present study extends the theory on voluntary disclosure by arguing against the 
adage that more public information is always better for all investors. This is not 
necessarily true in all instances. The investment horizons of the investor also have a 
role to play.  
 
From a cost-benefit perspective, familiarity of the long-horizon investors could support 
financial directors’ decision to resist demands for increasing public disclosure, as the 
cost (the gathering cost as well as the proprietary cost) may be greater than the 
benefits from lower cost of equity, or from improved liquidity of the shares. However, 
each company should negotiate its voluntary disclosure policy (frequency and extent 
of disclosures) with its own or potential institutional and block shareholders, based on 
their investment horizon. 
 
Secondly, in an environment with a dearth of information on institutional investors’ 
holdings and portfolio turnover, I propose a proxy for long-horizon investment in the 
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form of the average stability measure of the present model. This measure is based on 
the inverse of the average long-run share turnover ratio, so it can easily be employed 
by other researchers in emerging and developing countries who lack access to 
institutional investor investment patterns. 
 
Thirdly, the study adds to the general literature on voluntary disclosure (online or not) 
and the extent to which companies practise it, and empirical evidence on factors driving 
disclosure behaviour. 
 
Lastly, this is the first study to cover mid-tier and small companies of the JSE in a study 
on disclosure behaviour. This highlights important differences between the top 100 and 
the rest. If the study is accepted for publication, it will also be the first published 
regression model on factors associated with the voluntary online disclosure behaviour 
of South African companies.  
1.8.2. Contribution to practice 
According to Moizer (2009:286), the utilitarian view of accounting research is that its 
objective should be to produce something of value to society. I subscribe to this view. 
Hence, I intend to publish the results in practitioner journals as well so that others can 
find value in it. In 2015, the IR professionals in South Africa formed a non-profit 
company, the Investor Relations Society of South Africa. Results from the present 
study will be brought to their attention in the hope that it can improve IR practices in 
South Africa.  
 
Regarding the capabilities of the Internet as a facilitator of meaningful communication 
between companies and their stakeholders, Unerman and Bennett (2004:704) call on 
academics to play a role “in spreading the use, effectiveness and impact of this 
potentially important new technology through more widespread and deeper research”.  
 
The findings from the content analysis parts of this study can assist in improving online 
IR in the following ways: 
 Financial managers would benefit from a better understanding of what information 
investors want from them in order to make investment decisions. 
 Developers of corporate websites could ensure that they harness all the capabilities 
of the Internet, hardware and software technologies in order to facilitate the 
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assimilation of information in the most effective and efficient way for investors, and 
at the same time, in a cost-effective manner for companies, the preparers. 
 IR practitioners would gain a better understanding of what information should be 
provided and in what electronic format on the IR web pages of their companies’ 
websites. 
 Other stakeholders, such as labour unions, communities, and environmental 
groups, will be able to source the same information as that available to those who 
provide capital, which will level the playing field for them from a political and social 
perspective. 
 Academics involved in training accountants and future financial managers could 
benefit from a renewed awareness of what the value drivers for business entities 
are and how accountants can play a role in leveraging the maximum value from it. 
1.9. Limitations 
The main limitation of the study is the fact that websites, by their nature, change 
continually. It is therefore not possible to verify the results after the fact. However, this 
applies equally to all the prior studies discussed in the literature review. The exception 
is the study by Abdelsalam et al. (2007), who saved the websites used with an Internet 
Explorer functionality that is no longer available. 
 
Secondly, the focus is only a selection of listed South African companies. Although the 
sample covers the bulk of the market capitalisation of the JSE, it does not include all 
listed companies. The results can therefore not be extrapolated to all listed companies.  
 
Thirdly, the study is only cross-sectional at a point in time. It serves as an indication of 
differences between companies and factors that might explain these differences. A 
repeat study could provide further evidence. 
 
Fourthly, I assume that during private meetings between JSE-listed companies and 
their institutional investors, no value relevant information is divulged which is not 
already available publicly. This seems reasonable, given the high rating given to South 
Africa for the protection of its minority shareholders (WEF, 2012). It is unlikely that 
‘leaking’ value relevant information to specific long-horizon institutional investors would 
be a wide-spread practice among all JSE-listed companies. 
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Lastly, the study is limited to the dissemination of information on companies’ websites. 
It therefore excludes other forms of information communication such as printed annual 
reports, printed press releases, or conference calls. However, the argument of the 
study is that a good IR website serves as a central repository of these communications, 
and in fact, the checklist included checking for the presence on the website of these 
sources of information. 
1.10. Outline of the study 
The remainder the thesis consists of the following chapters: 
 
Chapter 2 Chapter 2 describes the most prominent motivations for companies 
to disclose information voluntarily. These are economic benefits, 
societal acceptance, institutional pressure, investor recognition, 
and investor clientele. The chapter also describes various studies 
on investors’ information needs. The chapter considers barriers to 
fuller disclosure from the companies’ perspective. 
 
Chapter 3 Chapter 3 provides an historical overview of reporting practices, 
from hardcopy annual financial statements to company webpages 
with hyperlinked text and visual displays. Three models are 
presented to explain the adoption phases of Internet financial 
communications. The role of the IR department is described, as well 
as the benefits of a good IR programme. This chapter concludes 
with an overview of prior research on IR practices in South Africa.  
 
Chapter 4 Chapter 4 introduces the long-horizon motivation for shareholder 
familiarity of JSE investors. The chapter starts by describing the 
unique characteristics of the JSE and highlights the low turnover of 
shares, implying that investors are invested in shares for longer 
horizons. It then compares the regulations regarding private 
disclosure in the US to those of the JSE. A summary of prior 
literature on factors associated with online IR quality is presented. 
In the last part of the chapter, the shareholder familiarity hypothesis 
is developed as a distinctive factor associated with voluntary 
 Chapter 1 – Introduction 17 
disclosure quality. The choice of control variables is explained on 
the basis of the prior literature. The chapter concludes with the 
regression model. 
 
Chapter 5 The methodology used in performing the content analyses and 
hypothesis testing for this study is set out, and the choice is 
explained in Chapter 5. The chapter also contains detailed 
descriptions of the sampling, the development of the measurement 
instrument, of how the content analyses were performed, and the 
resulting scoring to obtain the disclosure score. Details are also 
provided on how the information was obtained for the other 
independent variables in the regression model and the steps 
performed to ensure normality of the variables. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of how validity and reliability of the 
research process were embedded in the process, as well as the 
inherent limitations of the methodology and the data obtained. 
 
Chapter 6 Chapter 6 presents the results from the content analysis and its 
descriptive analyses. Disclosure scores of the Top 100 companies 
are compared to the rest of the sample. The overall disclosure 
score for JSE-listed companies is compared to the scores obtained 
in studies in other economic domains. Then the average disclosure 
scores for the 11 main categories of the checklist are described. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the top five (highest 
disclosure scores) and bottom five (lowest disclosure scores) 
checklist items in each main category. Following on from analyses 
of the use of technology features on the webpages of the sample 
companies, a conclusion is reached regarding the stage of 
development of online IR in South Africa. 
 
Chapter 7 Results from the regression model and hypothesis testing are 
presented in Chapter 7. Descriptive and univariate statistics, 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and the regression outputs are 
discussed. Conclusions are reached regarding the shareholder 
familiarity hypothesis. Practical significance is discussed for all the 
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significant variables in the model. Lastly, robustness tests are 
discussed. 
 
Chapter 8 The summary, conclusions, and recommendations for further study 
are presented in Chapter 8.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
2.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this study is intended to contribute to the voluntary 
disclosure theory in various capital and institutional settings. I therefore start with a 
broad discussion of the seminal works in the field of voluntary disclosure that theorise 
on companies’ motivations for engaging in additional voluntary disclosure. The theories 
suggested so far include economic motives (achieving direct benefits for the company), 
societal motives (gaining acceptance from society), institutional isomorphism (being 
influenced by what others are doing, being forced by regulations, or being subject to 
the demands of professional standards). I also discuss two further theories, namely 
investor recognition and investor clientele. These theories explain why companies 
behave in a certain manner in order to attract a certain kind of investor, which in turn 
results in economic benefits for the company or its shareholders. Empirical evidence 
from prior research in support of these theories is also discussed.  
 
The section thereafter deals with the types of information that investors and 
stakeholders demand. The focus is on voluntary disclosure. The chapter concludes 
with the counterarguments from preparers of such information as to why management 
may prefer to be less forthcoming with fuller disclosure. These reasons revolve around 
the issues of the cost of data gathering, the protection of proprietary information and 
fear of litigation, for example, if users’ expectations based on forward-looking guidance 
in respect of future earnings are not met. 
 
The next section starts with the theoretical background on why management may 
choose to disclose additional information voluntarily. 
2.2. Theoretical motivations 
Each JSE-listed company’s audited annual financial statement (AFS) must be 
prepared on the basis of the requirements of International Financial Reporting 
 Chapter 2 – Voluntary disclosure 20 
Standards (IFRS) in terms of Section 8.3 of the JSE Listings Requirements1 (JSE, 
2011a). The AFS is submitted by its board of directors for approval to the shareholders 
of the company at the annual general meeting. The AFS primarily deals with historical 
facts. It reports on how management has discharged its fiduciary duties in respect of 
shareholders’ assets during the past financial year. Chapter 1 (Paragraph 1.6) of the 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB, 2015) acknowledges that users of general-purpose financial 
reports may need to source additional information in order to make economic decisions 
regarding their investment or potential investment in a given company’s shares. 
Companies may thus choose to make available this additional information. Various 
theories have been proposed to explain why companies (via the board of directors) 
may want to provide additional voluntary disclosure. These theories are discussed in 
more detail below. 
2.2.1. Economic motives 
Several theories regarding economic motives for increased disclosures have been 
developed in the economics field. These theories propose that management would opt 
to disclose more information voluntarily for two main reasons. The first is to increase 
demand for the company’s shares, leading to an increase in the share’s price and 
liquidity (tradability). The second is to reduce the return required by providers of capital 
(cost of capital). The most influential studies on these theories are described below. 
 
Modern large listed companies operate in a context where ownership is widely 
dispersed and separated from control. Since the shareholders of a large listed 
company are not involved in the day-to-day management of the company, they also 
lack detailed knowledge of the company's operations, strategies, markets and 
finances. This gives rise to information asymmetry, which refers to the situation where 
one party in a transaction or relationship has access to more or better information than 
the other party, for example, in selling goods or employing people. In the case of a 
company, there are two forms of information asymmetry. The first form arises between 
different investors in the company, for example, when existing shareholders want to 
                                             
1 I refer to the 2011 version (Service Issue 14, effective 1 May 2011) because it specifies the disclosure 
regulation at the time of primary data gathering. I have confirmed that everything I refer to in the 2011 
version of the JSE Listings Requirements (Service Issue 14) in this document is also included in the 
current version, Service Issue 23, effective 24 October 2016 (JSE, 2016) 
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sell their shareholding because they are aware of certain adverse trading conditions, 
but potential buyers of this shareholding are not aware of these conditions. A second 
form of information asymmetry occurs between the owners of a company 
(shareholders) and its managers (the board of directors and other managers). 
 
Fama and Laffer (1971) considered the cost/benefits of producing information for the 
company itself, its shareholders and outsiders, depending on whether the company 
produces the information, or an outsider produces the information about the company. 
They identified three benefits from information: “(i) reduction of risk, (ii) improved 
operating decisions by the firm, and (iii) investor trading profits as a result of private 
access to new information” (Fama & Laffer, 1971:290). Regarding the production of 
information for investors’ trading purposes, they concluded that the optimal situation is 
that a company produces information about itself, rather than one where shareholders 
buy the information from outside information producers. However, when securities laws 
prohibit companies from selling information about themselves, and from making 
selective disclosure to investors or other outsiders, the incentive for companies to 
generate information for trading purposes (by investors) is removed (Fama & Laffer, 
1971).  
 
Hirshleifer (1971) investigated the production and distribution of information regarding 
research and innovation from a societal economic benefit perspective. He concluded 
that private technological information (such as new discoveries and designs) that 
remains private has no social value as production processes do not benefit from new 
technology. By contrast, public information has the potential to alter production 
decisions and thereby increase social economic welfare (Hirshleifer, 1971). Marshall 
(1974) examined scenarios where there is information asymmetry between investors 
themselves. He concluded that public information is valuable as long as it can be 
produced more efficiently by the company than by the combined effort of each 
investor’s own private information production (Marshall, 1974). Public information 
about a company can be provided by its management, or other intermediaries, such 
as analysts and the financial media. Marshall (1974) also noted the importance of the 
timing of the release of public information. If his caution in this regard is applied today, 
the benefit of a corporate website is clear, as it makes it possible to disseminate value-
relevant information to all market participants simultaneously as soon as it is available 
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and the company wants to release the information, thereby reducing opportunities for 
arbitrage based on privileged information.  
 
Akerlof (1970) has shown how information asymmetry in the form of uncertainty 
regarding quality can lead to ‘adverse selection’ in the second-hand car market. 
Adverse selection implies that an under-informed buyer would only be willing to pay a 
lower average price for a product or service in an attempt to minimise potential future 
losses (in case the product/service turns out to be of low quality). The seller (who has 
better information on the dubious quality of the product/service) would be prepared to 
accept a lower price, as long as it is higher than the price that would be obtained if the 
buyer had all the information (Akerlof, 1970). He also argues that information 
asymmetry works against a seller of a good quality product/service. If a buyer does not 
have all the information, he/she will offer a lower price, and the seller will not achieve 
the optimum price for the good quality product/service (Akerlof, 1970). In general, 
Akerlof (1970) also found that the number of market participants declines when 
information about quality is uncertain or scarce, which in turn implies that a seller may 
have to accept a lower price in conditions of illiquidity or in an inactive market.  
 
The discount on the optimal price (which could have been achieved between two fully 
informed participants) is referred to as the cost of information asymmetry. If Akerlof’s 
(1970) theory of adverse selection is applied to company shares, it would imply that 
the management of a company would want to disclose more information to the capital 
market to indicate the good quality of the company and its management. Management 
would then expect the share price to increase (once the full potential of the future cash 
flows is known) because more market participants would want to buy the share, and 
sellers would ask higher prices. More market participants would also realise a 
secondary beneficial effect on the share price, as increased market liquidity results in 
a reduction of the illiquidity discount.  
 
Spence (1973) added to Akerlof’s (1970) work by examining information asymmetry in 
the job market. Job applicants can signal their quality to prospective employers by 
incurring, for instance, further educational costs. In their turn, potential employers use 
screening criteria based on their inside knowledge to select candidates. If the analogy 
is extended to capital markets, the better-informed party (management) could incur 
‘signalling costs’ by voluntarily communicating more information to under-informed 
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parties (current and potential shareholders, and debt providers). Examples of these 
signalling costs include paying a dividend (signalling confidence about the future cash 
flow generation capability of the company), employing a Big 4-audit firm (signalling 
high quality reporting mechanisms), or holding investor days to communicate with 
investors and analysts, or investing in a good IR website and annual report (signalling 
transparency). The signalling increases the confidence of buyers in the quality of the 
company and its management, and thereby increases the value of the share (Spence, 
1973).  
 
Brown and Hillegeist (2007) investigated the scenario where there is informed traders, 
having private information about the company’s value, and uninformed traders that 
only have access to information disclosed publicly by the company. They argue that 
disclosure quality can affect information asymmetry in two ways: one, by reducing the 
incentive for the privately informed investor to trade, and two, by reducing the amount 
of undisclosed information, thereby reducing the likelihood that investors discover and 
trade on private information. Brown and Hillegeist (2007) find a negative relation 
between the quality of disclosure and the level of information asymmetry. The 
reduction in information asymmetry is mostly through the channel of a reduction in the 
incentives to search for private information when information quality is high. 
 
Another major branch of theory relates to the agency relationship between the 
shareholders and the managers of a company. Shareholders (the principals) appoint 
managers as their agents to manage the company on their behalf. In such an agency 
relationship, the shareholders have to face the risk that the management (agents) may 
not act in the best interest of the shareholders, but in their own self-interest (moral 
hazard). The owners of the equity carry the risk of financial loss, whilst the managers 
control the assets through their decision-making power. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
propose that the principals incur agency costs (the cost of monitoring and providing 
incentives to management) in order to increase the likelihood that the agents act in the 
best interest of the principals. Agents, from their side, may also accept bonding costs, 
such as limitations imposed on their powers (for example, the need for shareholder 
approval to dispose of a major part of the assets).  
 
Another form of agency cost is the loss in welfare for the shareholders, because, in 
practice, agents can never fully achieve optimum value for the principals. Jensen and 
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Meckling (1976) refer to this as residual loss. To limit such residual loss, shareholders 
incur auditing costs to monitor management’s fiduciary actions, offer incentives by 
entering into performance contracts with management, where bonuses are linked to 
share prices, and put governance structures in place to ratify and monitor the agents’ 
decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Voluntary disclosure to 
the capital markets can therefore be a strategy adopted by management (the agents) 
to indicate to the principals that management can be trusted to take the right actions 
and that goal congruency is being achieved. Manager-owners benefit personally from 
any resulting increase in the share’s market value arising from an increase in 
disclosure. 
 
Various economic (mathematical) models have been developed, based on the theories 
described above, to illustrate how voluntary disclosure (public information) leads to 
benefits for companies through reduced cost of capital, improved investment decisions 
and increased share prices and liquidity (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Lambert, Leuz 
& Verrecchia, 2007, 2012; Gao, 2010; Einhorn & Ziv, 2012; Cheynel, 2013; Wen, 2013; 
Chen, Huang & Zhang, 2014; Clinch & Verrecchia, 2015; Lambert & Verreccia, 2015). 
These models and theories regarding voluntary disclosure benefits have also been 
empirically confirmed in various market settings (Yeo & Ziebart, 1995; Botosan, 1997; 
Sengupta, 1998; Frankel, Johnson & Skinner, 1999; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; 
Petersen & Plenborg, 2006; Abdo & Fisher, 2007; Legoria, Boone & Stammerjohan, 
2008; Chang et al., 2008; Chen, Hope, Li & Wang, 2011; Bushee & Miller, 2012; Saxton 
& Anker, 2013; Chi, Dhaliwal, Li & Lin, 2013; Green, Jame, Markov & Subasi, 2014; 
Alves, Canadas & Rodrigues, 2015; Song, 2015; Ding & Hou, 2015; McCormick & 
French, 2016). 
 
In summary, the above studies report that a share’s price can be increased (or cost of 
capital can be reduced) directly, by reducing information asymmetry for investors by 
disclosing more voluntary forward-looking information regarding future cash flows, 
opportunities and risks. However, Bond, Edmans and Goldstein (2012) warn that price 
efficiency is not only about accurately predicting future cash flows, which they call 
forecasting price efficiency, and that prices in the secondary market (trading between 
investors) also contain information gathered (discovered) by market participants, which 
they call revelatory price efficiency. Forecasting price efficiency depends on 
information provided by management. Revelatory price efficiency is created by 
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investors that trade in the share. It is therefore also important to consider what 
information is changing a share’s price – is the change due to information provided by 
management or due to investors trading into or out of a share based on their self-
discovered information.  
 
Management also have non-financial or societal motivations for voluntary disclosures. 
This is covered in the following section. 
2.2.2. Societal motives 
Apart from purely economic or financial reasons for voluntary disclosure, companies 
also have other motivations for voluntary disclosure of non-financial information. The 
days when companies were only accountable for their financial performance to their 
shareholders and financial institutions are long gone. Climate change, carbon 
emissions, bio-diversity, human trafficking, poor corporate governance and income 
inequality have become important issues to people the world over. Communities, 
employees, and even activist shareholders (Uysal, 2014) now hold companies 
accountable for their impact on the environment, local communities, employees, etc. 
Maximising shareholder wealth to the exclusion of all other stakeholders is no longer 
acceptable.  
 
Legitimacy theory endeavours to explain why companies would voluntarily engage in, 
and disclose information about, their corporate social responsibility activities and the 
impact of their business operations on the environment, society and their employees. 
Companies want to be seen to be socially responsible and as operating in a 
sustainable manner. In disclosing information relating to their corporate social 
responsibilities, companies try to demonstrate that their actions are “desirable, proper 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995). DiMaggio and Powell (1983:155) argue that one reason 
for organisations to follow or mimic the practices of other successful organisations is 
that their own goals are ambiguous or disputed, and they are therefore “highly 
dependent upon appearances for legitimacy. Such organisations may find it to their 
advantage to meet the expectations of important constituencies about how they should 
be designed and run”. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) contend that in order for companies 
to survive, they have to enter into a contract with society where companies perform 
certain actions in order to win the approval of society for their continued existence and 
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main business activities. The principals in the agency relationship, previously defined 
in the section above on economic motives as the shareholders, are now extended to 
include society and the natural environment.  
 
Wheeler and Sillanpaa (1997) define four clusters of corporate stakeholders. Primary 
social stakeholders have direct financial dealings with the company, for example, 
shareholders, employees, customers, and suppliers. The secondary social 
stakeholders are financially indirectly affected by what the company does, for example, 
governments, trade bodies, and competitors. Primary non-social stakeholders are 
affected directly in a non-financial way by what companies do – for example, pumping 
out toxic gas into the air affects the natural environment, humans and non-human 
species, as well as future generations, reducing bio-diversity. The secondary non-
social stakeholders, such as environmental pressure groups and animal welfare 
organisations, may act on behalf of primary non-social stakeholders that do not have 
a voice of their own.  
 
Slack resource theory proposes that companies that are financially strong and that 
perform well have the slack financial resources to invest in social and environmental 
programmes (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Melo, 2012). These companies then 
communicate to the public about their social and environmental programmes. 
 
The concept of non-financial stakeholders is embedded in South African business by 
the codes on corporate governance developed by the King Committee, commissioned 
by the Institute of Directors (IoD) in July 1993. The King II Report (IoD, 2002:98) 
acknowledges the concept that stakeholders have a direct bearing on on-going 
corporate viability and financial performance, and requires specific reporting on 
sustainability. Environmental, social and governance (ESG)2 reporting requirements 
have now been included in integrated reporting. The King III Code (IoD, 2009)3 requires 
an integrated report to be produced for all financial years beginning on or after 1 March 
2010 on an apply-or-explain basis, and indicates that the Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2011, 2013) should be used. Since 
                                             
2 Many authors and companies refer to corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting. The terms ESG 
and CSR are used interchangeably in this document. 
3 King IV was launched on 1 November 2016. The 75 principles of King III have been condensed to 16 
in King IV, with a 17th principle that applies to institutional investors. King IV is effective in respect of 
financial years commencing on or after 1 April 2017. King IV replaces King III in its entirety. 
 Chapter 2 – Voluntary disclosure 27 
2010, Section 8.63 of the JSE Listings Requirements have also made an integrated 
report mandatory (JSE, 2010). 
 
Studies in countries where ESG or integrated reporting is not mandatory have found 
that, in addition to the legitimising effects discussed above, such disclosure also has 
capital market benefits for companies that voluntarily engage in this type of disclosure 
(Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang & Yang, 2012; Cho, Lee & Pfeiffer, 2013; Elliott, 
Jackson, Peecher & White, 2014; Jiraporn, Boeprasert & Chang, 2014; De Villiers & 
Marques, 2015; De Klerk, De Villiers & Van Staden, 2015; Lys, Naughton & Wang, 
2015; Zahller, Arnold & Roberts, 2015; Nollet, Filis & Mitrokostas, 2016). Initial 
research on JSE-listed companies reported value-relevance in such disclosure (Abdo 
& Fisher, 2007; De Klerk & De Villiers, 2012). However, a later study by Marcia, Maroun 
and Callaghan (2015) found no significant association between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure and JSE share prices, apart from the finding that larger 
companies disclose more. Research in this area is still in its initial stages and further 
studies should provide more clarity. 
 
In summary, companies’ desire for legitimisation by society and the demands of non-
financial stakeholders have resulted in the expansion of voluntary disclosure to include 
ESG and CSR aspects. As described above, ESG/CSR disclosures appear to result in 
some economic benefits for companies.  
 
Sometimes management also engages in voluntary disclosure to conform with what 
other companies are doing. I address institutional behaviour as a motive for voluntary 
disclosure next. 
2.2.3. Institutional isomorphism 
The definition of the adjective isomorphic is “[c]orresponding or similar in form and 
relations” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2016). In a seminal study of organisational 
behaviour, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) observe that institutions such as companies 
tend to behave more like one another over time. They have identified three institutional 
isomorphic processes: coercive, mimetic and normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
These are discussed below. 
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DiMaggio and Powell (1983:150) describe coercive isomorphism as resulting from 
“formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon 
which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which 
organizations function”. This can be observed when companies comply with new 
legislation, in other words, the requirement to produce an integrated report (IoD, 2009) 
and by complying with stakeholder demands for information.  
 
The mimetic form of isomorphism occurs in the absence of regulation or clear 
guidelines (uncertainty about what is expected). If their own goals are ambiguous or 
disputed and they seek legitimacy, companies tend to mimic the behaviour or practices 
of other companies that are seen as successful leaders (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983:151). This view of why companies behave as other leading companies do is 
closely linked to the legitimacy theory of voluntary disclosure discussed in Section 
2.2.2 Societal motives.  
 
The normative force for isomorphic change in companies relates to the extent to which 
their personnel are members of professional bodies, for example, chartered 
accountants. The output produced by these employees will look similar to that of other 
companies that employ the same type of employees, because of professional 
standards regarding such work (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983:152). CSR reports and other 
voluntary disclosures are usually prepared by people with the same type of training, 
such as IR officers or public relations officers.  
 
De Villiers, Low and Samkin (2014) found that the CSR reports of smaller mining 
companies in South Africa contain the same type of information, and are presented in 
the same formats as the reports of the larger companies. They attribute this finding to 
normative isomorphism due to mature practices of CSR reporting in the mining industry 
in South Africa (De Villiers et al., 2014). De Villiers and Alexander (2014) came to a 
similar conclusion when they compared and found the CSR reports of South African 
and Australian mining companies contained most of the same categories of 
information, although individual companies provided specifics that pertains to their 
context.  
 
CSR/ESG reporting is guided by the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI, 2011, 
2013), but no similar detailed guidelines are available for other kinds of non-ESG 
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voluntary disclosure. Although the King Code (IoD, 2009) and the International <IR> 
Framework developed by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC, 2013) 
include guidelines for non-ESG voluntary disclosure in the integrated report (strategy, 
business risks, forward looking information), the guidance is not as detailed as the GRI 
guidelines for sustainability/ESG reporting. Companies still have discretion in terms of 
what and how much detail they want to disclose aside from ESG matters. For evidence 
on progress made regarding integrated reporting, I refer to Ernst and Young who 
conduct annual reviews of the integrated reports of the 100 largest companies on the 
JSE. Ernst and Young report that the number of companies in the category “Average” 
and “Progress to be made” has declined from 44 for 2011’s integrated reports, to 39 
for 2015’s integrated reports, despite the assessment criteria becoming more stringent 
over time as more guidance and examples of good integrated reporting become 
available (Ernst & Young, 2016:13). I therefore conclude that institutional isomorphism 
is also a factor in the improvement of JSE-listed companies’ integrated reports over 
time. 
 
Considering the role that institutional isomorphism plays in the improvement of CSR 
and integrated reporting by JSE-listed companies, it is reasonable to assume that it 
also plays a role in online communication practices. Analysis of voluntary disclosure 
using company websites as a channel, is the first primary research objective of this 
study. This also affords me the opportunity to consider which type of institutional 
isomorphism is present for non-ESG voluntary disclosures of JSE-listed companies. I 
discuss prior research in this area in Section 3.7.3 Disclosure on South African 
corporate websites.  
 
Next, I present two further theories on why management engages in voluntary 
disclosure, namely investor recognition and investor clienteles. 
2.2.4. Investor recognition 
A different avenue of theory investigates the effect of disclosure on the number of 
shareholders invested in the company, which indirectly affects the company’s cost of 
capital and share price. A seminal study in this area is that by Merton (1987). Merton 
argues that investors in an incomplete information environment only invest in a limited 
number of shares. Investors incur information-processing costs, which limit them to 
investing only in a subset of possible shares as it is impossible to research all possible 
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shares. Furthermore, information-processing costs are lower for current investors than 
for new investors. Merton’s assumption about incomplete information in the investor 
base is known as the Investor Recognition Hypothesis. Merton (1987:488) argues, “an 
investor uses security k in constructing his optimal portfolio only if the investor knows 
about security k”. Security ‘k’ is the shares of a company that comes to the attention of 
an investor. Because the investors are only invested in a limited number of shares, 
they are under-diversified and carry some idiosyncratic risks for which they should be 
compensated through an increased estimated return. Merton deems this premium the 
shadow cost of incomplete information, which consists of three components: 
idiosyncratic return volatility, relative market size, and the breadth of the shareholder 
base. Merton (1987:495) proves through a mathematical model that expected returns 
(cost of equity) “tend to be lower on better-known firms with relatively larger investor 
bases.”  
 
Management who wants to reduce their companies’ cost of equity therefore has an 
incentive to expand the investor base by expending resources on public relations 
activities. Merton’s model indicates that this incentive is especially effective for smaller 
and less well-known companies (Merton, 1987:500). He proposes that there is 
economic value in increasing the visibility of the company “in the investment community 
[even] without providing new and meaningful information for investor evaluation of the 
firm” (Merton, 1987:501). However, Merton (1987:504) cautions that 
 spending on public relations and IR activities can create and sustain what he calls 
“speculative bubbles”;  
 spending on marketing the company will not change the investor base “if the 
underlying fundamentals do not justify a change”; and 
 as with advertising, management may frame information to its advantage by 
selecting the form and medium through which the information is communicated. 
 
Following on from Merton’s investor recognition hypothesis of investing in shares 
known to the investor, is several other studies. Huberman (2001) compared the 
subscribers of seven regional fixed line telephone operators in the US with the 
shareholder database of those companies. All seven were listed and therefore 
available to a broader investor community. Shareholders of a given telephone 
company tended to live in the area served by that company (Huberman, 2001:670). 
Furthermore, account holders tended to hold more shares in the regional telephone 
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company than in any of the other six telephone companies (Huberman, 2001:672). 
Huberman (2001:678) observes:  
A person is more likely to invest with a company he knows (or thinks he knows). 
At the extreme, this will lead people to shy away from foreign stocks and to 
concentrate their portfolios on stocks they know – for instance, their own 
company’s stock, stocks of firms that are visible in the investors’ lives, and stocks 
that are discussed favorably in the media. 
 
This familiarity bias was modelled in an international setting by Cao, Han, Hirshleifer 
and Zhang (2011). Their model is based on stock exchanges in two countries, each 
populated by both rational and familiarity-biased investors. Investors start with a known 
portfolio to which they then compare new options. These authors argue that from a 
psychological perspective investors view the outcomes from investing in new shares 
with greater pessimism than they anticipate from staying invested in their current 
portfolio. When uncertainty in respect of diversifying the portfolio is very high or very 
low, familiarity bias does not play a role in the equilibrium price. However, when there 
is moderate uncertainty, share prices reflect an unfamiliarity premium in equilibrium 
(Cao et al., 2011:175). 
 
Other researchers have gathered empirical data to test various components of 
Merton’s (1987) shadow cost of incomplete information. Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) 
tested Merton’s (1987) theory in a unique setting: they had access to the identities of 
direct and ultimate owners of shares comprising 98% of shareholders of listed public 
companies in Sweden (Bodnaruk & Ostberg, 2009:211). Knowing who the 
shareholders were was a unique research advantage, as other researchers reported 
missing or opaque shareholder identity information in the shareholder databases most 
commonly used: 
 Gompers and Metrick (2001:236) reported that the CDA/Spectrum database4 of 
13F forms filed by US institutional shareholders who hold more than $100 million 
under management (individual holdings greater than $200 000 or 10 000 shares) 
only contains information on about 50% of market capitalisation.  
 Dyl and Elliott (2006:2057) note that Compustat gathers the number of 
shareholders from a company’s 10-K filing, which only needs to be an approximate 
number.  
                                             
4 South African researchers do not have access to a central database of institutional shareholders’ 
detailed holdings and trading in JSE-listed companies. 
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 Furthermore, Compustat only contains the name of an intermediary (e.g. broker) 
and not the name of the ultimate owner. 
Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) found that the shadow cost of incomplete information is 
positively related to returns. Companies with low levels of investor recognition tend to 
offer larger returns than highly visible companies. Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009:225) 
concur with the Investor Recognition Hypothesis that the size of the shareholder base 
influences the cost of capital by adding a premium for incomplete information on less 
well-known shares with a smaller number of shareholders. 
 
A more recent study by Chichernea, Ferguson and Kassa (2015) analysed the 
interaction between the breadth of the investor base and the pricing of idiosyncratic 
return volatility estimates of the cross-section of shares traded on US exchanges from 
July 1963 to December 2012. They used breadth of institutional ownership, the number 
of analysts covering the company and the number of shareholders as a proxy for 
visibility. Chichernea et al. (2015:287) reported that the coefficient on the idiosyncratic 
volatility variable is 2.608, 1.476 and 1.459 higher for neglected shares than for highly 
visible shares for each of the institutional ownership, number of analysts and number 
of shareholder measures of the investor base respectively (significant at a one per cent 
level). They concluded that idiosyncratic volatility risk premia are larger for neglected 
shares, while for shares that are more visible, they are smaller and even economically 
insignificant (Chichernea et al., 2015:290). 
 
Further studies investigated whether increasing investor visibility (reducing the shadow 
cost of incomplete information) results in a reduction of the required return. These 
studies can broadly be grouped according to the method used to increase investor 
visibility/recognition, namely cross-listing on a major stock exchange (or inclusion in a 
benchmark index, or offering further equity issues), increasing advertising and 
marketing of the company’s products, and engaging in an IR programme. Each of 
these is discussed in more detail below.  
2.2.4.1 Cross-listings, benchmark indices and seasoned equity offerings 
Fanto and Karmel (1997) surveyed foreign companies that cross-listed during 1995/6 
on a US exchange on the reasons for cross-listing and the obstacles that the 
companies encountered. Of the companies surveyed, 11 per cent (Fanto & Karmel, 
1997:63) reported that expansion of their investor base was one of the main reasons 
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for the decision to cross-list. Another empirical study by Foerster and Karolyi (1999) 
investigated the listing of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) by non-US companies 
from 1976 to 1992. Foerster and Karolyi (1999:1008) found that the companies earned 
cumulative abnormal returns of 19 per cent during the 12 months before the listing, 
and another 1.2 per cent during the week of the listing, but surprisingly incurred losses 
of 14 per cent in the year after the listing. The shareholder base for these companies 
increased with 28.8 per cent (median 11.1 per cent) (Foerster & Karolyi, 1999:987). 
According to Foerster and Karolyi (1999), this provides evidence that increased 
investor recognition, translated into an increased shareholder base, is a driving force 
that provides economic value through reductions in cost of capital. However, this was 
a transient effect that dissipated after the listing, as the underlying fundamentals of 
these firms did not change. Still, the decline after the listing week was ameliorated for 
firms that also had an equity issue (an indication of additional information), and not 
only a listing. These findings therefore also support Merton’s (1987) Investor 
Recognition Hypothesis. 
 
Hacibedel (2014) investigated the price effects of inclusions or exclusions from the 
MSCI Emerging Markets index from 1996 to 2008. A permanent increase in abnormal 
returns of 2.4 per cent was reported for inclusions. It is explained by the increase in 
investor recognition, proxied by increased analyst recommendations (Hacibedel, 
2014:3).  
 
Seasoned equity offerings5 provide another environment for examining investor 
recognition effects. Autore and Kovacs (2014) analysed underwritten seasoned equity 
offerings by US companies from 1983 to 2005. They argue that the underwriting costs 
are in effect a marketing cost to achieve greater investor recognition for the seasoned 
equity offering. Consistent with Merton’s (1987) Investor Recognition Hypothesis, they 
found a positive association between underwriting costs (the spread percentage), 
larger investor recognition, greater increases in company value and larger declines in 
illiquidity risk (Autore & Kovacs, 2014:216). They concluded that management can 
actively manage the investor recognition achieved (with its resulting benefits in 
required return) via a seasoned equity offering by increasing the discount for the offer 
                                             
5 Seasoned equity offerings are further equity issues to the public subsequent to the Initial Public 
Offering. 
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price (Autore & Kovacs, 2014:225) or via increased analyst following, which follows 
from the underwriters’ marketing efforts (Autore & Kovacs, 2014:228). 
 
In a related study of stock markets, Kaniel, Ozoguz and Starks (2012) investigated 
determinants of the high volume return premium6 in 41 countries. They measured 
trading volume over 70-day intervals. They defined high (low) volume trading as the 
volume of shares traded on Day 50 that ranked in the top (bottom) 20th percentile of 
the share’s own trading volume distribution during the preceding 49 days of trading. 
They then formed trading portfolios for high/low volume shares, and measured the 
returns over the next 20 trading days. Kaniel et al. (2012:278) reported that a high 
volume return premium is a pervasive phenomenon in most countries’ shares. Their 
sample included data on 221 South African companies and 63 trading intervals, 
starting on 1 January 1996 and ending on 30 June 2001 (Kaniel et al., 2012:258). The 
average high volume return for the South African shares was 1.11 per cent (significant 
at a five per cent level) versus a reference portfolio return of 0.17 per cent (Kaniel et 
al., 2012:260). After testing with various proxies for investor visibility, Kaniel et al. 
(2012:278) concluded that high volume return premium is consistent with Merton’s 
(1987) hypothesis that higher visibility amongst investors leads to higher returns. 
2.2.4.2 Advertising and media coverage 
Interestingly, advertising and marketing a company’s products and services increases 
visibility, not only with the company’s customers and clients, but also with potential 
investors. Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004) investigated whether advertising had 
capital market effects. Their sample consisted of all the companies that appear on the 
Industrial Compustat database for at least one year over the period 1993–1998 (2004: 
443). They found that companies with higher advertising spending have significantly 
larger numbers of investors, both individual and institutional (Grullon et al., 2004:448). 
Their regression analysis indicate that one standard deviation increase in advertising 
expenditure increases the number of shareholders by almost 99 per cent and the 
institutional shareholders by about 12 per cent (Grullon et al., 2004:450). They propose 
that the much greater impact on individual investors can probably be attributed to the 
familiarity phenomenon. Greater advertising expenditure reduces the information 
                                             
6 This is the “excess market-adjusted return that occurs after a stock receives a substantial positive 
volume shock” (Kaniel et al., 2012:255). 
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asymmetry (proxied by the bid-ask spread) and encourages trading activity, thereby 
increasing the company’s liquidity (Grullon et al., 2004:455, 458). 
 
Barber and Odean (2008) investigated whether individual and professional investors 
react the same way to attention-grabbing incidents. They argue that attention is a 
scarce resource and that individual investors tend to select potential buys from shares 
that come to their attention. On the other hand, when they sell, individual investors 
have a much smaller information acquisition effort, as they sell from the limited number 
of shares they already own. By contrast, professional investors routinely sell short; 
hence, professional investors seek information even when they are selling and have 
large, diversified portfolios (Barber & Odean 2008:786). Furthermore, “attention is not 
as scarce a resource for institutional investors as it is for individuals…Institutions use 
computers to narrow their search” (Barber & Odean 2008:787). These researchers 
used proxies to identify attention-grabbing incidents: a share’s abnormal daily trading 
volume; the share’s previous one-day return; and whether the firm appeared in that 
day’s Dow Jones News Service (Barber & Odean, 2008:793-795). Data were obtained 
for individual investors from 1991 to 1996 and for institutional investors from January 
1993 to March 1996. Barber and Odean (2008:789) found that professional investors 
were not as affected in their purchasing behaviour by attention-grabbing incidents as 
individual investors were. Individual investors made almost twice as many purchases 
of shares with high trading volumes (above the 95th percentile) or shares with an 
extremely low prior day return (below the 5th percentile). 
 
A more recent study by Huang and Wei (2012) analysed the association between 
advertising (their proxy for investor recognition) and expected returns for the period 
from 1975 to 2001. They reported that increasing the spending on advertising with one 
standard deviation should lower the cost of capital with 36 basis points (Huang & Wei, 
2012:286).  
 
Ding and Hou (2015) distinguish between an active measure of investor attention, 
using the Google Search Volume Index, and passive measures of investor attention, 
using the number of online news articles by Google News, and advertising expenditure. 
Their data covered the period from 2004 to 2009. All three measures of investor 
attention were significantly positively associated with the number of shareholders (Ding 
& Hou, 2015:18). The authors remark that “the Internet has become an important tool 
 Chapter 2 – Voluntary disclosure 36 
for retail investors to gather information and make investment decisions” (Ding & Hou, 
2015:19). When Ding and Hou (2015:20) regressed the bid-ask spread (their proxy for 
liquidity) on the three measures of investor attention, the Google Search Volume Index 
and the advertising expenditure coefficients were significantly negative. 
 
The study by Chichernea et al. (2015) described earlier also included advertising as a 
proxy for investor attention for the period from 1963 to 2012. They too found that lower 
levels of advertising were associated with significantly lower abnormal returns (at a 
one per cent level), in other words, higher required cost of capital (Chichernea et al., 
2015:285) and significantly higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility (at a one per cent 
level) (Chichernea et al., 2015:287). 
2.2.4.3 Investor relations activities 
The main objective of a company’s IR department (or external IR service provider) is 
to ensure effective communication of the company’s investment proposition to the 
capital market and thereby to increase the company’s visibility. As already discussed, 
voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry, and improved visibility increases 
the share price, trading volume and analyst following. Prior research into the efficacy 
of IR functions has found evidence of these benefits (Peasnell, Talib & Young, 2011; 
Bushee & Miller, 2012; Agarwal et al., 2016). The role of the IR department is therefore 
discussed in more depth in Section 3.4 Role of the Investor Relations (IR) department.  
2.2.5. Investor clientele 
A fairly recent avenue of research regarding voluntary disclosure relates to the 
sophistication and investment horizon of different types of investors. Voluntary 
disclosure was found to attract different kinds of investors, who have differing levels of 
sophistication (ability to process information) and display trading behaviour that 
indirectly affects companies’ cost of capital and liquidity in various ways.  
2.2.5.1 Investor sophistication 
Companies’ decisions regarding voluntary information disclosure should take 
cognisance of the sophistication level of different types of investors. Kalay (2015:976) 
defines disclosure clienteles as “the ability of different types of disclosure activities to 
differentially benefit investors with varying levels of sophistication”. The ability to use 
disclosed information depends on investors’ sophistication, and determines their 
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preference for certain information. He argues that sophisticated investors have more 
resources available to analyse and interpret information about their investments. Less 
sophisticated investors are less inclined to track their investments daily and to absorb 
information about those investments (Kalay, 2015:984).  
 
Kalay (2015) used a novel measure of sophistication – he based his measure on 
investors in a company’s traded options that exercise call options which are in the 
money, on the last cum div date. He attributed the proportion of call options that 
remained open on the ex div day to the presence of less sophisticated investors. Thus 
a smaller percentage of unexercised options implied that the company had more 
sophisticated investors (Kalay, 2015:984) who took advantage of profitable trading 
opportunities. The sophistication level was also ranked in quintiles with more well-
known shareholder classification schemes, namely the percentages of institutional 
ownership (all types), hedge fund ownership, and transient institutional investors (as 
defined by Bushee, 1998). Total institutional ownership does not display much 
variation with levels of sophistication, but hedge fund ownership decreases as 
sophistication levels decrease, and transient ownership increases as sophistication 
decreases (Kalay, 2015:991). 
 
Kalay (2015) then regressed the sophistication levels in a company on three variables 
for voluntary information: the number of Newswire articles after company-initiated 
news releases, the overall IR score for the company published by IR Magazine from 
2002 to 2007, and whether the company is a regular issuer of earnings forecasts 
(Kalay, 2015:985-6). Kalay (2015:994) found that more Newswire disseminations and 
higher IR scores were positively related to higher levels of less sophisticated investors. 
This is consistent with Kalay’s view that less sophisticated investors require other 
parties to digest and repackage information for them. By contrast, ongoing earnings 
forecasting companies have higher levels of sophisticated investors (Kalay, 2015:996) 
who pay attention to these forecasts and are able to interpret them.  
 
Kalay (2015) ran further sensitivity tests on smaller samples of companies that initiated 
an earnings guidance practice or terminated such a practice. Kalay (2015:1001) 
reported increases in the presence of sophisticated investors following the 
implementation of earnings guidance, and conversely, an increase in less 
sophisticated investors when ongoing earnings guidance ceased. He concluded that 
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“variation in the sophistication of firms’ investor bases has implications for the liquidity 
of firms’ shares and the ability of disclosure to reduce information asymmetry” and that 
“while managers invest resources in various types of disclosure, not all disclosure 
activities are created equal” (Kalay, 2015:1005). 
2.2.5.2 Shareholders’ investment horizon 
The effect of shareholders’ investment horizon on company behaviour has also been 
the subject of various studies. In his analysis of the failings of the American system to 
invest in industry infrastructure and research and development (R&D) during the 
1990s, Porter (1992) blames institutional investors for not holding companies’ 
management accountable for long-term performance and management’s deficient 
investment in cutting-edge technology. He ascribes this lack of oversight and the 
decline in the technological capabilities of American industrial companies to 
institutional investors’ short-term investment horizon (on average less than two years) 
(Porter, 1992:70) and on highly diversified holdings, resulting in extremely small 
shareholdings in individual companies (Porter, 1992:69). He found that many 
institutional investors, such as pension funds, held as much as 70 to 80 per cent of 
their investments in index funds in an effort to achieve performance that is at least on 
par with the market (Porter, 1992:70).  
 
By contrast, German and Japanese companies were starting to outperform American 
industrial companies. Porter (1992:70) ascribed this to the fact that German and 
Japanese owners held their shares for long periods and held large share blocks. These 
dedicated owners wanted to see the company succeed in the long term. They have 
access to internal information of the company and work closely with management 
(Porter, 1992:70). For US companies to regain competitive advantage, Porter 
(1992:76) proposed a  
…system in which managers will make investments that maximize the long-term 
value of their companies. The interests of the capital providers must be aligned 
with those of the corporations so that investors seek out high-quality information 
that fosters more appropriate investment choices.  
 
A number of Porter’s (1992) proposals for improving the American capital allocation 
system are of interest to the present study. These are the following (Porter, 1992:79-
81): 
 Chapter 2 – Voluntary disclosure 39 
 accounting rules should be modified so that earnings reflect corporate performance 
better; 
 public disclosure should be expanded to reduce the cost of assessing true corporate 
value (the kind of information that provides important measures of long-term 
corporate value); 
 the disclosure of ‘insider’ information to significant long-term owners should be 
allowed under rules that bar trading on that information; 
 long-term shareholder value should be codified as the appropriate corporate goal 
rather than the current stock price; 
 institutional investors should 
o increase the size of stakes (shareholdings); and 
o reduce turnover and transaction costs; 
 companies should 
o seek long-term owners and give them a direct voice in governance (boards); 
o link incentive compensation to competitive position; 
o shift from fragmented to integrated organisational structures; and 
o transform financial control systems into position-based control systems 
(measure market share, customer satisfaction, productivity etc.). 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is interesting to notice how prescient these 
recommendations were, especially the recommendations to account for employee 
share option schemes, to ensure management remuneration containing multi-year 
locked-in share options, to implement integrated reporting practices (including use of 
internal management information), and to use ‘balanced’ measurement tools such as 
the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Bushee (1998) refined the institutional shareholder groups used by Porter (1992) 
further, based on their investment patterns relating to portfolio turnover, diversification, 
and momentum trading. He found the following (Bushee, 1998:310-311): 
 Transient institutional owners have small shareholdings in a large number of 
companies and trade in and out of these companies frequently. Trading activity is 
mostly induced by short-term signals such as current earnings.  
 Dedicated institutional owners have large, long-term shareholdings in only a few 
companies. They evaluate management’s long-term performance and use a more 
complete set of information for that purpose. 
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 Quasi-indexers invest in indexes or buy-and-hold strategies. Their portfolios are 
highly diversified (directly or indirectly via the index invested in), but their turnover 
is low. 
Bushee (1998) then analysed the influence of the type of institutional investor on the 
R&D spending patterns for US companies from 1983 to 1994. He hypothesised that 
investors with a short-term focus lead companies to cut their R&D spending to meet 
these shareholders’ earnings expectations. Bushee (1998:319) found that institutions 
owned on average 24 per cent of the outstanding shares. Quasi-indexers made up 70 
per cent, transient investors 26 per cent and dedicated shareholders four per cent of 
the institutional shareholder base in the sample (Bushee, 1998:327). He reported that 
where transient institutional investors have high ownership, the likelihood is increased 
that management will cut R&D spending to increase earnings (Bushee, 1998:330).  
 
Although the present study is not about earnings management or earnings quality, I 
included this research to indicate that the investment horizons of institutional owners 
influence management decisions. Further research is now discussed that applies 
Bushee’s (1998) classification system, but investigates how disclosure affects the 
investor type and vice versa. 
 
The first study to investigate the impact of disclosure quality on institutional investors 
according to investment horizon is that by Bushee and Noe (2000), which used the 
Association for Investment and Management Research (AIMR)7 annual rankings of 
corporate disclosure practices8 as a proxy for disclosure quality. The AIMR rankings 
are based on analysts’ assessments of the informativeness of the following: the annual 
reports, interim reports, and IR activities of companies (Bushee & Noe, 2000:178). 
Bushee and Noe based their analyses on all companies for which rankings were 
available between 1982 and 1996. The average AIMR percentile ranking score was 52 
per cent, and the average shareholding by each of the transient, dedicated and quasi-
indexers was 10 per cent, 10 per cent and 29 per cent respectively (2000:183). Bushee 
and Noe found that the presence of institutional investors as a group was positively 
associated with disclosure quality levels. However, when the regressions were run on 
                                             
7 In 2004 the AIMR changed its name to the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute.  
8 AIMR rankings have also been used in other disclosure studies as proxy for disclosure quality (Lang 
& Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998)  
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the three types separately, a different picture emerged. Transient and quasi-indexers 
were positively associated with disclosure quality levels, but dedicated institutional 
owners were not significantly attracted by disclosure quality (Bushee & Noe, 
2000:186). The trading behaviour of transient investors (small holdings and high 
turnover) and quasi-indexers (small holdings and low turnover) cancelled one another, 
with an effect of almost zero on return volatility.  
 
When the regressions were run on changes in levels of disclosure, Bushee and Noe 
(2000:200) found that increases in disclosure quality led transient investors 
immediately to increase their holdings, whilst quasi-indexers held steady. The net 
increase in transient investor holdings was positively associated with increases in 
return volatility. Higher share return volatility is perceived to increase a company’s 
riskiness, resulting in increases in cost of capital (Froot, Perold & Stein, 1992). Bushee 
and Noe (2000:200) therefore caution that managers who are considering changing 
their disclosure practices “must weigh any potential benefits of improved disclosure 
against the potential cost of attracting investors that exacerbate stock return volatility”.  
 
Attracting institutional investors with a short investment horizon not only heightens the 
risk of increasing a company’s return volatility, but also seems to play a role during 
mergers and acquisitions. Gaspar et al. (2005) investigated the size of premiums 
offered for control, and the returns for the bidder, in merger and acquisition activities 
for US companies from January 1980 to December 1999. They followed a different 
methodology than that used by Bushee and Noe (2000) to identify institutional 
investors’ investment horizon. First, they calculated each institutional investor’s 
portfolio churn rate and averaged it over the four quarters preceding the takeover offer. 
Then, both the bidder and the target company’s institutional investor shareholder base 
were weighted based on the first calculation. This provided a ratio indicating the 
weighted average investment horizon of institutional investors in the company.  
 
Gaspar et al. (2005:148,149) found that high investor turnover in target (bidder) 
companies elicited a lower (higher) control premium (three per cent) accepted (offered) 
compared to companies with low investor turnover. They ascribed this finding to two 
reasons. The first reason is that short-horizon investors do not hold out long enough 
for a higher (lower) offer price during negotiations, as they want to exit. The second 
reason is that short-horizon investors do not effectively monitor management (it takes 
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too much time and effort), which results in managements’ not optimising the merger 
and acquisition deal to get maximum benefit for the existing shareholders. A lower 
abnormal return is earned for bidders with high investor turnover (their offer price is too 
high) because the control premium offered is too high (Gaspar et al., 2005:149). A 
noteworthy finding is that companies with a higher investor turnover have a significantly 
higher probability of receiving a takeover bid. They contend that this suggests that 
bidders are aware that companies with high investor turnover are “easier targets with 
lower bargaining power” (Gaspar et al., 2005:155). They argue that many companies 
engage in IR activities in an attempt to increase their long-horizon investors.  
 
The relationship between companies’ ex ante cost of equity and the presence of 
institutional investors with long-term investment horizons was examined by Attig et al. 
(2013), using data from 1985 to 2007. They follow Gaspar et al.’s (2005) methodology 
to determine the investment horizon. Attig et al. (2013:456) found that the presence of 
institutional investors with long-term investment horizons results in lower cost of equity. 
They propose that this is due to improved monitoring of management and being able 
to obtain higher quality information about the company. In further analyses, Attig et al. 
(2013:460) found evidence that the presence of long-horizon institutional investors is 
even more important for companies whose management has excessive power9 
compared to shareholder rights. Long-horizon institutional investors provide better 
oversight over management as they are invested for a longer period. 
 
In a different approach, Serafeim (2015) considers how a company’s disclosure quality 
attracts investors with different investor horizons. His analyses are based on 1 114 US 
companies’ integrated reporting disclosure (whether they call it an integrated report or 
not) from 2002 to 2010. Using Bushee’s (1998) classification, he found that nine per 
cent of the shares were held by dedicated institutional investors, 16 per cent were held 
by transients, and 47 per cent were held by quasi-indexers. The mean integrated 
reporting score was 39 per cent (Serafeim, 2015:39). His regression analyses indicate 
that the integrated reporting quality (explanatory variable) was positively associated 
with the predominant presence of long-horizon institutional investors (dependent 
variable) (Serafeim, 2015:41).  
                                             
9 The power balance is based on the governance index methodology used by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003). 
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Serafeim (2015) explains that long-term investors find companies attractive that signal 
their intent of sustainably growing shareholder wealth over the longer term, and tend 
to increase their holdings in such companies. His findings suggest that companies with 
higher share liquidity and better recent profitability attract more transient investors, 
which is consistent with these investors’ trading strategies (quick selling and 
momentum trading without deep investigation into fundamentals) (Serafeim, 2015:42). 
His further analyses of a smaller group of 97 international companies revealed that 
information on the six forms of capital and the guiding principles of integrated reporting 
are significantly positively related to investment by long-term institutional investors 
(Serafeim, 2015:49). Serafeim (2015:50) cautions that even though it may be beneficial 
for a company to engage in integrated reporting in order to attract long-horizon 
institutional investors, the cost of generating such a report should not be overlooked. 
 
A survey of 138 IR professionals at US companies by the Rock Center for Corporate 
Governance and the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) (2014) revealed 
agreement that companies believe that they can achieve economic benefits by 
managing their investor base (based on investment horizon). Participating IR 
professionals indicated that they thought that if they can achieve a greater proportion 
of long-horizon investors, it would result in an average increase of 15 per cent in the 
share’s price, a 20 per cent decrease in price volatility and a six per cent increase in 
trading volume (Rock Center for Corporate Governance & NIRI, 2014:12). IR 
professionals classified a short-term investment horizon as between 0.6 years or less, 
a medium-term horizon as 0.9 to 2.3 years and a long-term horizon as 2.8 years or 
longer (Rock Center for Corporate Governance & NIRI, 2014:3).  
 
In terms of shareholder concentration, companies prefer dispersed shareholding. Of 
the participants, 48 per cent agreed and 16 per cent strongly agreed that no single 
shareholder should own more than ten per cent of the shares. Indeed, 24 per cent 
agreed and five per cent strongly agreed with an even more stringent cut-off of five per 
cent shareholding (Rock Center for Corporate Governance & NIRI, 2014:10). An 
analysis of these companies’ current shareholder composition (Rock Center for 
Corporate Governance & NIRI, 2014:6) indicated that the largest shareholder types 
were index, growth and value mutual funds, owning between 14 per cent and 23 per 
 Chapter 2 – Voluntary disclosure 44 
cent of shares.10 Attracting long-term investors would afford management the ability to 
focus on long-term strategies to add value, but companies also expects these long-
term shareholders to “provide higher quality feedback on management’s decision” 
(Rock Center for Corporate Governance & NIRI, 2014:9).  
 
Bailey, Berube, Godsall and Kehoe (2014:1) surveyed 722 top executives and 316 
board directors between April and May 2013 on the pressure to deliver short-term 
results. Their results indicate that the pressure had been building steadily over the 
previous three years (Bailey et al., 2014:3). This had a particularly negative effect on 
the strategic planning of the participating companies: 44 per cent reported using 
periods of less than two years for future strategic planning, whilst 73 per cent indicated 
that they should actually use a period of three years and longer (see Figure 2.1).  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Primary time horizons management teams use in future strategic 
planning 
Source: Bailey et al. (2014:6) 
 
Of the respondents, 86 per cent agreed that their companies would benefit from a 
longer-term focus. The three most cited benefits were increased innovation, 
strengthened financial returns and relieving executives of pressure so that they could 
                                            
10 Shareholder concentration of JSE companies is much higher and is discussed in Section 4.6.2 
Ownership structure. 
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perform more effectively (Bailey et al., 2014:7). These findings agree with the position 
of Porter (1992) that a short-term focus robs companies of their innovativeness and 
competitive edge. 
 
Barton and Wiseman (2014:45), agreeing with Porter (1992) about the negative 
aspects of short-termism comment: 
Since the 2008 financial crisis and the onset of the Great Recession, a growing 
chorus of voices has urged the United States and other economies to move away 
from their focus on ‘quarterly capitalism’ and toward a true long-term mind-set.  
 
They express concern that short-termism by asset managers leads to suboptimal 
pricing, increased volatility and companies’ making decisions that benefit short-term 
earnings instead of long-term value (Barton & Wiseman, 2014:47). They envision the 
interaction between a company and institutional investors along an Equity Engagement 
Spectrum (see Table 2.1). As the size of the shareholding grows, the investors spend 
more time interacting with the company and giving input into the long-term strategy. 
 
Table 2.1: The Equity Engagement Spectrum 
Ownership stake in company 
<2% 1-5% >10% 
Ongoing engagement Active ownership Relationship investing 
Continuously monitors 
companies, with a mix of 
active and reactive 
engagement 
Owns a meaningful position 
in a handful of companies 
Takes a significant minority 
ownership 
May build micro-coalitions 
with other investors 
Usually remains below the 
5% threshold for public 
disclosure of holdings 
 
Often has board seats 
Often does not pursue any 
additional investment 
beyond an index-weighted 
holding 
Tries to build micro-
coalitions with other 
investors 
 
Works collaboratively with 
management on long-term 
strategy 
 Works publicly or privately to 
persuade the board and 
management to change 
long-term strategy 
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Source: McKinsey & Company and Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (cited in 
Barton & Wiseman11, 2014:49) 
 
Analysing the transcripts of earnings conference calls of 3 613 companies for the 
period from 2002 to 2008, Brochet, Loumioti and Serafeim (2015:1128) aimed to 
discover the characteristics of companies whose management used words implying a 
short-term focus (e.g. day, month, short-term). They found that voluntary disclosure 
(via conference calls) with a short-term focus is positively associated with share-based 
remuneration for management, earnings guidance, and greater analyst following. In 
line with earlier studies of Bushee (1998), and Bushee and Noe (2000), Brochet et al. 
(2015:1138) also reported a negative correlation between their short-term proxy and a 
long-term investor base. Brochet et al. (2015:1155) found evidence of financial effects; 
their proxy for short-termism in management was significantly negatively associated 
with lower return on equity (ROE) for the next two years. This parallels the results of 
Bushee and Noe (2000) and Attig et al. (2013) of negative financial consequences 
when short-horizon shareholders dominate. Brochet et al. (2015:1123) warn that if 
management is aware that their choice of words indicate a short- or long-term focus, 
they, together with their legal and IR departments, can manipulate their presentation 
by deliberately using or avoiding time-horizon words to convey the opposite meaning. 
 
Souder et al. (2016) also investigated the detrimental effect of a short-term focus by 
management, catering to pressure from shareholders with a similar short-term focus 
on earnings, in their capital investment decision-making. They compared the expected 
useful life of property, plant and equipment (investment horizon) and return on assets 
(performance) to industry averages for 2 300 US manufacturing companies from 1991 
to 2011. Their results show that investment horizon was positively associated with 
company performance (adjusted for industry differences) (Souder et al., 2016:1211). 
The dampening effect on performance appears to be much more pronounced when 
the investment horizon is too short, and this effect levels off as companies’ investment 
horizons lengthen (Souder et al., 2016:1212). The authors further hypothesised that 
investors’ investment horizon (which they call capital patience, and measured as the 
industry-adjusted share turnover) would play a role. When they brought a capital 
                                             
11 Barton is the global managing director of McKinsey & Company. Wiseman is the president and CEO 
of the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB). In 2013, CPPIB and McKinsey & Company co-
founded Focusing Capital on the Long Term (FCLT) to promote long-term investing. 
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patience interaction variable into the regression model, they found that when capital 
patience is low, coupled with low investment horizons of management, performance is 
even lower (Souder et al., 2016:1212).  
 
Souder et al. (2016) contribute to the debate about investment horizon by showing with 
their model that the relationship between horizon (of management and of investors), 
and performance is not linear, but quadratic. The benefits of increasing the investment 
horizon and capital patience do not continue in a linear manner without limits. 
Companies with below average investment horizons pay a much higher penalty in 
performance (Souder et al., 2016:1213). Souder et al. (2016:1215) explain their 
findings as due to companies’ investing in property, plant and equipment with shorter 
expected useful lives, pursuing quicker initial returns (to satisfy investors with low 
capital patience), but lower overall net present values. Their findings corroborate those 
of Attig et al. (2013), Brochet et al. (2015) and Bushee and Noe (2000) regarding the 
negative effects of short-termism. 
  
To conclude this section on the benefits of attracting long-term investors, and on 
companies’ focusing on implementing and communicating long-term value-creating 
strategies, I present the new Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Long-Term Value Creation 
(LTVC) Global Index, which was launched on 21 January 2016 (S&P Dow Jones 
Indices, 2016:1). Under the Index Attributes, the Fact Sheet states: 
Companies that seek to anticipate and manage current and future economic and 
governance opportunities and risks by focusing on long-term strategy, innovation, 
and productivity may be more likely to maintain a competitive advantage and 
thereby sustain stakeholder value. (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016:1) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 2.2, the LTVC Global Index has outperformed the 
benchmark S&P Global LargeMidCap Index in respect of total returns by about 3.1 
percentage points over the last ten years. This provides further evidence that 
communicating a long-term strategy and attracting long-horizon investors do provide 
economic benefits in terms of increased total returns. The Fact Sheet indicates that on 
29 April 2016, the index was comprised of 246 companies from 26 countries, including 
ten companies from South Africa (S&P Dow Jones Indices, 2016:4, 5). South Africa 
has the eighth most companies in the index, after France, with 13. This is an indication 
that many of the largest companies in South Africa are already following a long-term 
strategy for value creation. 
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These studies on shareholders’ investment horizon form an important backdrop to the 
development of the present study’s familiarity hypothesis to address a gap in the 
literature. This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.5 Shareholder familiarity 
hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: S&P LTVC Global Index Performance 
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices (2016:2) 
 
In summary, in this section, I discussed various theories regarding managers’ decision 
to engage in voluntary disclosure. Agency and signalling theories propose that by 
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reducing information asymmetry for investors, companies can reduce their cost of 
capital and increase their liquidity. Legitimacy and stakeholder theories argue that 
companies need to disclose voluntary information, and specifically environmental, 
social and governance information, in order to obtain society’s approval for their 
continued operations. Institutional isomorphism theory claims that sometimes 
companies engage in disclosure behaviour because other (leading) companies are 
doing it, because legislation requires it, or because the professionalism of their 
employees results in similar behaviour regarding the manner in which they disclose 
and report relevant information. The last two subsections described disclosure theories 
that postulate that a company’s cost of capital or liquidity is affected indirectly by its 
attracting more investors (the Investor Recognition Hypothesis), or by its attracting 
specific types (clienteles) of investors (investor sophistication and investor horizon). 
Empirical evidence from prior studies supporting these theories has also been 
discussed. Next, I elaborate on the types of information that users find value-relevant 
for decision-making. 
2.3. Investors’ information needs 
Many investigations have been conducted into what information investors and 
stakeholders (users)12 actually require. The discussion in this section is limited to early 
voluntary disclosure studies that are generally cited by most researchers, and studies 
that are more recent. The discussion will show that users’ information needs have not 
changed much over the decades. The scope of the discussion is also narrowed by 
focusing on equity investors’ information needs, because the variable of interest of this 
study relates to movement in equity shareholding. Although a lot of recent research 
relates to ESG and CSR disclosures, these disclosures form part of the broader set of 
information required by equity investors (pointing towards risks and sustainability). I do 
not delve into the depth of ESG/CSR disclosure research.  
 
In 1991, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) formed a 
Special Committee on Financial Reporting to address concerns about the relevance 
and usefulness of financial reporting at that stage. The Special Committee undertook 
a major study to determine the needs of users and to identify the types of information 
                                             
12 The terms ‘investors’, ‘potential investors’, ‘shareholders’ and ‘users’, are used interchangeably in this 
thesis. These terms also include analysts who make recommendations for institutional investors. 
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most useful in predicting earnings and cash flows for the purpose of valuing shares 
and assessing the prospect of repayment of debt securities or loans. Data was also 
gathered about the relative priority that users place on different kinds of information. In 
this ground-breaking report, generally referred to as the Jenkins report (AICPA, 
1994:25-31), the following main categories of information needs of users were 
identified: 
 financial statements and related disclosures; 
 high-level operating data and the performance measurements that management 
uses to manage a business; 
 reasons for changes in the financial, operating and performance-related data and 
the identity and past effect of key trends; 
 a description of opportunities and risks, including those resulting from key trends; 
 management’s plans, including critical success factors; 
 a comparison of actual business performance to previously disclosed opportunities, 
risks and management’s plans; 
 information about directors, management, compensation, major shareholders and 
transactions, and relationships among related parties; 
 broad objectives and strategies of the company; 
 the scope and a description of the business and its properties; and 
 the impact of industry structure on the company. 
 
In these ten categories, the inclusion of 56 items not found in the financial statements 
and related notes (at that time) was proposed – in other words, discretionary or 
voluntary items. Most of these items are indicators of future performance, and risks 
and rewards. These recommendations added substantially to the minimum statutory 
disclosure requirements, which dealt with the historical actions of management. A later 
study by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (2001) recommended voluntary 
disclosure substantially along the same lines.  
 
The report Voluntary annual report disclosures: What users want (Beattie & Pratt, 
2002) was based mainly on the Jenkins report recommendations (AICPA, 1994) with 
added items from the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1992) and value drivers 
as identified by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) (2000), amongst others. The intention 
of the study was to determine unequivocally what users thought about the usefulness 
of a comprehensive set of disclosure items. The views of expert users and private 
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shareholders were considered (Beattie & Pratt, 2002:5). A comprehensive list of 130 
information items was included in the questionnaire. The items were grouped into 11 
topics. Respondents were asked to rate the usefulness of each item for investment 
decision-making. (The needs of other stakeholder groups, such as employees and 
customers, were not considered.) The researchers found that across all groups, the 
categories were generally ranked in the following descending order of usefulness 
(Beattie & Pratt, 2002:83): 
 financial information (including performance measures, financial statements, 
revenue and costs by line of business); 
 objectives and strategy; 
 management discussion and analysis; 
 background (including business description, description of industry structure and 
management and shareholders); 
 innovation value drivers; 
 risks and opportunities;  
 customer value drivers; 
 process value drivers; 
 employee value drivers;  
 intellectual assets/capital; and 
 environmental, social and community aspects (rated last in usefulness). 
 
In 2003, the AIMR reported the results of a survey amongst its members (portfolio and 
fund managers, and securities analysts) on financial reporting quality and the 
disclosure practices of the companies they followed. Almost three quarters of the 
respondents reported that companies’ disclosure practices and the quality of their 
financial reporting were very (43 per cent) or extremely (30 per cent) important factors 
in their investment decisions and recommendations (CFA, 2003:1).  
 
However, respondents rated the overall quality of financial or corporate information 
disclosed with an average of 3.4 out of 5 (where 5 is excellent). The respondents had 
to rank 33 specific types of information according to importance, quality and change 
over the previous three years. If one excludes many of the items which have since then 
been incorporated into mandated IFRS, the remaining voluntary disclosure items are 
rated as set out in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: Voluntary information items (importance vs quality) 
 Importance Quality 
 Very or 
extremely 
important 
Good or 
excellent 
Average Poor or 
below 
average 
Forward looking information 70 18 43 29 
Information about risk factors, 
sensitivity of key assumptions 
69 17 40 31 
Non-financial information (e.g. 
key customers, business cycles) 
66 15 37 36 
Continuous disclosure reporting 
such as SEC filings on material 
events 
63 19 50 16 
Reconciliation of local/national 
GAAP to US GAAP or IAS/IFRS 
56 19 39 21 
Information on corporate 
governance practices 
53 14 47 26 
Forecast of earnings per share 
(EPS) numbers 
49 16 42 27 
Source: CFA (2003:3-4) 
 
Cohen, Hoff, Nath and Wood (2007) conducted a survey of 228 professional investors 
in the US to identify which types of non-financial information they were using in their 
investment decision-making. They classified information items into three groups: 
industry cohort, governance and CSR. On a seven-point Likert scale, the average 
scores for each of the three groups were 4.83 (69 per cent), 4.8 (68.6 per cent) and 
3.81 (54 per cent) respectively. Respondents used the following three types of 
information the most: market share (5.57), innovative products (5.53) and board 
selection processes (5.28) (Cohen et al., 2007:7). Apart from product safety (9th most 
useful, 4.64), the three least useful information types were from the CSR group: 
humanitarian initiatives (3.37), employee diversity (3.43) and human rights (3.5). 
Professional investors who reported that they had a minimum of 50 per cent invested 
in socially responsible investments used governance and CSR information significantly 
more than other investors (Cohen et al., 2007:7). 
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In a related study, using the same information classification, an online survey was 
conducted by Holder-Webb, Cohen, Nath, Hoff and Wood (2008) with 750 US retail 
investors to determine their use of non-financial information. The average use for each 
of the three groups was industry (51 per cent), governance (45 per cent) and CSR (36 
per cent). From Figure 2.3, it is clear that retail investors still rank industry information 
very highly, in addition to paying moderate attention to governance and CSR 
information. Retail investors’ use of all three groups of non-financial information was 
also decidedly lower than that of the professional investors, indicating that they still 
paid a lot of attention to the financial statements (Holder-Webb et al., 2008:8).  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Past use of non-financial information by retail investors 
Source: Holder-Webb et al. (2008:9) 
 
Professional and retail investors were then asked to pick the top five most important 
kinds of information, in their opinion. Both groups agreed on the following order: market 
share, customer satisfaction, innovative products, product safety, and executive 
compensation (Holder-Webb et al., 2008:13). It is noteworthy that many of the 
information types identified and used by both professional and retail investors (Cohen 
et al., 2007; Holder-Webb et al., 2008) agree with the categories identified by AICPA 
(1994) and Beattie and Pratt (2002). 
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In a study of 45 US and six Canadian companies in the wireless industry, Simpson 
(2010) investigated analysts’ use of six industry-specific non-financial indicators that 
are indicative of future turnover and earnings, for 1997 to 2007. Simpson’s (2010) 
results show that analysts underreact to the information in cases where companies did 
not consistently disclose the same non-financial information from period to period. The 
information was correctly weighted by analysts for companies that persistently 
disclosed these six key performance indicators in the period under review (Simpson, 
2010:270). She also reported that analysts’ use of the non-financial information 
improves when the companies’ overall disclosure quality is higher (Simpson, 
2010:282). She recommends that companies disclose their non-financial key 
performance indicators persistently across metrics and over time as a way to improve 
their usefulness for analysts (Simpson, 2010:251). FCLT (2015:19) similarly propose 
that companies disclose the same long-term metrics consistently year-over-year, as 
well as rolling averages for three to five years, irrespective of whether the metric is 
good or bad. FCLT furthermore advises that once a company discloses a key metric, 
investors need to be sure the metric will not be abandoned if the company cannot 
deliver on the target set for such metric (FCLT, 2015:19). 
 
Financial collapses of companies before the 2007/8 worldwide financial crises (for 
example, Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat) and after it (for example, Northern Rock, 
HBOS, Lehman Brothers and AIG) have prompted investors and regulators to question 
the usability and reliability of financial reporting mechanisms of the time. Various 
regulatory bodies and auditing firms produced reports commenting on the increasing 
complexity and volume of mandatory IFRS disclosures and regulatory filings, but users 
(especially professional users) reported still not being able to form a clear picture of 
companies’ risks and rewards (CFA, 2007; Global Accounting Alliance, 2009; IFAC, 
2009, 2010, 2013; KPMG & FERF, 2011; Eurosif & ACCA, 2013). According to these 
reports, users continued to express a desire to see the types of information identified 
by the Jenkins Committee (AICPA, 1994) and the ICAS study (Beattie & Pratt, 2002). 
 
Executive and directors in Bailey et al.’s (2014) survey agreed with the statement that 
if top management and the directors (appointed by institutional shareholders) were to 
change the focus of the company to a more long-term focus, they would need different 
information (see Figure 2.4). Note that once again, accounting measures ranks highest 
in terms of current use, but score much lower for helping companies to set their long-
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term strategies. Most of the other information items are outside the AFS, in other 
words, voluntary. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: KPI’s already in use and most useful 
Source: Bailey et al. (2014:9) 
 
A comprehensive review of European studies (limited to those that generated primary 
data by using surveys, experiments and interviews) was undertaken by Cascino, 
Clatworthy, Osma, Gassen, Imam and Jeanjean in 2014. The purpose of Cascino et 
al.’s (2014) review was to assist the IASB with its Conceptual Framework review by 
establishing who the users of accounting information are and for what purposes they 
use such information. Users need information primarily for two reasons, to value the 
equity and/or debt of the company, and secondly, to fulfil a stewardship role in 
evaluating management’s performance (Cascino et al, 2014:186). They found that 
“capital providers are heterogeneous and that their information needs, as well as their 
demand for information, differ systematically” (Cascino et al., 2014:200). Furthermore, 
Cascino et al. (2014:191) note that capital providers use multiple information sources, 
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and that accounting information plays an anchoring role in the evaluation of the 
reliability of other information sources. Interestingly, Cascino et al. (2014:200) 
conclude that academics and regulators  
…know surprisingly little about the actual information usage by capital providers. 
Direct evidence is scarce and many inferences are based on archival data that 
reflect aggregate investor behaviour and not their information-gathering activities. 
 
In response to Cascino et al.’s (2014) findings regarding a lack of direct, primary 
evidence of users’ information needs and the use of accounting information, the 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) and ICAS commissioned a 
study on this kind of evidence by the same authors. In total, 81 professional investors 
(48 from Europe, 28 from the UK, and five from the US) were interviewed between 
September 2014 and May 2015 on the decision-usefulness of financial reporting 
(Cascino, Clatworthy, Osma, Gassen, Imam & Jeanjean, 2016:27). Three quarters of 
these (60 interviewees) also participated in a two-by-two experimental case study. Half 
of them were asked to use the case study information to value a company and the 
other half were asked to assess the performance of management. Secondly, half of 
these users were told that management’s compensation was linked to financial 
accounting information, and the other half were told that management’s compensation 
was based on non-financial accounting data (Cascino et al., 2016:31). They were also 
asked to identify three additional information sources that they would use for their 
assignment and to allocate a fictional budget (100 000 EUR) between accounting 
information and the three additional information sources (Cascino et al., 2016:43).  
 
As Table 2.3 shows, the participants would spend just under two-thirds of the budget 
for information acquisition on information outside the AFS, or voluntary information 
disclosed by management or other third parties. Interestingly, the objective of the 
information acquisition (to value the company or to evaluate the managers’ 
performance) resulted in a slightly different budget allocation by the two groups (see 
Figure 2.5). It appears that when users fulfil a stewardship role (evaluating 
management), they spend (rely) more on the accounting information than users valuing 
the company as a whole (Cascino et al., 2016:46). 
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Table 2.3: Requested additional information by content 
 Weighted
Financial accounting information 34.8%
Qualitative data on business 13.7%
Non-financial quantitative data on business 13.4%
Data on competitors and industry 12.3%
Data on products and markets 8.1%
Information about corporate governance 3.9%
Information about management 2.7%
Macro-economic information 2.5%
General/unspecified 8.6%
Total 100.0%
Source: Cascino et al. (2016:44) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Effects of investors’ information acquisition objective on the usage 
of alternative information sources 
Source: Cascino et al. (2016:45) 
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In another recent survey, PwC interviewed Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and 
investment professionals on their views of business success in a changing world. They 
interviewed 1 409 CEOs from 83 countries between September and December 2015 
(PwC, 2016a). Another 286 investment professionals completed an online survey 
between December 2015 and January 2016, and interviews were conducted with a 
further 152 investment professionals between September 2015 and January 2016 (a 
total of 438 in 18 countries) (PwC, 2016b). Of interest to this study are the CEOs and 
investment professionals’ views on measuring and communicating success. Figure 2.6 
shows that both groups largely agree that more measurement and communication is 
required in respect of companies’ innovation practices, business strategy and key 
risks.  
 
 
Figure 2.6: Measurement and communication success: views of CEOs and 
investment professionals 
Source: PwC (2016b:27) 
 
The biggest disagreement can be observed for the item regarding communication of 
organisational purpose and values: CEOs deemed 50 per cent more disclosure to be 
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necessary than investment professionals did. This may be because CEOs tended to 
consider a wider audience of users than the investment professionals, especially taking 
into consideration the findings of Cascino et al.’s studies in 2014 and 2016, which 
indicate that investment professionals usually have a valuation or stewardship 
objective when using reported information. Of the ESG/CSR categories, only the item 
‘Environmental impact’ seems high on the agenda (fourth), whilst the items ‘Impact on 
wider communities’ and ‘Employee practices’ are the bottom two information 
categories. The higher ranking for ‘Environmental impact’ may be attributed to the 
possibility that this item may have a more direct financial impact through penalties and 
regulations. PwC concluded that if CEOs do not know what information their investors 
require, they may not report decision-useful information and may also pursue the 
wrong strategies for their companies (PwC, 2016b:32). Barton and Wiseman (2014:50) 
propose that metrics  
…like 10-year economic value added, R&D efficiency, patent pipelines, multiyear 
return on capital investments, and energy intensity of production is likely to give 
investors more useful information than basic GAAP [Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practices] accounting in assessing a company’s performance over the 
long haul.  
A comparison of these categories to the findings by PwC (2016b), as set out in Figure 
2.6, reveals agreement on the need for voluntary information and key performance 
indicators (KPIs) over and above the AFS. However, simply sharing KPIs and targets 
with investors is not enough; investors should be convinced to use them. Investors 
should be made to understand why using certain KPIs and metrics are better indicators 
of the company’s long-term sustainable earnings and cash flows (FCLT, 2015:18) than 
others. 
 
No discussion of investors’ information needs would be complete without a 
consideration of integrated reporting. The continued pressure from users of corporate 
reports for enhanced voluntary disclosure has culminated in the development of the 
concept of Integrated Reporting <IR> by the IIRC. The aims of <IR> are to (IIRC, 
2013:2) 
 Improve the quality of information available to providers of financial capital to enable a 
more efficient and productive allocation of capital.  
 Promote a more cohesive and efficient approach to corporate reporting that draws on 
different reporting strands and communicates the full range of factors that materially affect 
the ability of an organization to create value over time. 
 Enhance accountability and stewardship for the broad base of capitals (financial, 
manufactured, intellectual, human, social and relationship, and natural) and promote 
understanding of their interdependencies.  
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 Support integrated thinking, decision-making and actions that focus on the creation of 
value over the short, medium and long term. 
These aims are echoed in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD’s) latest draft Principles of Corporate Governance which 
require shareholders and potential investors to be able to “make informed decisions 
about the valuation, ownership and voting of shares” (OECD, 2015:38). 
 
Section 4.1 of the Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRC, 2013:24) requires the 
following content to be discussed: 
 organisational overview and external environment; 
 governance; 
 business model; 
 risks and opportunities; 
 strategy and resource allocation; 
 performance; 
 outlook; and 
 basis of preparation and presentation. 
 
The Integrated Reporting Framework also acknowledges other forms of capital in 
addition to financial capital (IIRC, 2013:12). It requires discussion of manufactured, 
intellectual, human, social and relationship, and natural capitals. The integration 
between the various elements of the report can be seen in the value creation process 
illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
 
South Africa has been a leader in the adoption of integrated reporting practices due to 
the requirements of the successive King Commission reports. The King III Code 
applies to entities incorporated and resident in South Africa (IoD, 2009:16), and took 
effect on 1 March 2010 (IoD, 2009:17). It has now been superseded by King IV that is 
effective for financial years starting on or after 1 April 2017 (IoD, 2016:38). The King 
III Code was part of the JSE Listings Requirements from Service Issue 13 on an ‘apply 
or explain’ (author’s emphasis) basis for financial years commencing on or after 
1 March 2010 (JSE, 2010). King IV should be applied on an ‘apply and explain’ 
(author’s emphasis) basis.  
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Figure 2.7: The value creation process 
Source: IIRC (2013:13) 
 
Ernst and Young's 2012 Excellence in Integrated Reporting Awards bestowed ratings 
of ‘Top 10’, ‘Excellent’ (17 companies) and ‘Good’ (29 companies) to companies 
included in the top 100 JSE-listed companies based on capitalisation on 31 December 
2011 (Ernst & Young, 2012:3). Therefore, 56 per cent of the top 100 companies were 
rated as ‘Good’ or higher in respect of the quality of their integrated reporting. In a 
similar study, the audit firm Nkonki reviewed integrated reports produced by the top 
10013 JSE-listed companies, plus seven additional companies included in the JSE’s 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Index, for year ends from 31 December 2010 
to 30 November 2011 (Nkonki, 2012:10). They grouped companies based on 
compliance with the requirements of the King III Code (IoD, 2009) into the following 
groups (Nkonki, 2012:61–63): 
 between 80 and 100 per cent – 13 
 between 70 and 79 per cent – 12 
                                             
13 One of the top 100 companies delisted during the review and was therefore excluded from the results. 
The final sample consisted of 99 of the top 100 companies. The seven companies added was to 
complete the full list of companies making up the SRI Index (the rest were already part of the top 100 
companies (Nkonki, 2012:71). 
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 between 60 and 69 per cent – 30 
 between 50 and 59 per cent – 30 
 49 per cent and below – 21 
Fifty-two per cent of companies achieved ratings of higher then 60 per cent, prompting 
the reviewers to remark that JSE companies “have truly embraced the King 3 
Disclosure requirements” and “integrated reporting standards in South Africa are 
improving at an applaudable pace” (Nkonki, 2012: 4). The combined evidence from the 
Ernst and Young (2012) and Nkonki (2012) studies suggest that JSE-listed companies 
are serious about integrated reporting and the additional disclosures that the King III 
Code (IoD, 2009) requires. The Ernst and Young (2012) and Nkonki (2012) findings 
are also in line with the WEF’s (2012:325) ranking of first place that South Africa 
receives for its reporting.  
 
Caution should be exercised when attributing various economic benefits to the 
production of an Integrated Report as such. Much, if not most, of the value relevant 
information contained in such a report would have already been communicated to the 
capital market by any good IR department in prior financial years. It would therefore be 
difficult, if not impossible, to ringfence the information already in the market (and 
discounted into share prices) due to prior communications from the IR department, and 
that provided by publication of an integrated report for financial years starting on or 
after 1 March 2010. 
 
Between March and September 2011, 34 investors and 35 analysts were surveyed on 
their use of and the perceived relevance of their non-financial data, including the 
integrated report by Accounting for Sustainability, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
and Radley Yeldar (2012). In Figure 2.8, one can see that more than a third of the 
respondents indicated that integrated reporting provides various benefits to users. 
Accounting for Sustainability et al. (2012:41) remark that although there are many 
similarities between how investors and analysts source and use extra-financial 
information, there are also marked differences. They recommend that companies 
develop communication strategies targeted at specific user groups’ preferences. 
Investors and analysts want quality data and information that support comparison and 
benchmarking (Accounting for Sustainability et al., 2012:43). 
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Figure 2.8: Usefulness of integrated reporting in decision-making or analysis 
Source: Accounting for Sustainability et al. (2012:34) 
 
PwC (2014) conducted interviews with 85 investment professionals to establish what 
investors want to know from companies, what the quality of the information that they 
receive is and how integrated reporting can be of use to them. Figures 2.9 to 2.12 set 
out the ‘gap’ between information needed and the quality of information received. The 
gap ranges from 11 per cent to 38 per cent. In respect of all categories of information, 
the importance for investment professionals exceeds the quality of the information that 
they did receive. The smallest gap was for KPI information. It could be because it is 
probably easier to compile and communicate KPI metrics than strategy or risk 
information. Note from Figure 2.12 that the importance of sustainability information is 
much lower than information on financial and operational KPIs. 
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Figure 2.9: Importance versus effectiveness of information being received 
Source: PwC (2014:8)  
 
Figure 2.10: Importance versus effectiveness of strategic information being 
received 
Source: PwC (2014:11) 
 
Figure 2.11: Importance versus 
effectiveness of risk information being 
received 
Source: PwC (2014:13) 
Figure 2.12: Importance versus 
effectiveness of KPI information being 
received 
Source: PwC (2014:15) 
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For more studies on integrated reporting and investor benefits, please refer to the IIRC 
2015 report. It describes various studies conducted during the last three years on the 
benefits and obstacles relating to integrated reporting (IIRC, 2015:22).  
 
In this section, prior research has been presented about investors’ information needs. 
It was established that users mainly have one of two intentions when they source 
information, namely to value the company or to fulfil a stewardship or fiduciary duty. 
Even more than two decades later, most voluntary or extra-financial information 
required can still be traced to the proposals of the Jenkins Committee (AICPA) in 1994. 
Prior research has found that where the overall quality of voluntary disclosure is high, 
and metrics are reported consistently from period to period, investment professionals 
are able to use the information better to come to a fair valuation or performance 
evaluation. Despite growing acceptance of the integrated reporting concept, the 
studies discussed in this section gave clear signals that users want more forward-
looking information, as well as key metrics that are used internally by management, 
such as market share and customer satisfaction ratings. Users have confirmed the 
usefulness of integrated reports, but lamented the fact that there is still not enough 
integration between various pieces of information, and that business risks and 
strategies are still not reported sufficiently. In the next section, hurdles to more 
voluntary disclosure is discussed. These hurdles stem from the nature of the 
information itself. 
2.4. Hurdles to fuller voluntary disclosure  
Although there is sufficient evidence that increased disclosure will have a beneficial 
effect on share prices and that users want more information, many companies are 
reluctant to disclose more information. Management’s decision to limit disclosure is 
usually based on three arguments, namely the cost of data gathering, the need to 
defend the company’s competitive advantage, and the threat of litigation. The validity 
of these arguments is addressed in more detail in the next three subsections. 
2.4.1. Cost of data-gathering and publishing 
The IASB’s Framework (IASB, 2015:par. 2.38) maintains that the balance between 
benefit and cost is a pervasive constraint rather than a qualitative one. The benefits 
derived from information should exceed the cost of providing it. This view is also 
supported by the AICPA (1994:91). As can be seen from the above discussion of the 
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types of information that investors would find useful, management should already be 
using most of the KPIs, if not all, in their day-to-day steering of their company. 
Management should be under no obligation to gather information it does not have, or 
does not need to manage the business (AICPA, 1994:54-57). Elliott and Jacobson 
(1994:83) also distinguish between information that already exists for management 
purposes and that should not attract further gathering costs on the one hand, and the 
cost of packaging and presenting the information to outside users on the other. This 
implies that if some of the information does not exist and thus first has to be gathered, 
it would send a serious message of incompetence or bad corporate governance to 
shareholders. It follows, then, that the cost of data gathering should be negligible. 
Furthermore, the computer systems of the company should have the information 
readily available, or the information would be stored in electronic format (in 
management information systems). Internal management reports should already 
report key metrics, strategy, and so on. Technology like the Internet allows for 
negligible cost of distribution or the publication of such information.  
2.4.2. Protecting competitive advantage (commercial sensitivity) 
The AICPA (1994:54-57) report acknowledges that management should not be 
required to report information that could harm the company’s competitive position 
significantly. Elliott and Jacobson (1994:84) identified the following categories of 
information that might create a competitive disadvantage: 
 information about technological and managerial innovation; 
 strategies, plans and tactics; and 
 information about operations. 
They argue that the potential for disadvantaging a company is determined by the timing 
of the release, the type of information, the level of detail, and the audience for the 
disclosure.  
 
However, many companies belong to industry bodies, which require statistics to be 
submitted annually, if not quarterly. These are published in industry newsletters or 
bulletins. Suppliers usually supply more than one company in the same industry. 
Companies vie with one another to attract the best marketers or sales representatives, 
who take their institutional knowledge with them when they change employers. Market 
share is usually won at the expense of the competitor and customers are updated on 
new products in the pipeline that would satisfy their currently unfulfilled needs. All of 
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these arguments cast doubt on the claim that disclosure would reduce competitive 
advantage. Elliott and Jacobson (1994:85) claim that every entity that suffers a 
competitive disadvantage could gain competitive advantage from comparable 
disclosure by its competitors. This view is also supported by the CFA, which believes 
that industry competitors generally know much more about each other than they share 
with investors (CFA, 2007:54). Only genuine R&D projects (such as R&D on 
pharmaceutical drugs, design stage proto-types etc.) should fall under that protection. 
A reasonable investor would agree that not disclosing that information (for example, 
on a new HIV/AIDS drug in development) would protect his/her long-term cash flow 
and capital growth from the investment. 
 
FCLT (2015) acknowledges that companies may be uncomfortable about sharing 
details of their long-term strategies with investors, in case it could harm their 
competitive advantage. However, they argue that true competitive advantage is 
“typically not easily replicated” (2015:11). They propose that the process of becoming 
more open about a company’s long-term strategies is gradual. Furthermore, each 
company should make the trade-off between protecting its competitive advantage and 
attracting a shareholder base with a long-term horizon that supports long-term 
strategies, with resulting benefits (see Section 2.2.5.2 Shareholders’ investment 
horizon). 
2.4.3. The threat of litigation 
Elliott and Jacobson (1994:83) group the causes for litigation costs (legal fees and 
damages awarded) into two groups: insufficient disclosure and allegations of 
misleading disclosure. It follows that lawsuits that arise from insufficient disclosure 
support the notion that litigation threats would decrease with increased disclosure. 
They argue that the following four factors should reduce litigation costs that arise from 
misleading disclosure: 
 Fuller disclosure should lead to smaller claims, as the financial market would have 
more realistic expectations of the company’s prospects. The difference between 
the expected share price and the actual share price should therefore be smaller, 
leading to lower claims for damages. 
 Defendants (preparer companies) would have a better defence, as they can argue 
that users had sufficient access to information regarding risks surrounding the 
company. 
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 The first two conditions would make it unattractive for class action suit attorneys, 
resulting in few cases’ going to court. 
 The nature of the business is a key factor in triggering declines in share prices 
(which may lead to lawsuits), rather than increased disclosure. 
 
It is the view of the AICPA (1994:54-57) that management should not be required to 
provide forecasted financial statements. Rather, management should provide 
information that helps users to forecast for themselves what a company’s financial 
future may be. This view is supported by the finding in the 2003 AIMR survey of 
investment professionals that management’s giving current period trend updates is 
considered more valuable (by 47 per cent of respondents) than management’s giving 
earnings guidance (by 31 per cent of respondents) (CFA, 2003:5). By a narrow 
majority, 51 per cent of respondents also felt that earnings guidance increases the 
volatility of a share, compared to 36 per cent who want to receive general trend updates 
from management.  
 
The obstacle of the threat of litigation regarding issues such as forward-looking 
information can be overcome with proper legal consultation. Most companies publish 
extensive Disclaimer notes in their annual reports and websites. An example from 
Sasol Ltd is displayed in Figure 2.13. 
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Figure 2.13: Website disclaimer 
Source: Sasol Ltd (2016) 
 
In conclusion, the overall benefits of producing and communicating voluntary 
information should exceed the costs and potential risks. Figure 2.14 shows a clear 
visual representation by Schuster and O’Connell (2006) of the costs, risks, and benefits 
associated with voluntary disclosure practices, as discussed in this chapter. 
 
Website disclaimer 
The content on this Sasol web site is proprietary to Sasol and is for informational purposes 
only. In particular, the content does not constitute any form of legal, financial, or other 
advice, recommendation or arrangement by Sasol (which includes its divisions, affiliates, 
joint ventures or departments) or its associated information providers, and is not intended 
to be relied upon by users in making (or refraining from making) any specific investment or 
other decisions. For greater certainty, the information contained in or accessible through 
this Website is for information purposes only and is not intended to and does not constitute 
an offering of securities in any jurisdiction. Appropriate expert advice should be obtained 
before making any such decision or using the information. 
In using this Website, you agree that Sasol shall not be liable for any damages whatsoever 
(including indirect, incidental, special, punitive or consequential damages and loss of 
profits, opportunities or information) arising from (a) your use of or reliance on 
information contained on this Website; (b) any inaccuracy or omission in such information 
or failure to keep the information current; (c) use of any third party web sites linked or 
referred to in this Website; (d) any delays, inaccuracies or errors in, or in the transmission 
of, any stock price quotes or historical price data; (e) any Internet software used in 
connection with this Website or computer viruses or other destructive programs 
encountered as a result of using this Website; and (f) any other matter connected with the 
Website; even if Sasol is made aware of the possibility of such claims, damages or losses. 
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Figure 2.14: Potential effects from value-oriented business reporting 
Source: Schuster and O’Connell (2006:6) 
 
2.5. Summary and conclusion 
This chapter opened with a discussion of various theories on managers’ decision to 
engage in voluntary disclosure. The agency and signalling theories propose that by 
reducing information asymmetry for investors, companies can reduce their cost of 
capital and increase liquidity. The legitimacy and stakeholder theories argue that 
companies need to disclose voluntary information, and specifically environmental, 
social and governance information, in order to obtain society’s approval for their 
continued operations. The notion of institutional isomorphism implies that sometimes 
companies engage in disclosure behaviour because other (leading) companies are 
doing it, because legislation requires it, or because the professionalism of their 
employees results in similar behaviour (similar ways of disclosing and reporting 
information). The last two subsections described disclosure theories that postulate that 
the company’s cost of capital or liquidity are affected indirectly by attracting more 
investors (the Investor Recognition Hypothesis), or by attracting specific types of 
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investors (depending on investor horizon and sophistication). Empirical evidence from 
prior studies supporting these theories was also discussed.  
 
Section 2.3 Investors’ information needs, elaborated on the types of information that 
users indicated as value-relevant for decision-making. It was established that users 
mainly have one of two intentions when they source information, namely to value the 
company or to fulfil a stewardship or fiduciary duty. The demand for and provision of 
most voluntary or extra-financial information can still be traced to the proposals of the 
Jenkins Committee (AICPA) in 1994. Prior research has found that where the overall 
quality of voluntary disclosure is high, and metrics are reported consistently from period 
to period, investment professionals are able to use the information better to come to a 
fair valuation or performance evaluation.  
 
Despite growing acceptance of the integrated reporting concept, studies that reviewed 
initial reports found clear signals that users want more forward-looking information, as 
well as key metrics that are used internally by management, such as market share, 
customer satisfaction ratings, etc. Although users report that the integrated report is 
useful, they also remark that there is not yet enough integration between various pieces 
of information and risks and strategies.  
 
This chapter concluded with a section on hurdles to more voluntary disclosures. These 
hurdles stem from the nature of the information. Users want more forward-looking 
information about future projects and income streams. Managers argue that disclosing 
this information may erode their competitive advantage. Being too specific in forward-
looking guidance also raises concerns about class action suits for not delivering on 
promises. In conclusion, the costs and potential risks involved in producing and 
communicating voluntary information should, overall, be outweighed by the benefits, 
as discussed in this chapter. 
 
The next chapter deals with the evolution of reporting practices from printed annual 
reports to the complete IR webpages on companies’ websites. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
ONLINE INVESTOR RELATIONS PRACTICES 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter described various theories for why company management 
engages in voluntary disclosures. This chapter discusses how the practice of IR 
developed. The chapter starts with a short history of how financial reporting evolved 
from traditional, paper-based audited AFS to the practice of publishing the annual 
report and other voluntary information on a company’s website in various formats. 
Three models that describe the stages of the adoption of online communication are 
presented.  
 
Due to the increasing complexity of capital market disclosures, the communication 
strategies that companies employ are now largely the domain of IR specialists, working 
in conjunction with the financial director or chief financial officer (CFO) and the chief 
executive officer (CEO). Prior research has provided some evidence on what types of 
information users want to see on IR webpages and the benefits to companies of having 
effective IR programmes. An overview of IR practices in South Africa, with some views 
from users and practitioners is then presented. This serves as a background to and 
motivation for the first primary objective of the study. 
3.2. From printed AFS to online communication 
According to Crowther (2000), there are four broad stages in the evolution of the format 
and function of corporate reporting through the twentieth century and up to the present.  
3.2.1. Stage 1: Before 1940 
The distinction between the company and its environment was recognised, but a 
deliberate choice was made to ignore the external environment. Corporate reporting 
was simply a way for the managers and the owners of the business to communicate. 
The communication was retrospective – it simply reported past actions and results. 
Results were what mattered and the annual report was merely deemed an effective 
means of communicating those results to the owners (the existing shareholders). The 
main emphasis was accountability to the shareholders only (Crowther, 2000:1843). 
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3.2.2. Stage 2: From 1940 to 1975 
In this period, the company and its managers recognised the existence and importance 
of the external environment and the need to attract additional investment for expansion 
projects and other purposes. The orientation of reports thus shifted towards potential 
investors. To attract new investment, there was an increasing focus on future 
prospects for the company, rather than only past performance. Crowther (2000:1843) 
argues that in this stage the agency relationship between managers and shareholders 
started to weaken. Managers began to view themselves as being in a relationship with 
any investors (current and potential) in the business, rather than only with the current 
owners of the business. In this stage, past results and future prospects for the company 
were the issues that mattered, and annual reports remained an effective means of 
communication only. The emphasis began to shift towards forward-looking information 
that could be used for decision-making purposes (Crowther, 2000:1843). 
3.2.3. Stage 3: From 1975 to 1995 
Companies no longer sought to communicate only internally, to existing shareholders 
or potential shareholders, but began widening their focus to include the external 
environment. Results no longer mattered: they were still included in annual reports, but 
became less prominent. Future prospects mattered more. The forward orientation did 
not focus on the economic prospects of the company, but on prospects for 
shareholders in terms of rewards – both dividends and share price increases. The 
annual report acknowledged other stakeholder groups and sought to demonstrate 
good corporate citizenship by including employees, customers and the local 
community in its intended audience. This resulted in annual reports becoming not only 
a communication medium, but also a mechanism for self-promotion. The results of the 
past performance were no longer of primary importance; the image of the company 
was. The production and distribution of the report became a major event on the 
corporate calendar (Crowther, 2000:1844). 
 
3.2.4. Stage 4: Since 1995 and online 
This is the age of electronic communication and reporting. The performance of the 
company is now included in a wider range of information concerning the company. The 
Internet is used as another communication channel. The company’s image is still 
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important, and companies vie with each other to have the most elaborate, spectacular 
and entertaining websites (Crowther, 2000:1844).  
 
In order to engage users online (including investors), the usability of a company’s 
website becomes a crucial consideration. Usability as a general term is defined by ISO 
9241-11 as 
…the extent to which a system can be used by specified users to achieve a 
specified goal with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context 
of use. (ISO, 1998) 
 
Useful websites are described by Nielsen (2012), a usability expert, as having the 
following: 
Utility = whether it provides the features [and information] you need. 
Usability = how easy and pleasant these features are to use. 
Useful = utility + usability. 
 
Loranger and Nielsen (2009) conducted usability tests of 94 IR websites with 
individuals and investment professionals, which resulted in the publication of 103 
usability guidelines focusing specifically on online IR. The aim of usability guidelines is 
to help companies to get users to the right information swiftly, to make websites easy 
to view, and to make it easy for those who view the sites to use the information. Nielsen 
(2011) reported that websites need to attract a visitor’s attention within ten seconds; 
otherwise, visitors leave the site in increasing numbers during the next 20 seconds. 
Accounting for Sustainability et al. (2012:42) also recommends that companies “should 
be mindful not only of content but the usability of websites.”  
 
The short history above illustrates how companies have moved from reporting in 
printed format to communicating with investors online. The next section describes 
models of how companies implement the Internet as a communication medium. 
3.3. Online communication: Adoption models 
3.3.1. Lymer, Debreceny, Gray and Rahman’s model of Internet financial 
reporting 
Lymer, Debreceny, Gray and Rahman (1999) conducted research on behalf of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) on the annual financial 
reporting by 660 companies on the Internet. These companies represented the 30 
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largest companies listed on the Dow Jones Global Index for 22 countries. The websites 
were analysed for the period from November 1998 to February 1999.  
 
Lymer et al. (1999:48) describe the following stages of Internet financial reporting:  
 Duplicate print  
The electronic format financial information duplicates the printed financial 
statements. Portable Document Format (PDF) versions of documents are used 
extensively. This involves little additional effort from management. 
 Interactive webpages and downloading  
The financial information uses Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) hyperlinking, 
and data are available for downloading. Much more effort is involved, and 
companies are serious about using the Internet as an information distribution 
platform. 
 Enhanced Internet technologies  
The financial information is now presented with enhancements that cannot be 
incorporated in printed documents. These provide alternative ways to present 
complex information, for example, user-specified graphing, slides with videos of 
presentations, or live-feed of presentations. 
 
They found that 86 per cent of the companies had websites, but this differed from 100 
per cent to 43 per cent between countries. Just under 50 per cent used HTML in some 
format – 35 per cent disclosed substantial elements of their complete financial 
statements in HTML format. Lymer et al. (1999:49) concluded that at that stage most 
of the Internet reporting was still in Stages 1 and 2. 
 
3.3.2. Hedlin’s model of corporate reporting on the Internet 
Based on his research on the websites of 60 companies listed on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange during September 1998, Hedlin (1999:373-374) framed the following model 
for the adoption of the Internet for IR: 
 Establishing a web presence 
This entails establishing a website with general company information. There is 
usually little information of interest to investors. The focus is mostly on customers 
buying the company’s products or services. 
 Using the Internet to communicate financial information  
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Companies start to realise that different stakeholders require different information. 
IR departments are established and they effect changes to the company’s website. 
Electronic versions, such as PDFs of paper-based documents such as annual 
reports, interim reports and press releases are made available on websites. The 
Internet is only used as a low-cost and efficient second distribution channel and 
little attention is paid to specific advantages that could be leveraged by using the 
Internet. 
 Taking advantage of the unique features and possibilities of the medium 
In this stage, corporate websites are not only used as alternative means to 
distribute traditional paper-based information, but companies exploit the unique 
features and possibilities of the Internet, such as interactive graphs, Flash-video, 
real-time webcasts, HTML hyperlinked reports, etc.  
3.3.3. Teo and Pian’s model of Web adoption 
Teo and Pian (2005:458) developed a model of Internet adoption that reflects the 
strategic intentions of a company, based on website research on 159 companies listed 
in Singapore. Although their model is not specifically related to Internet use for financial 
communication, it is still a valuable model in terms of general trends in the adoption of 
Internet capabilities.  
 No website, only an email account  
Companies in this stage do not have independent domain names and websites. 
They only have an email account to establish connectivity with customers and 
business partners. In Teo and Pian’s (2005) study, 17 per cent of companies fell 
into this category. 
 Web presence 
The adoption decision has been made and implementation is in progress. Websites 
generally provide very simple information and brochures, and tend to be non-
strategic. Thirty per cent of companies fell into this category. 
 Prospecting 
This stage involves limited use of the Internet and initiatives are driven by individual 
departments, and not tied to a cohesive strategy. They provide customers with 
product information, news, interactive content, email support etc. In Teo and Pian’s 
(2005) study, 33 per cent of companies fell into this category. 
 Business integration 
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Web adoption is incorporated into the business model. There are cross-functional 
links between customers and suppliers and web strategy is integrated with the 
firm’s business strategy. The Internet is used for business support and cost 
reduction. Sites include features for interactive marketing, sales, online 
communities, and secure online ordering. In Teo and Pian’s (2005) study, only 11 
per cent of companies achieved this integration. 
 Business transformation 
The business is transformed by Internet adoption. The focus is on building 
relationships and developing knowledge to create new business opportunities. The 
supply chain is electronically integrated. Only nine per cent of companies in the 
study were at this level. 
 
Teo and Pian (2005:465) found that the more proactive an organisation’s strategy, the 
higher their adoption level of Internet features. They also assessed the impact of Web 
adoption on an organisation’s competitive advantage in terms of its differentiation, cost 
reduction, innovation, growth and alliances, using a 7-point Likert scale (7=extremely 
much). Companies with only a ‘Web presence’ had mean scores of 3.51 to 4.35, 
whereas companies in the ‘Business transformation’ phase had mean scores of 
between 4.81 and 5.94 across the five dimensions measured (Teo & Pian, 2005:466). 
They concluded that companies that used the Web at higher levels did so for innovation 
and knowledge transfer, rather than simply as a mechanism to lower costs. The 
competitive advantage of Web adoption at higher levels were greater than those 
achieved at lower levels. Teo and Pian’s model’s applicability to the present study is 
that it highlights the benefit that the Internet (in the form of a company website) can 
have on the cohesiveness of a company’s strategy. In an effective company, one of 
the objectives of its strategy would be to lower the cost of long-term funding by means 
of, inter alia, increased effectiveness in communicating with investors. 
 
As mentioned in Section 1.4 Research objectives, a secondary objective of this study 
is to deduce the phase in which JSE-listed companies are. Hedlin’s (1999) model deals 
specifically with using the Internet for IR activities. It is therefore appropriate that the 
rest of the present study refers to the stages as defined by Hedlin. 
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3.4. Role of the Investor Relations (IR) department 
A few definitions of IR are helpful in achieving greater clarity on the role of IR 
departments.  
 
One of the earliest studies into the role of IR departments was conducted by Marston 
(1996) on 61 per cent of the 500 largest UK-listed companies. She defines IR as 
…the link between a company and the financial community, providing information 
to help the financial community and the investing public evaluate a company. 
(Marston, 1996:477) 
 
Dolphin (2004:26) describes IR as 
…continuous, planned, deliberate, sustained marketing activities that identify, 
establish, maintain and enhance both long- and short-term relationships between 
a company and not only its prospective and present investors, but also other 
financial analysts and stakeholders. 
 
The IRS of the UK expands the IR definition, describing IR as 
…the communication of information and insight between a company and the 
investment community. This process enables a full appreciation of the company’s 
business activities, strategy and prospects and allows the market to make an 
informed judgement about the fair value and appropriate ownership of a company. 
(IRS, 2013)  
 
Another view of the role of IR is offered by the FCLT-initiative. They define ‘investor-
corporate dialogue’ as 
…[the] flow of information and ideas between corporations and their current and 
future investors. A healthy dialogue can empower management to make strategic 
and operating decisions that build value for the long term. (FCLT, 2016:4) 
 
The FCLT definition places a strong emphasis on two-way communication and the 
valuation to be determined as the long-term value, in line with Dolphin’s view (2004).  
Note the similarity of the IR definitions above with the first aim of the Integrated 
Reporting Framework (IIRC, 2013:2), which is to “[i]mprove the quality of information 
available to providers of financial capital to enable a more efficient and productive 
allocation of capital”. Companies have practised IR, and communicated about the 
various capitals, for decades (the questionnaire for Marston’s 1996 study was 
completed by IR professionals in 1991), long before the formalisation of the concept of 
integrated reporting.  
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The importance of transparency and the strategic role of IR departments is also 
recognised by the OECD. The OECD advises that the board of directors clearly 
establish functions and responsibilities in respect of disclosure and communication. 
For large listed companies, the appointment of an IR officer who reports directly to the 
board is considered good practice (OECD, 2015:50).  
 
In its tenth annual survey of global IR practices in 2015 (responses from 550 
companies in 54 countries), the Bank of New York Mellon (BNY Mellon, 2016:10-11) 
reported on the structure and budget of IR teams inside companies as follows: 
• the average IR team consists of 3.2 members (2.1 professionals and 1.1 support 
staff member); 
• the number of years of experience of the most senior IR professional in the team is 
9.5 years on average; 
• ten per cent of companies had IR staff located outside their home market; 
• the average IR budget (excluding IR staff’s salaries) for North America is $658 000, 
followed by Western Europe with $621 000, Latin America with $497 000, 
Developed Asia with $410 000, and Africa with $367 000; and 
• the IR department reports to the CFO in 64 per cent of companies (BNY Mellon, 
2016:23). 
 
Communication with the equity market is split between the CEO, the CFO and the IR 
Officer. The percentage of time usually spent on IR activities is set out in Table 3.1. 
The bulk of the time across all role players and across all company sizes is spent on 
communicating with institutional shareholders and sell-side analysts. Executives of 
micro-sized organisations have the highest non-participation rate. Retail investors and 
the financial media received the least amount of time across all role players and across 
all company sizes.  
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Table 3.1: Percentage of time spent on IR-related activities 
 
Source: BNY Mellon (2016:12) 
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Only 24 per cent of companies have a written policy regarding interaction between the 
board of directors and investors, whilst 22 per cent reported having a company policy 
not to meet with investors (BNY Mellon, 2016:25). In line with the OECD’s 
recommendation (2015:50), 82 per cent of companies now have a disclosure policy 
and 37 per cent have a policy that covers analyst and broker interaction (BNY Mellon, 
2016:27). 
 
The importance of an IR department can be judged by how it is perceived by the users 
of its output. An earlier survey of investment professionals by the AIMR (now the CFA) 
revealed that 74 per cent of respondents rated the CFO, controller, treasurer, or 
equivalent, as a very or extremely important source of communication, compared to 
65 per cent who thought the CEO was extremely important as a source of information. 
IR staff scored only 31 per cent for importance as a source of information (CFA, 
2003:7). The quality of information received from these three sources was scored 43, 
35, and 22 per cent each in the good or excellent category.  
 
A more recent study (Hoffmann & Fieseler, 2012:145) found that equity analysts in 
Frankfurt rated the quality of a company’s IR department as the second most important 
factor in forming an opinion of the company, aside from its financials. In South Africa, 
Bechan (2011) surveyed large institutional and private shareholders. His results show 
that transparent communication is regarded as the most important aspect of corporate 
governance that affects confidence in a company (Bechan, 2011: 148): 98 per cent of 
respondents indicated that they were likely to lower a company’s rating if sufficient 
information was not available to them (Bechan, 2011:150). These surveys point 
towards the increasing importance of IR departments in the process of communicating 
with the capital market. 
 
Next, I discuss what types of information investors and analysts want to see on 
corporate websites to assist them in decision-making. 
3.5. Users’ perceptions 
Loranger and Nielsen (2009) conducted interviews with 63 retail investors, analysts, 
professional investors and the business press regarding their information needs when 
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they visit a company’s website for research purposes. A summary of the items that 
users wanted to see on websites is presented in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: The most important information requirements by category of user 
Private (retail) investors Financial analysts  Institutional investors  
Company overview  
(the company’s purpose and 
its history, such as when it 
was founded and where it is 
based)  
Company overview  
(the company’s purpose, 
size, and markets)  
Company overview  
(the company’s purpose, 
size, and markets, and its 
business philosophy and 
values)  
Annual and quarterly reports  Annual and quarterly reports, 
and SEC filings  
Annual and quarterly reports, 
and SEC filings  
Share information  
(current and historical share 
price, charts, and graphs)  
Share information  
(current and historical share 
price, charts, and graphs)  
Share information  
(current and historical share 
price, charts, and graphs)  
Press releases  
(current news, business 
strategies, and acquisitions)  
Press releases  
(current news, business 
strategies, and acquisitions)  
Press releases  
(current news, business 
strategies, and acquisitions)  
 Executive information 
(management bios, previous 
positions, business concepts 
and direction)  
Executive information 
(management bios and 
previous positions)  
 IR contact information  
(names, phone numbers, and 
email addresses) 
IR contact information  
(names, phone numbers, and 
email addresses) 
 Financials calendar  
(dates for events such as 
conferences, earnings 
releases, and reports)  
Financials calendar  
(dates for events such as 
conferences and earnings 
releases)  
  Competitor information (who 
they are, how they are 
performing)  
  List of analysts following the 
company 
Source: Summarised from Loranger and Nielsen (2009:11&13) 
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The first four items (a company overview, annual and quarterly reports, share 
information and press releases) were chosen by all three categories of users, but the 
level of detail required differs, depending on the skill and purpose of the user. Private 
investors wanted to see a one-page financial overview of the company, as well as 
dividend information and product information (innovative products, services, and 
research) (Loranger & Nielsen, 2009:11). The institutional investors required 
information on the industry in which the company operates, as well as a list of analysts 
that are following the company.  
 
In the same study, Loranger and Nielsen also conducted user testing to simulate how 
users use company IR pages. Based on this research, Loranger and Nielsen (2009) 
published 103 guidelines for effective and user-friendly online IR. These guidelines 
include what information should be available, as well as what presentation formats to 
use. These guidelines formed the basis of the measurement instrument of this study, 
as discussed in Section 5.6.1 Measurement instrument and categories.  
 
Information needs can also be inferred from analyses of the information actually 
accessed on the IR webpages of companies. For example, Rowbottom and Lymer 
(2009) analysed the weblogs of traffic to 12 large UK-listed companies from January 
2003 to February 2004. Only information actually provided on a website can be 
accessed (limiting their results), but the results in Table 3.3 bear a striking similarity to 
those listed in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.3: Aggregate content requested from UK websites 
Content % of total requests 
General company information 20.8 
Annual reports 20.2 
Share price information 14.2 
Media and press releases 14.2 
Sustainability 10.8 
Website services 8.1 
Contact information 4.9 
Financial information (outside the annual report) 3.4 
Shareholder services 3.3 
Total 100.0 
Source: Rowbottom and Lymer (2009:39) 
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Large South African institutional and private investors (Bechan, 2011:151) indicated 
that the most important issues that should be communicated to the investment 
community are a clear path or strategy, new product or service developments and 
changes in the senior executive team. This agrees with many of the items on Loranger 
and Nielsen’s (2009) list. Although Bechan’s study was not about online IR in South 
Africa, it nevertheless indicates that users in South Africa want the same type of 
information as international investors. The South African investors did indicate that the 
company’s website was their second most preferred source for finding information 
about the company (Bechan, 2011:150). 
 
The IRS of the UK similarly proposes voluntary disclosure across a range of areas that 
would assist analysts and investors to grasp the competitive and financial strategies of 
the company, the various types of risk it faces and other forward-looking information 
that will guide these readers to estimate the future cash flows of the company. 
Examples of these types of disclosure are short biographies of directors, charts of 
market share for each of the main divisions of a company, future product launches, 
risk management policies and structures, governance structures, future capital 
expansion plans and dividend policy (IRS, 2012). In addition, companies can use their 
websites to load their analyst presentation booklets, allow the public to dial into 
conference calls with analysts when results are released, and present interactive and 
hyperlinked company reports. The information requirements described here strongly 
resemble those discussed in Section 2.3 Investors’ information needs. This is logical, 
as the only difference is the channel through which the information is accessed by the 
users and investors. 
 
Benefits of online IR are obvious for private (retail) shareholders and other stakeholder 
groups. Using these Internet technologies enables private shareholders and the public 
to access the same information as that which is accessible to investment professionals, 
adding to company accountability and transparency (Rowbottom & Lymer, 2010; 
Elliott, Hodge & Sedor, 2012; Bagnoli, Wang & Watts, 2014; Basoglu & Hess, 2014; 
Fuertes-Callén, Cuellar-Fernández & Pelayo-Velázquez, 2014; Gajewski & Li, 2015). 
Investors in low disclosure markets (China, emerging markets, and Europe prior to 
IFRS) benefit even more from online disclosure. Souissi and Khlif (2012) found these 
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investors to be very sensitive to voluntary disclosure in annual reports and on 
companies’ websites.  
 
IR websites also have benefits for analysts and institutional shareholders. In an 
analysis by Eurosif and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) 
(2013), company websites were deemed ‘essential’ or ‘high’ as a source of non-
financial information for more than 80 per cent of analysts and investors surveyed. In 
its survey of professional investors, PwC (2014) reports on how often various sources 
of information are used (see Table 3.4). Investor presentations by companies are the 
top source for information about a company’s strategy and resource allocation, and the 
third most popular source for financial information and information on risks and 
opportunities. If the company’s IR department uploads these presentation webcasts 
and/or slides to the company’s website, private or individual shareholders also have 
access to this information. Professional investors also rated the corporate website the 
third most popular source for information about environmental, social and governance 
issues. Apart from personal dialogue with management, all other information sources 
should be archived on the company’s IR webpages in any case. 
 
Table 3.4: The top three data sources per information category 
Financial  Strategy and 
resource 
allocation 
Risks and 
opportunities 
Governance  Environmental, 
social and 
human capital 
1.Annual report Investor 
presentations 
Dialogue with 
management 
Annual report Annual report 
2.Preliminary 
 results 
 announcement 
Dialogue with 
management 
Annual report Proxy 
statements 
Sustainability 
report 
3.Investor 
 presentations 
Annual report Investor 
presentations 
Dialogue with 
management 
Website 
Source: PwC (2014:17)  
 
Quality of investor communication is therefore not only about the type of information 
that is communicated, but also about whether the technology and channel(s) used for 
the communication add to the credibility and usability of the information for a variety of 
users of corporate financial and non-financial information. It is therefore of the utmost 
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importance that a company’s CFO and the IR officer work closely together to sell the 
company’s investment case on its website.  
 
In the next section, I discuss the benefits to the company from having an effective IR 
programme. 
3.6. Benefits for the company from having an IR programme 
Chapter 2 Voluntary disclosure, explored the role of voluntary disclosure in reducing 
information asymmetry and thereby improving the information component of share 
prices. Disclosure made via an IR programme makes use of another channel by which 
information is passed on to the capital markets (see the various definitions provided 
for IR in Section 3.4 Role of the Investor Relations (IR) department). One would 
therefore expect the same benefits as those described in Section 2.2.1 Economic 
motives to follow from high quality IR programmes and from increasing quality over 
time. Empirical studies have indeed found this to be true. Increasing IR quality reduces 
the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts and bid-ask spreads, increases the analyst 
following, increases investment by institutional investors, and improves trading volume 
and book-to-price ratios (Farragher et al., 1994; Brennan & Tamarowski 2000; Chang 
et al., 2008; Bushee & Miller, 2012; Vlittis & Charitou, 2012). Kirk and Vincent (2014) 
have shown that companies that invest in an internal IR department (as opposed to 
contracting external service providers) experienced increased disclosure, higher 
analyst following, greater institutional shareholdings, improved liquidity and higher 
market valuations than a control group of matched companies. 
 
Agarwal et al. (2016) found that companies with higher quality IR strategies, which are 
nominated for Best Overall IR award, tend to have significantly higher valuation 
multiples than companies that are not, nominated. They also found that increasing the 
IR quality led to higher analyst following and improvements in shares’ liquidity. These 
findings applied to companies of all sizes, but were stronger for smaller companies. 
They extended the findings of Bushee and Miller (2012) and Vlittis and Charitou (2012), 
whose studies focused on smaller, less visible companies. Interestingly, having a good 
IR programme did not seem to shield US companies from investor distrust in the wake 
of the Enron disaster and related financial scandals (Peasnell et al., 2011). They advise 
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companies to be cautious and to adapt their IR programmes during specific periods of 
investor mistrust in capital markets.  
 
Some benefits to a company’s investment in IR, for example, improved liquidity, do not 
accrue equally to all shareholders (small shareholders do not benefit from improved 
market depth, but proportionally share in the cost of IR). They may not even lead to an 
increase in the company’s long-term share price, according to various conceptual 
models developed by Hong and Huang (2005:21-22). This is especially true for small 
and recently listed companies where the CEO and CFO need to spend a large portion 
of their time with analysts and institutional shareholders to increase visibility in the 
equity market at a time when survival is crucial (see also Table 3.1 for the percentage 
of time spent on various IR activities by small and micro companies). Management 
usually has high equity stakes in small and recently listed companies. Hong and Huang 
(2005:4) argue that an agency problem arises because “it is these high equity stakes 
that lead insiders to consider the liquidity of their shares possibly at the expense of 
adopting a value maximizing investor relations policy.”  
 
The background and research into IR practices in South Africa follows next. 
3.7. Investor relations in South Africa 
Schoonraad (2003) investigated the financial communication process and role players 
inside companies in South Africa. As companies’ types of financial reporting 
progressed towards Stage 4 as described by Crowther (2000), and Stage 3 as 
described by Hedlin (1999), the reporting process itself also evolved into a multi-
functional team effort. Schoonraad (2003:102) found that there was some confusion 
regarding the nature, management, and organisation of financial communication. 
There is also a lack of integration, in terms of both management and organisation. She 
proposed a conceptual model for an inclusive and integrated approach to financial 
communication. Schoonraad’s model recommends that the entire financial 
communication process should be managed and organised in an interdisciplinary or 
cross-functional manner, linking the accounting, IR and public relations departments.  
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In prior research, I amended Schoonraad’s model to include the role that the Internet 
plays in facilitating two-way communication between parties (Esterhuyse, 2004:25), as 
set out in Figure 3.1. Schoonraad’s model was adapted to reflect the information 
technology (IT) department’s involvement as a fourth party and the Internet as another 
channel for communication with stakeholders. The IT department’s role is to facilitate 
the company’s communication via the Internet. I proposed that once the company has 
decided what information to publish, it is the IT department’s task to put that information 
on the company’s website (Esterhuyse, 2004:25).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Model for integrated management and organisation of financial 
communication – incorporating the Internet 
Source: Esterhuyse (2004:25) 
 
Users that have subscribed for specific updates or releases of certain information can 
be alerted by email. Normally, most financial information is posted on the website under 
the menu of the IR webpage. Information needs of other stakeholders are normally 
catered for under pages such as Community, Environment and so on. It is also the role 
of the IT department to keep up to date with technological developments and to advise 
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the team of ways that can enhance the communication process, for example, webcasts 
of analysts’ presentations, live conference calls for results announcements, or social 
media such as Twitter. I also recommended that the financial director take an active 
role in determining what information is disclosed and what Internet technologies would 
get the company’s message across most effectively in collaboration with the IT 
department (Esterhuyse, 2004:65).  
 
in the wake of the 2007/8 global financial crises, a survey by the South African Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) of CFOs of the JSE’s top 40 companies reported 
that CFOs rated communication management as the third most important soft skill 
(after leadership and problem-solving skills) in 2010, and for the next three years ahead 
(SAICA, 2010:29). A majority of 58 per cent of CFOs indicated that they envisaged 
spending a lot or most of their time on investor, stakeholder and market liaison and 
communication work in the next three years. Communicating with stakeholders and 
investors was also repeatedly mentioned as a challenge for the future (SAICA, 
2010:52). 
 
King II (IoD, 2002:138) acknowledges that IT such as the Internet is a potentially 
powerful enabler to improve the reporting and transparency of companies. The King III 
(IoD, 2009:par 48 - 50) stipulates that a company’s board of directors should ensure 
that there is transparent and relevant communication with stakeholders. South Africa 
is part of the global economy, and in terms of financial services is rated to be on par 
with developed countries such as the US and UK (WEF, 2012:325). It follows that 
international trends in reporting and IT would be followed locally. International and local 
investors expect to find the same information and presentation formats for South 
African companies as those they find on international companies’ websites.  
3.7.1. Investors’ (users’) views 
Stainbank and Peebles (2006:74) surveyed 72 unit-trust managers in South Africa in 
2000 to determine their views (using a 5-point Likert scale) on the usefulness of various 
sources of information for investment decision-making. Table 3.5 represents their 
findings from 12 responses (a 17 per cent response rate).  
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Table 3.5: Sources of information for unit trust managers in South Africa in 2000 
 Rank Mean 
Communication with management 1 4.50 
Company announcements/reports 2 4.27 
Stockbroker advice 3 3.73 
Newspapers, magazines and journals 4 3.25 
Internet 5 2.92 
Financial analysts 6 2.67 
Technical analysis 7 2.33 
Family/friends’ advice 8 1.17 
Source: Stainbank and Peebles (2006:74) 
Interestingly, the Internet was only ranked fifth in usefulness. This could be explained 
by a lack of quality decision-relevant information on those websites. Although the 
survey was published in 2006, the survey was already done in 2000. At that stage 
Internet reporting and communication in South Africa was still in Stage 1 in terms of 
Hedlin’s (1999) model. Information items ranked above the Internet were either not 
usually present on company websites, or could be found more easily through other 
direct means, such as a telephone call to the CEO or newspaper announcements. It 
should also be borne in mind that this survey was executed before the implementation 
of regulations prohibiting companies from releasing information selectively. The low 
response rate makes it difficult to generalise the findings of this 2006 study to all users.  
 
Bechan (2011:150) reports that large institutional and private investors rank corporate 
websites as the second most popular source of information, after articles in the 
financial press. No further studies could be found that solicited the views of South 
African investors (users) of companies’ IR websites.  
 
The next section discuss the views of IR practitioners in South Africa. 
3.7.2. IR practitioners’ views 
Lujiza (2011) interviewed 12 of the largest companies listed on the JSE regarding their 
IR practices. The IR managers reported that they had an IR strategy to achieve the 
following (Lujiza, 2011:37): 
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 Ensuring that the cost of equity is reduced. The only way to reduce the cost of 
capital is to ensure that the share price is valued fairly on the market. 
 Ensuring that they effectively manage communication between management 
and investors. 
 Focussed investor targeting by understanding investment styles, in order to get 
the investor on their shareholder register.  
 Providing information on company financial performance, business strategy 
and operations in an accurate, honest and quick manner.  
 Being accessible to the investor community (investors, analysts, sponsors, 
etc.). 
 Complying with JSE regulations and other reporting requirements imposed by 
King 3 and the Companies Act. 
These objectives are in line with the definitions of IR provided in Section 3.4 Role of 
the Investor Relations (IR) department. 
 
All but one of the respondents in Lujiza’s (2011) interviews with IR officers reported 
that their companies take IR very seriously, have formalised it, and have incorporated 
it into their structures. Having an IR function and strategy is voluntary. Therefore, 
spending money on IR (for example, going on international road shows, employing IR 
staff and investing in an IR website) is evidence of how seriously they take IR (Lujiza, 
2011:41-42). Companies reported the following reasons for presenting IR information 
on their websites (Lujiza, 2011:55, cited verbatim): 
 It was common practice with all listed companies around the world to have 
information on the website, as it is publicly accessible  
 Potential investors from anywhere in the world could access information and 
make enquiries based on the information provided on the website  
 It was a generally accepted communication practice with the JSE to disclose 
market information via websites  
 It was a quick method of disseminating useful information about investor events 
and storing documents that investors had been given already 
 
Respondents also indicated that they used the Internet for IR to meet the increased 
information requirements of stakeholders and because of the transparency provided 
by the Internet (Lujiza, 2011:72). Only one respondent regarded the Internet as 
strategically important for the company’s IR activities; the rest admitted to using the 
Internet because it was ‘common practice’ (Lujiza, 2011:78). Bearing in mind that 
Lujiza’s interviews were conducted with some of the largest companies on the JSE, it 
seems that this is a classic example of mimetic isomorphism, as described by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Lujiza (2011:79) adds: 
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..the organisations were not thinking about Internet investor relations as a medium 
through which relationships could be built, but rather as a medium for distributing 
disclosure information. [author’s emphasis] 
 
From the above observation by Lujiza in 2011, one can deduce that companies were 
still using the Internet as a ‘push’ (‘distributing’) communication medium instead of as 
a two-way channel with feedback loops, as I proposed seven years earlier (Esterhuyse, 
2004:25). There was no IR certification, or professional body to which IR practitioners 
in South Africa could belong (Lujiza, 2011:82). Since then, on 12 October 2015, the IR 
Society of South Africa was incorporated (IRS SA, 2015) and the society has an 
operational website at http://irsociety.co.za/. Lujiza (2011:83) noted that for some 
companies “the seriousness starts and ends with complying with the minimum 
requirements of the JSE only.” This finding provides a rationale for the choice of the 
first aim of this study, namely to establish what the current online IR practices of South 
African companies are. 
 
The next section deals with studies about what is actually displayed on IR websites of 
South African companies. 
3.7.3. Disclosure on South African corporate websites 
Various authors have researched the use of web technologies in South African 
companies for communicating financial and other voluntary information. The earliest 
study that included South Africa was done by Lymer et al., (1999). The top 30 
companies, according to the Dow Jones South African Index, were analysed for the 
period from November 1998 to February 1999 regarding their Internet characteristics, 
as part of a larger study (22 countries). Of the 30 companies, 26 (87 per cent) had 
websites, but only 22 (73 per cent) had financial information on these websites. As can 
be seen in Table 3.6, 13 (59 per cent) of the 22 companies with financial information 
on their websites made use of a downloadable format. HTML was used in some format 
for their financials by 18 companies (82 per cent).  
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Table 3.6: Stage of development of financial reporting by country (South Africa) 
 Count % of all companies % of companies with 
financials 
No website 4 13  
Website – no financials 4 13  
Download accounts only 4 13 18 
HTML summary only 2 7 9 
HTML summary & download 3 10 14 
HTML accounts 7 23 32 
HTML accounts & download 6 20 27 
Total 30 100 100 
Source: Extracted from Lymer et al. (1999:51)  
 
Table 3.7: Types of information supplied under financials (South Africa) 
 Disclosed (n = 22) % 
Balance sheet 13 59 
Income statement 13 59 
Cash flow statement 12 55 
Notes to the accounts 4 18 
Changes in equity statement 4 18 
Financial summary 11 50 
Audit report 3 14 
Segment report 6 27 
Chair’s report 10 45 
Corporate information 10 45 
Year in review 7 32 
Management report 4 18 
Source: Extracted from Lymer et al. (1999:53, 55) 
 
The types of information supplied under the financial sections of the web sites are 
summarised in Table 3.7. Half of the companies supplied at least the summary 
financials, and 55 per cent or more supplied the cash flow statement, balance sheet 
and/or income statement. Only 18 per cent of these companies provided the notes to 
the financial statements. This omission reduced the usability of the financial figures 
greatly. 
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Roberts (1999:2) reported in a study of the top 100 South African companies for June 
1999 that only 43 companies (43 per cent) had accessible websites. The ratio of 
companies with websites is lower than that of Lymer et al. (1999), but the sample size 
of Roberts (1999) is much larger than that of the Lymer et al. (1999) study (100 
companies versus 30 companies). Of those websites, 33 supplied financial information 
(77 per cent of those with websites). Financial statements were supplied in 22 cases 
(67 per cent of those with financial information) and only 11 (33 per cent of those with 
financial information) provided full annual reports (Roberts, 1999:3). However, when 
the 33 company websites with financial information are compared to the total sample 
of 100 companies, only 33 per cent of companies used the Internet to communicate 
financial information at that stage. 
 
In January 2002, the websites of the top 100 companies (from the Top 150 Market 
Leaders identified by the Financial Mail) were investigated by Venter (2002). Of the 
100 companies, 85 had a website. This was already almost double the number of 
companies with websites than in the study by Roberts in June 1999. Of these, 83 (98 
per cent) had some form of IR or financial information web page. Only 45 per cent of 
companies provided a search option, and 34 per cent had a site map. Venter (2002) 
found that 66 per cent of the companies provided a link to IR or investor information 
and concluded that these links are an important part of the planning of a company's 
website. At that time, 54 per cent of companies had links to their latest annual financial 
statements. Stock prices were provided on the home page by 25 per cent of 
companies. 
 
Of the companies, 78 per cent provided their annual statements in PDF format, 
compared to the use of HTML (63 per cent). On average, the companies provided 2.4 
years of information on their annual results. Only four companies (5 per cent) 
presented their financial statements in both English and Afrikaans. Five companies (6 
per cent) furnished their information in foreign currencies, or had the option to convert 
to foreign currency. Of the companies that provided financial information in electronic 
format, 27 per cent did not provide a chairperson’s report. In cases where it was 
present, the chairperson’s reports were signed in 53 per cent of cases. Moreover, 18 
per cent of companies did not provide information on their directors. Just under half of 
the companies (49 per cent) provided a presentation of their latest results. Newer 
 Chapter 3 – Online investor relations practices 95 
 
 
technologies such as webcasting were used in 16 per cent of instances. A few 
companies also provided the opportunity to read the opinions of market analysts, either 
by links to reports, or by supplying the contact details of analysts that followed the 
company and from whom the user could request reports. 
 
In a later study undertaken in January and February 2003 by Barac (2004) as part of 
a larger study, the websites of the top 100 companies in South Africa (the SA Giants 
as identified by the Financial Mail of June 2002) were assessed for their content, style 
of presentation and application of navigation aids. Of the 100 companies, six had been 
delisted at the time of the survey. A further six did not have a website and one's site 
was under construction. Therefore, 87 sites were investigated. Of the companies with 
websites (93 per cent), nearly all (99 per cent) used drop-down menus or a table of 
contents. Site maps were only found on 46 per cent of the websites, and only 44 per 
cent provided a search facility. Detailed annual reports were provided on 86 per cent 
of the sites, mostly as PDFs. Hyperlinks were only found in 29 per cent of the annual 
reports presented on-line. A corporate governance statement was evident in 84 per 
cent of cases and even social and environmental reports were found on 63 per cent of 
websites. At that time, 75 per cent of companies had an IR page on their website. The 
following information appeared on these pages: 
 press releases (94 per cent); 
 share price information (77 per cent); 
 shareholder information (e.g. dates of meetings, proxy votes) (86 per cent); 
 presentations (69 per cent); and  
 interim reports (82 per cent). 
The annual reports were presented in PDF in 78 per cent of cases. Barac (2004) found 
that 46 per cent of companies used HTML (33 per cent used both). Audio and video 
presentations were very limited. Two-way communication took place by email (93 per 
cent), chat groups (9 per cent) and frequently asked questions (FAQ) sections (25 per 
cent). Barac (2004:15) commented that “top South African companies are using their 
websites mainly as bulletin boards with limited real-time financial information”. She 
concluded that electronic media are used as a mere substitute for traditional printed 
material, rather than for the more innovative practices already being implemented 
internationally (Barac, 2004:18). 
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In a study with more companies, but more limited in its content analyses, Nel and Baard 
(2006) selected 240 companies in Africa and determined during April and May 2006 
that all 40 selected South African companies had working websites. All of these South 
African companies had dedicated IR sections on their websites. Determining a logical 
website address or Universal Resource Locator (URL) was 95 per cent successful for 
the South African companies. 
 
Nel and Baard (2007) conducted another study on online investor communication 
practices for South Africa and four other African countries during June 2007. This is 
the most recent study on the topic for South Africa. Nel and Baard (2007) reviewed the 
websites of the top 40 companies in South Africa in terms of market capitalisation on 
31 December 2005. However, their checklist was limited, containing only eight items 
for content (representing broad categories rather than specific items) and 12 items for 
presentation (for example, if the company presented the information on its IR pages, 
its own dedicated page or elsewhere on the website). Webpages for company 
information, annual reports, annual report archives and corporate governance were 
present for all forty websites. Of the 240 companies, 39 had a news page, 38 had 
corporate governance pages and 37 had a page for shareholder information. 
Bondholder information was the least represented with only 15 companies making this 
information available.  
 
Since Nel and Baard’s (2007) study, Internet saturation and bandwidth in South Africa 
have increased substantially. In 2012,14 the WEF reported that 21 per cent of the 
population in South Africa were using the Internet, compared to 7.8 per cent in 2008 
(WEF, 2009:227, 2012:325). South Africa's average download speed was 1.16 Mbps 
(megabits per second) in January 2008 versus 3.22 Mbps in June 201215 (Ookla, 
2014). The growth in bandwidth and online users means that companies can reach a 
wider audience with their online IR programmes. Companies will be able to use 
bandwidth-intensive technologies such as videos, online conference calls with 
                                             
14 Although newer statistics are available and were consulted, reference is made to 2012 figures as it 
relates to the period when the content analyses of the websites for the current study were executed. 
15 I could not obtain the latest Internet speeds from Ookla as they have since made their data proprietary. 
An alternative source is Akamai, which reports average speeds of 5.6 Mbps for South Africa in quarter 
two of 2016 (Akamai, 2016:40). 
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analysts, webcasts of presentations and interactive stock charting more widely and 
efficiently as bandwidth capacity increases for both companies and private investors.  
 
Given that 
 the most recent study on IR in South Africa was conducted in 2007; 
 Internet speeds have improved considerably since 2007;  
 the Integrated Report <IR> has been implemented for financial years beginning on 
or after 1 March 2010; and 
 there is no evidence on the use of online IR outside of large companies; 
it is evident that the online IR landscape in South Africa needs to be revisited. This 
provided the motivation for the first primary objective of the present study, namely to 
understand the state of online IR practices of JSE-listed companies. The Ernst and 
Young (2012) and Nkonki (2012) findings of high ratings for JSE-listed companies’ 
integrated reporting and the WEF (2012) first rating for South African companies’ 
compliance with reporting standards (see Section 2.3 Investors’ information needs), 
led me to expect that I would find similar high ratings for online IR practices of the 
present study’s sample of JSE companies.  
 
A secondary research objective, following on from an assessment of these practices, 
was to conclude in which stage of online IR South Africa finds itself as described in 
Section 3.3.2 Hedlin’s model of corporate reporting on the Internet. 
3.8. Summary and conclusion 
The chapter started with a brief history of how financial reporting developed from the 
traditional, paper-based audited annual financial statements (AFS) to the practice of 
disclosing the annual report and other voluntary information on the company’s website 
(Crowther, 2000). Models by Hedlin (1999), as well as Lymer, Debreceny, and Gray 
and Rahman (1999) describe three stages in the adoption of online investor 
communications. Due to the increasing complexity of disclosure, communication 
strategies are now largely the domain of IR specialists. Prior research has provided 
evidence on the benefits to companies of having effective IR programmes. Research 
into the use of websites and other electronic communication media by investors was 
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discussed. It highlighted the fact that investors increasingly prefer to gather their 
information from companies’ websites. 
 
Prior research into IR practices in South Africa was also discussed. Users indicated 
the same preferences as those of users in other parts of the world. Lujiza (2011) 
reported evidence that IR practices are not well developed in some companies, where 
only the minimum information required by regulation is provided. Further evidence was 
discussed from prior studies into what was actually displayed on the IR webpages of 
South African companies. These studies were mainly conducted on large companies, 
in the top 40 or top 100 companies. Barac’s (2004) results showed that companies 
were still stuck in Stage 2 of Hedlin’s (1999) model, as they tried to replicate the paper 
documents only, instead of taking full advantage of the Internet’s capabilities to 
enhance communication with investors. The most recent study on JSE-listed 
companies’ IR practices was conducted by Nel and Baard in 2007. This study was 
limited to the top 40 companies. I have pointed out that Internet broadband has 
improved significantly since then. I therefore indicated that, based on the literature 
review, there is a strong reason to pursue the first primary objective of this study, 
namely to discover what the latest online IR practices of South African companies are, 
and to reassess the stage of implementation of online IR in terms of Hedlin’s (1999) 
model as a secondary objective. 
 
The next chapter introduces the long-horizon motivation for the shareholder familiarity 
hypothesis of the study, and describes prior studies on factors associated with the 
levels of online IR practices in other parts of the world.  
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 CHAPTER 4 
LONG HORIZONS AND SHAREHOLDER FAMILIARITY 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the purpose and practice of online IR in the rest of the world 
and in South Africa were discussed. This chapter argues that the practice of IR is 
influenced by the capital market in which it is practised. Studies comparing IR in 
different regions of the world have confirmed that the national disclosure environment 
is a differentiating factor (Debreceny, Gray & Rahman, 2002; Bollen, Hassink & Bozic, 
2006). The chapter starts by describing the unique characteristics of the JSE and the 
companies listed on it. 
 
Many of the theories that underpin voluntary disclosure behaviour were formulated in 
the US during periods when institutional investors and block-holders had preferential 
access to the management of their investee companies. I therefore discuss the 
disclosure regulations of the SEC in the US and those of the JSE. This forms the 
background to the motivation for the concept of long investment horizons by investors 
and shareholder familiarity. Findings of prior studies on other factors that are 
associated with the quality or extent of online IR are then described. The chapter 
concludes with the presentation of the model proposed by this study for voluntary 
online IR practices by JSE-listed companies. 
4.2. Characteristics of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) classifies South Africa as an emerging market 
and developing economy in the Sub-Saharan African cluster (IMF, 2014). In their meta-
analysis of studies on company characteristics related to disclosure behaviour, Khlif 
and Souissi (2010) noted that differences in cultures and business environments 
between emerging market countries and developed economies may explain the lack 
of transparency in corporate disclosure practices in emerging market countries. In their 
subsequent meta-analysis of studies on the relationship between annual report 
disclosure and cost of equity, Souissi and Khlif (2012) found a negative association 
between these two variables in countries with a low disclosure environment. In low 
disclosure environments, shareholders usually only have access to the annual report 
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as a source of information (Souissi & Khlif, 2012:58). By contrast, Souissi and Khlif 
(2012) found no significant association between annual report disclosure and the cost 
of equity in high disclosure environments such as the US, Canada, and the UK. They 
attributed this finding to the high quality of the annual reports in these three countries, 
where there is not much variation between companies’ disclosure levels, and a 
significant relationship can therefore not be observed. Information intermediaries such 
as analysts also reduce the information asymmetry with their reports. However, when 
the disclosure proxy was based on Internet disclosure and conference calls, the 
association became significantly negative, even for high disclosure countries (Souissi 
& Khlif, 2012:59). These authors therefore recommend that managers in low 
information environments increase their “voluntary disclosure to reduce uncertainty 
among investors and increase the marketability of their securities” (Souissi & Khlif, 
2012:49). 
 
Emerging markets are not only usually low information environments, but stock 
exchanges in emerging markets are also smaller and less liquid than those in 
developed countries. The JSE is characterised by low stock turnover, high transaction 
costs, the absence of retail investors, and the presence of large long-term block-
holders (JSE, 2014). For illustrative purposes, I compared the JSE to four other capital 
markets, namely the US and UK (most prior studies were conducted in those two 
countries), China (like South Africa, China is a BRICS16 country and some research 
has been published on online financial communication in China) and Hong Kong 
(previously a colony of the UK17). Figure 4.1 shows that in 2012 the US equity market 
was 30 times larger than the JSE. The equity markets of the UK and China were 
respectively five and six times larger, and that of Hong Kong was almost twice as large.  
 
                                             
16 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
17 Debreceny, Gray and Rahman (2002:382) classify Hong Kong, Singapore and South Africa as 
‘colonial’ countries. 
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Figure 4.1: Market capitalisation of listed companies (US$)18 
                                            
18 The US market capitalisation is represented on the secondary Y-axis so as to make the graph more legible for the other four stock markets. 
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Source: Extracted from World Bank (2014a) 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Stocks traded, turnover ratio (per cent) of market capitalisation 
Source: Extracted from World Bank (2014b) 
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Emerging markets and developing economies are also known for having a larger 
portion of controlling shareholders, such as founding families, government, or block 
ownerships, which limits liquidity. Orsagh, Schacht and Allen (2013:138) report that 
21.7 per cent of a sample of 46 South African companies included in an international 
index such as the Russel 1000 or S&P 500, had a controlling shareholder. The 
corresponding figures for the US, UK, China, and Hong Kong were 8.4, 7.6, 61.1 and 
53.9 per cent respectively. South Africa is thus on middle ground in respect of 
controlling shareholders.  
 
Although South Africa exhibits some characteristics typical of emerging markets, it 
performs in line with advanced economies in other respects. South Africa tends to be 
strong with regard to shareowner rights, compared to other emerging markets (Orsagh 
et al., 2013). This argument is corroborated by the Global Competitiveness Report for 
2012-2013 (WEF, 2012:325) which ranked South Africa tenth out of 144 countries for 
investor protection (the US, UK, China and Hong Kong were ranked fifth, tenth19, 
eightieth and third respectively for the same metric. South Africa performed even better 
in the protection of minority shareholders’ interest (2nd), compared to the US (33rd), the 
UK (16th), China (68th) and Hong Kong (13th) (WEF, 2012:325). Confidence in the 
South African financial markets should be bolstered further by its first ranking for the 
strength of its auditing and reporting standards, the efficacy of its corporate boards, 
the regulation of securities exchanges and legal rights (WEF, 2012:325). In the 
Financial Development Report (WEF, 2012:259) South Africa is ranked second for 
‘Financing through local equity market’ (Hong Kong was ranked first), and it is ranked 
third for ‘Financial market sophistication’ (the UK was ranked first). The JSE was also 
the first stock exchange to mandate the production of an integrated report (<IR>), albeit 
on an ‘apply or explain’ basis (JSE, 2010). Since King III has been superseded by King 
IV, which is effective for financial years starting on or after 1 April 2017 (IoD, 2016:38), 
<IR> must now be applied on an ‘apply and explain’ basis. 
 
It is therefore argued that the JSE (South Africa) is a unique capital market in which to 
study voluntary disclosure behaviour, because it is classified as an emerging market 
and developing economy, but exhibits many of the characteristics of advanced 
                                             
19 Joint ranking is possible. 
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economies in respect of its stock exchange, protection of minority shareowners and 
corporate governance. In the next section, the regulatory regimes in the US and the 
JSE are compared. 
4.3. Comparing the disclosure regime of the SEC to the JSE 
Historically, institutional investors (investment funds, pension funds), block-holders, 
and analysts had access to sources of information such as analyst presentations (via 
road shows), conference calls, and one-on-one meetings with the management of the 
investee company, while private or individual shareholders did not have such access. 
These ‘back room’ communication channels were criticised for denying individual (or 
private) shareholders access to relevant information (exacerbating information 
asymmetry between investors) and for delays before that privileged (value relevant) 
information was made public. The SEC in the US, and the JSE Listings Requirements, 
addressed the issue of unequal access with similar regulation. The US regulation and 
its consequences are discussed in some detail in the next section, as most of the prior 
empirical research on information asymmetry, voluntary disclosure, the effect of 
institutional investment horizon and ownership concentration has been conducted 
using the large databases available for US shares, such as Compustat, the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), I/B/E/S (analysts’ forecasts) and Thomson’s 13 
F filings (details of institutional investors’ portfolio holdings).  
4.3.1. Regulation Fair Disclosure (US) 
On 23 October 2000, the SEC in the US implemented Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(known as Reg FD) (SEC, 2000). This prohibits companies from privately disclosing 
value-relevant information to selected securities markets professionals without 
simultaneously disclosing the same information to the public. Rule 101(e) stipulates 
that the company’s website and the Internet (for example, webcasting or a conference 
call) may be used as part of a process to provide equal and simultaneous access to 
material information (SEC, 2000).  
 
Various researchers have studied the effect of Reg FD on voluntary disclosure via 
private channels. Because companies and investors would not openly admit to 
receiving private information before 2000, these studies use the implementation of Reg 
FD as an exogenous shock to the information environment. They then compare 
 Chapter 4 – Long horizons and shareholder familiarity 105 
 
 
behaviour before and after implementation of Reg FD. In this regard, Ke, Petroni and 
Yu (2008) established that transient institutional investors (short-horizon) previously 
sold off shares a quarter before bad news broke (after a series of quarterly earnings 
increases). However, after Reg FD came into effect, the abnormal selling off before 
the breaking of bad news stopped. Like Ke at al. (2008), Ramalingegowda (2014) 
reported that long-horizon institutional investors sold off significantly fewer investments 
in companies where bankruptcy was imminent after the implementation of Reg FD than 
before. In the period before Reg FD, these investors would use their private information 
to project potential bankruptcy, and sell their holdings at least a quarter before the 
bankruptcy filing took place.  
 
Other studies found that the public information environment was enriched after Reg FD 
came into effect. Lee, Strong and Zhu (2014) found that the mispricing of US stocks 
declined after the implementation of Reg FD. This effect was stronger for companies 
that had a poor information environment before the regulation was implemented. Kirk 
and Vincent (2014) reported that companies with established professional IR 
departments more than doubled their public disclosure after the implementation of Reg 
FD. These companies also experienced a post-Reg FD increase in analyst following, 
institutional shareholders, and liquidity.20  
 
Despite some of the positive findings described here, other researchers had lingering 
doubts about whether the private disclosure channels had really been shut off. A case 
study investigation of a large New York Stock Exchange-listed company indicated that 
sell-side analysts continue to spend large amounts of time privately with company 
management and the IR department (Soltes, 2014). No access was observed for the 
blackout periods before earnings announcements, but private access peaked 
immediately after public announcements of earnings results (Soltes, 2014:256). More 
than half of private access occurred during other times of the year (259). Soltes 
(2014:259) comments: 
Despite the passage of Reg FD, analysts can still become more informed by 
speaking with management. While Reg FD restricts managers’ ability to convey 
material information, analysts are legally permitted to acquire pieces of nonmaterial 
information from management. When used in conjunction with an analyst’s other 
                                             
20 For a comprehensive discussion of the many studies on the effect of Reg FD, see the literature review 
by Lee et al. (2014). 
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sources of information, this information may become material in an information 
“mosaic”. 
 
To verify that this was not a situation unique to the case study company, Soltes 
confirmed the behaviours he observed with four directors of large sell-side analyst 
firms, who corroborated his observations (Soltes, 2014:247).  
 
In a related article, based on the same case study, Solomon and Soltes (2015:328) 
also reported that hedge funds that meet privately with management make more 
informed trading decisions, but this advantage does not apply to investment advisors 
or pension funds. Solomon and Soltes (2015:329) lament: 
Our analysis provides evidence suggesting that private meetings undermine one 
of the SEC's goals of assuring that all investors have equal access to information. 
These results do not necessarily imply that these meetings ought not to be allowed, 
as there may be other market benefits to permitting these interactions. Yet our 
analysis suggests that the benefits and costs of these private interactions may not 
accrue equally to all market participants. 
 
Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp (2015) extended the work of Soltes (2014) and 
Solomon and Soltes (2015) by surveying 365 sell-side analysts, supplemented by 
interviews with 18 of them. They found that information gathered during private 
conversations (mostly telephone calls) with management was more useful for earnings 
forecast accuracy than their own primary research (Brown et al., 2015:10). Some 
examples from Brown et al. (2015:19) of how the private conversations add value are 
cited verbatim: 
• Many analysts said companies schedule analyst “call-backs” immediately after 
their public earnings conference calls: one-on-one, private calls from the CFO, 
who answers additional questions from individual analysts. 
• One analyst suggested the order of calls is based on the analysts’ valuations 
of the company: “Management will call the analysts who are at the low end of 
their valuation, if they want the stock to move up. By the order in which 
management calls analysts, they can move the consensus to where they want 
it to be.”21 
• Another analyst explained the benefits of private calls as follows: “In private 
conversations with management, you get details that they’re not necessarily 
going to go into on a public call with investors. They might be more willing to 
share that with us because we can then go to clients and say, ‘This is our 
understanding of the situation. This is what the company says; this is what we 
think.’ It’s a way for them to broadcast. We’re sort of like a megaphone for 
them.” 
                                             
21 The italics indicate Brown et al.’s verbatim quotations of analysts in their study. 
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The studies by Soltes (2014), Solomon and Soltes (2015) and Brown et al., (2015) are 
highlighted here, because in Section 4.6.2 Ownership structure, I discuss studies that 
include institutional shareholding as control variables in regression models of online IR 
disclosure quality. The studies discussed in Section 4.6.2.Ownership structure rely on 
the assumption that institutional shareholders and block-holders have access to direct 
communication channels with management (as discussed here) which private or retail 
investors do not have, and therefore rely less on public information.  
 
Now that we have a better understanding of the effect of Reg FD on the US securities 
market’ disclosure environment, we will focus on the disclosure regulations of the JSE. 
4.3.2. Disclosure regulations of the JSE 
Similar to Reg FD, the JSE also prohibits companies from releasing information that 
might influence the share price (value sensitive information) to selected parties only. 
This is stipulated in Regulations 3.4 to 3.8 of the JSE Listings Requirements, which 
came into effect on 1 September 2003 (JSE, 2011a). If information is released, it 
should be released via a public medium accessible to everybody at the same time. 
Regulation 3.46 of the JSE Listings Requirements determines that after publishing 
announcements via the Stock Exchange News Service (SENS), companies are 
allowed to post the information on their websites and in the general news media (JSE, 
2011a). The prohibition of private disclosure was recently reinforced with specific 
guidance on how management should handle discussions with journalists and 
investment analysts (JSE, 2015) without releasing value-relevant information by 
chance. Of particular relevance are the following guidelines: 
• During discussions with analysts, issuers are allowed to expand on information 
already in the public domain or discuss the markets/industry in which they 
operate, provided that such expanded disclosure does not qualify as price 
sensitive information. Therefore, issuers must decline to answer questions from 
analysts where the answer would lead to divulging price sensitive information. 
In responding to certain comments or views from analysts which appear to be 
inaccurate, issuers should respond with information drawn from information 
released publicly to the market through SENS (JSE, 2015:2). 
• Issuers must not correct draft reports from analysts which are sent to them with 
a view to commenting on financial figures and/or assumptions. The issuer may 
consider the financial figures and/or assumptions and discuss them with the 
analyst, in broad terms and without providing any price sensitive information. 
Issuers can of course correct information in relation to financial figures and/or 
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assumptions that do not constitute price sensitive information and drawn from 
information released publicly to the market through SENS (JSE, 2015:3). 
• Body language: Spokespersons must be mindful of body language when 
answering questions. As an example, the shake of a person’s head in a “yes” 
or “no” gesture or showing thumbs up or down in a “positive” or “negative” 
gesture, does constitute communication when answering questions although 
not in a verbal format (JSE, 2015:3). 
• Responding to financial projections and reports: Issuers must confine 
comments on financial projections by analysts to errors in factual information 
and underlying assumptions that do not constitute price sensitive information. 
Avoid any response which may suggest that the current projections of an 
analyst are incorrect (JSE, 2015:4). 
 
In line with the OECD recommendations (OECD, 2015:50), the JSE also recommends 
that companies institute a written policy for handling confidential and price sensitive 
information (JSE, 2015:3). Provisions against insider trading are also contained in 
sections 77 to 82 of the Financial Markets Act, No. 19 of 2012 (RSA, 2012). These 
regulations together ensure that private investors, institutional shareholders and 
analysts all get value-relevant information at the same time.  
 
It would be inappropriate to make direct comparisons with the findings of Soltes (2014), 
Solomon and Soltes (2015), and Brown et al. (2015), as similar studies on the extent 
of private information signals have not been conducted in South Africa. However, it 
seems from its release of specific guidance (JSE, 2015) that the JSE wants to ensure 
that there is no private disclosure of price-relevant information. The efficacy of these 
measures can be found in the rankings that South Africa receives from the WEF, 
whose rankings are based on responses from their Executive Opinion Survey, plus 
local economic data (WEF, 2012:69-78). As indicated, in 2012, South Africa was 
ranked first for the regulation of its securities exchanges (WEF, 2012:325), second out 
of 144 countries for the protection of its minority shareholders’ interests and tenth for 
the strength of investor protection. This supports my contention that in South Africa, 
institutional shareholders and analysts do not have an informational advantage, 
compared to private (or retail) shareholders, in respect of information released by 
company management. I address this again in the hypothesis development (see 
Section 4.5 Shareholder familiarity hypothesis).  
 
The JSE’s Regulations 3.4 to 3.8 and 3.46 also paved the way for the company’s 
website to become the de facto default channel for simultaneous ‘publication’ (after 
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publication via SENS) of value-relevant information, as well as a ‘repository’ of 
previous SENS and other news releases.  
 
The discussion in Section 3.7.3 Disclosure on South African corporate websites 
indicated that even amongst large companies, best practices for online IR are not 
uniformly followed. Outside of the top 100, no research has been done on their online 
IR practices. We do not know what factors are present in the South African context that 
explains the lack of uptake of best practices in online IR. In the next section, I describe 
what researchers in other domains have found regarding factors determining online IR 
quality. 
4.4. Prior literature on predictors of online investor relations quality 
The empirical studies reviewed in Section 3.6 Benefits for the company from having 
an IR programme found that reduced cost of capital, improved liquidity and increased 
analyst following are associated with higher quality IR. However, not all companies 
engage in extensive disclosure or invest in all the Internet features. This has given rise 
to a plethora of studies since the late 1990s that investigated whether particular 
company characteristics are associated with the quality of online IR programmes.22 
Discussion here focuses on studies that report fieldwork (content analyses) conducted 
during the period ten years before the present study’s fieldwork. Studies conducted 
before 2002 contained very few variables in their explanatory models. Furthermore, 
technology, a key focus of the present study’s content analyses, has changed 
considerably.  
 
Online IR studies were initially conducted on US and UK companies, and European 
companies followed later. In the last decade, studies were published on emerging and 
developing economies, for example, on Asian, Middle-Eastern and South American 
countries and Egypt. Multi-country studies have also been conducted by many 
researchers. The complexity of the explanatory models for online IR quality evolved 
over time as more companies started adopting online financial communication 
                                             
22 I specifically excluded studies on online disclosure of environmental, social and governance 
information, or corporate social responsibility disclosure. Primary users of that information differ from 
those that the current study focuses on; motivations for such disclosure also differ (see Sections 2.2.2 
and 2.2.3). 
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practices (the dependent variables changed from ordinal to scale measures as the 
measuring instruments were refined).  
 
A brief description of the main findings, in order of when the website content analyses 
took place, follows in Table 4.1. I specifically highlight in a separate column the 
definition of ownership structure that was employed. After the implementation of Reg 
FD in 2000, the disclosure regime in the US changed. The discussion in Section 4.3.1 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (US) above indicates that, although regulations prohibit 
value-relevant disclosures from being made in private to analysts and institutional 
investors, it appears that non-value-relevant disclosures are still being made in private, 
which does seem to create value for the analysts in the bigger ‘mosaic’. The public and 
private channels of ‘accessibility’ for large block-holders and institutional shareholders 
therefore provide the basis for including ownership structure as a variable in models of 
online IR quality. Some researchers used the other side of the coin, the percentage 
free float shareholding as a variable. 
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Table 4.1: Factors associated with online investor relations practice quality 
Model fit Website 
analyses 
Country Sample size Ownership 
structure 
Significant factors No significance 
+ -
Debreceny, Gray and Rahman (2002) 
Log Likelihood = 96.210 
Chai sq = 0.000 
BIC = -37.845 
November 
1998 to 
February 1999 
22 
countries23 
Top 30 in each 
country; per 
MC24 
 Presentation model 
Size (MC); 
US listing; 
Technology 
industry; 
National disclosure 
environment 
Foreign listing Growth prospects; 
Beta; 
Leverage; 
Internet saturation 
Log Likelihood = 79.330 
Chai sq = 0.000 
BIC = -20.965 
Content model 
Size (MC); 
US listing; 
Growth 
prospects; 
Foreign listing; 
Technology industry; 
Beta; 
Leverage; 
Internet saturation; 
National disclosure 
environment 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
23 This study had a very basic rubric compared to the comprehensive checklists in the other studies due to the large scale. Content was measured on a scale of 0 = 
No internet financial reporting, to 3 = Full financials and additional information downloadable and/or HTML. Presentation format was measured on a scale of 0 = No 
website, to 2 = Dynamic (downloads and HTML). The focus was primarily on financial information (statements) (Debreceny et al., 2002:374). 
24 MC = Market capitalisation 
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Model fit Website 
analyses 
Country Sample size Ownership 
structure 
Significant factors No significance 
+ -
Bollen, Hassink and Bozic (2006) 
Weighted Index: 
Adj R2 = 0.198 
F = 5.130 
P = 0.000 
December 
2001 and 
October 2002 
Australia 
Belgium 
France 
The Nether-
lands 
South 
Africa  
UK 
270 largest 
companies; 
50 each for 
European 
countries and 
40 each for 
Australia, SA 
and UK 
Percentage of 
shares available to 
the public 
Size (MC); 
Foreign revenue; 
Foreign listing; 
National disclosure 
environment 
 
Growth 
prospects 
Public shares (‘free 
float’); 
Leverage; 
Share return; 
Return on equity 
(ROE); 
Industry 
Marston and Polei (2004)
2000:stepwise 
Adj R2 = 0.410 
F = 7.676 
21 to 26 July 
2000; 
 
Germany DAX100  
1st & 4th quartile 
2003:44 
 
Percentage free 
float 
Size (MC); 
Free float; 
Foreign listing 
(2003 sample) 
 Foreign listing (2000 
sample); 
ROE; 
Beta 
2003:stepwise 
Adj R2 = 0.617 
F = 14.849 
25 May to 3 
June 2003 
2000:49 
Gandía (2008)
Stepwise: 
Adj. R2 = 0.504 
F = Not reported 
P = Not reported 
Not disclosed. 
Sample 
selected on 
1 June 2003 
Spain 92 excl. 
financial firms 
‘Free float’ = 100% 
less sum of 
shareholdings ¥ 
5%  
Media visibility 
(number of news 
items); 
Number of analyst 
earnings estimates 
(only in additional 
analyses) 
Listing age; 
Consumer 
Goods sector; 
Capital & 
intermediate 
goods sector; 
ICT sector 
 
Size (MC); 
ROE; 
Free float; 
Size of board; 
CEO/Chair duality 
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Model fit Website 
analyses 
Country Sample size Ownership 
structure 
Significant factors No significance 
+ -
Kelton and Yang (2008)
Poisson  
total sample: 
Likelihood ratio = 95.48 
P = 0.00 
October to 
November 
2004 
US NASDAQ 
284, excl. 
financial firms, 
& those with 
recent mergers 
& acquisitions 
Block-holdings > 
5% 
Full sample 
Size (MC); 
Big4 auditor; 
Shareholder rights; 
% Independent 
directors; 
% Financial 
experts on audit 
committee; 
Number of audit 
committee 
meetings; 
Earnings quality 
Block-holdings 
 
Management 
shareholding; 
CEO/Chair duality; 
ROE; 
Growth prospects; 
Issued equity 
Poisson: 
Likelihood ratio = 69.60 
P = 0.00 
    Small companies 
% Financial 
experts on audit 
committee; 
Number of audit 
committee 
meetings; 
Growth prospects; 
Block-holdings; 
CEO/Chair 
duality; 
 
Shareholder rights; 
Management 
shareholding; 
% Independent 
directors; 
Size (MC); 
ROE; 
Issued equity;  
Earnings quality; 
Big4 auditor 
Poisson: 
Likelihood ratio = 62.96 
P = 0.00 
    Large companies 
Size (MC); 
Big4 auditor; 
Block-holdings 
 
Shareholder rights; 
Management 
shareholding; 
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Model fit Website 
analyses 
Country Sample size Ownership 
structure 
Significant factors No significance 
+ -
% Independent 
directors; 
Number of audit 
committee 
meetings; 
Earnings quality 
CEO/Chair duality; 
% Financial experts 
on audit committee;  
ROE; 
Growth prospects; 
Issued equity 
Bonsón and Escobar (2006)
Stepwise: 
Adj R2 = 0.501 
F = 70.825 
P = 0.000 
Mid-February 
to Mid-March 
2005 
13 Eastern 
European 
countries 
266; random  Size (MC); 
Big4 auditor; 
Financial services 
 Country 
Abdelsalam, Bryant and Street (2007) 
Ranks: 
Adj R2 = 0.358 
F = 7.561 
P = 0.000 
Mid-2005 UK 110 from 
London Stock 
Exchange top 
quartile 
Block-holders 
holding ¥5% 
Independent 
directors %; 
Number of 
analysts following; 
Manufacturing 
industry 
Director holdings; Block-holdings; 
CEO/Chair dual role; 
Return on assets 
(ROA); 
Size (Assets); 
Growth prospects 
 
Cormier, Aerts, Ledoux and Magnan (2010) 
Adj. R2 = 0.453 
F = 9.12 
P = 0.001 
Summer 2005 Canada 139, excluding 
financial 
companies 
Block-holders 
¥10% 
Size (Assets); 
Beta; 
US listed; 
Board 
independence; 
Board size 
 
 
Block-holdings; 
Free cash flow; 
Leverage; 
CEO share 
options 
New financing 
(equity or debt); 
Audit committee 
size; 
Media exposure; 
High skill 
employees; 
Repeat customer 
relations 
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Model fit Website 
analyses 
Country Sample size Ownership 
structure 
Significant factors No significance 
+ -
Boubaker, Lakhal and Nekhili (2012) 
Adj. R2 = 0.5132 
F = 102.48 
P = 0.01 
October and 
November 
2005 
France 529; All, excl. 
financial firms 
Percentage free 
float 
Size (Assets); 
Free float; 
Cross-listed; 
IT industry; 
New issue of 
shares; 
Big4 auditor 
 Leverage; 
ROA 
AbuGhazaleh, Qasim and Roberts (2012) 
Rank 
Adj. R2 = 0.439 
F = 9.15 
P = 0.000 
October 2007 Jordan 105 active, with 
websites 
Government-
owned shares 
>5%; 
Institutional 
shareholders >5%; 
Number of 
shareholders 
Government 
holdings; 
Institutional 
holdings; 
Number of 
shareholders; 
Size (MC); 
Finance industry 
List age ROE; 
Growth prospects; 
Big4; 
New issue of equity 
Desoky (2009)
Adj. R2 = 0.400 
F = 7.226 
P = 0.000 
February 2008 Egypt 57, excl. 
banking & 
insurance 
Free float ¥15% Foreign listed; 
Free float 
 Size (MC);ROE; 
Industry 
Government 
shareholder 
Fuertes-Callén, Cuellar-Fernández and Pelayo-Velázquez (2014)
SEM: 
E-disclosure  
R2 = 0.398 
Web-presence 
development 
R2 = 0.324, P = 0.001 
2008 Argentina 
Mexico 
Chile 
Excl. financials 
A = 18 
M = 30 
C = 28 
 Cross-listed; 
Size; 
Web-presence 
development 
 
 Leverage; 
Profitability; 
Industry 
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Model fit Website 
analyses 
Country Sample size Ownership 
structure 
Significant factors No significance 
+ -
Samaha, Dahawy Abdel‐Meguid and Abdallah (2012) 
Adj. R2 = 0.6903 
F = 11.29 
P = 0.000 
January 2009 Egypt 61 with 
websites from 
Top100 
Free float = % 
held by individuals 
(retail) 
Size (MC); 
Free float; 
Board size 
Government 
ownership 
Management 
ownership; 
Independent 
directors; 
CEO/Chair duality; 
Leverage; 
ROE; 
Industry; 
Foreign sales; 
Foreign listing; 
Big4 auditor 
Uyar (2012)
Adj. R2 = 0.526 
F = 16.545 
P = 0.001 
February 2009 Turkey 14 Corporate 
Governance 
Index plus 
29 random 
 Corporate 
Governance Index; 
Size (Assets) 
 ROA; 
Industry 
Alali and Romero (2012)
Adj. R2 = 0.752 
F = 13.664 
P = 0.000 
Mid-March to 
mid-June 
2009 
Argentina 72, all listed 
with website 
Majority 
shareholders = 
international 
investors + local 
investors + family 
ownership 
holdings ¥ 35%  
Size (Assets); 
Merval25 index; 
Industry (various); 
Majority 
shareholders 
Growth 
prospects; 
 
Leverage; 
ROA; 
Big4 auditor; 
Foreign investor with 
¥ 35% 
Bozcuk (2012)
Adj. R2 = 0.347 
F = 6.8 
P = 0.000 
December 
2009 
Turkey All listed on 
Istanbul Stock 
Exchange, 311 
Percentage free 
float 
Size (MC); 
Big4 auditor; 
Governance 
Indices 
 Profitability (3 
ratios); 
Growth prospects; 
Free float; Industry 
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Model fit Website 
analyses 
Country Sample size Ownership 
structure 
Significant factors No significance 
+ -
Turrent and Ariza (2012)
Adj. R2 = 0.560 
F = 11.351 
P = 0.000 
Not disclosed. 
Sample 
selection 
based on 2009 
lists 
Mexico 
Spain 
Largest by MC, 
weighted by 
free float 
M = IPyC35 
S = IBEX35 
 
Shares owned by 
majority 
shareholders 
National legal 
framework; 
Ownership 
concentration; 
CEO/Chair 
duality 
Size (employees); 
Independent 
directors; 
Number of directors;  
ROA; 
Leverage 
Nurunnabi and Hossain, 2012 
Adj. R2 = 0.368 
F = 6.251 
P = 0.000 
January 2010 Bangladesh All companies 
with websites, 
83 
Dichotomous: 
family-controlled 
or not 
Big4 auditor; 
Not family- 
controlled 
 List age; 
NP%; ROE; 
Size (Sales); 
Size (MC); 
Industry  
Dâmaso and Lourenço (2011) 
Adj. R2 = 0.264 
F = 15.784 
P = 0.000 
February to 
June 2010 
UK 316 from 
FTSE350 
applying IFRS 
Percentage held 
by the largest 
shareholder 
Size (MC) 
Industry (air 
pollution & mining) 
Leverage; 
Ownership 
concentration 
ROA; 
Big4 auditor 
Andrikopoulos, Merika, Triantafyllou and Merikas (2013)
GMM: 
J-stat = 0.1849 
October to 
December 
2010 
Inter-
national 
merchant 
shipping 
companies 
171 with 
websites, from 
the following 
stock 
exchanges: 
New York, 
NASDAQ, 
London, 
Singapore and 
Oslo  
 
 
Percentage 
holding of the 
largest 
shareholder 
(measures 
dispersion) 
Size (Assets); 
Ownership 
concentration; 
ROE; 
Leverage 
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Model fit Website 
analyses 
Country Sample size Ownership 
structure 
Significant factors No significance 
+ -
Dolinšek, Tominc and Skerbinjek (2014) 
Stepwise: 
Adj. R2 = 0.389 
F = 14.867 
P = 0.000 
January 
2012 
Slovenia 110 large Percentage of ten 
largest 
shareholders 
Size (Number of 
employees); 
Size (Income); 
Finance industry; 
Legal structure 
Ownership 
concentration; 
 
ROE;  
ROA;  
% Net Profit; 
List age 
Size (assets) 
 
Ghasempour and Yusof (2014) 
Adj. R2 = 0.065 
F = 4.660 
P Chi sq = 0.000 
Not disclosed. 
Sample 
selected in 
March 2012. 
Iran 65 random from 
182 trading for 
ten years, excl. 
finance firms 
 Size (MC); 
Complexity 
(debtors + 
inventory/assets) 
Growth 
prospects; 
 
Leverage; 
ROE; 
Earnings volatility; 
Firm value t-1 
Pozniak (2013) 
Adj. R2 = 0.4745 
F = 8.04 
P = 0.0000 
First week of 
April 2012 
Belgium 
France 
Unregulated 
exchanges 
(Free Market & 
Alternext). 
B = 34 
F = 34 
Percentage of free 
float (public 
holdings) 
Size (Assets); 
IT industry 
List age Free float; 
Leverage; 
ROA and ROE 
Jankensgård (2015)
Adj. R2 = 0.728 
F = not reported 
P = not reported 
Kanton & 
Aktiespararna 
ratings for 
2007 – 2012  
 
Sweden 321 listed on 
NASDAQ & 
NGM Equity list 
(large MC to 
small firms 
seeking risk 
capital), HQ in 
Sweden, excl. 
financial and 
 Bond issue Financial status 
(Altman’s Z-
score) 
Size (Assets); 
New equity issue; 
Share return; 
Increased bank 
borrowing; 
Leverage; 
Growth prospects; 
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Model fit Website 
analyses 
Country Sample size Ownership 
structure 
Significant factors No significance 
+ -
holdings 
companies 
Mohamed & Basuony (2014)
Log likelihood = 
222.865 
Cox & Snell R2 = 0.150 
Chi-sq = 31.176 
January to 
March 2013 
Qatar 
Oman 
Bahrain 
192, all listed 
Q = 39 
O = 113 
B = 40 
 Size (Assets)  ROA; 
Big4 auditor; 
Industry; 
Leverage 
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In summary, it seems that evidence can be provided for the significance or 
insignificance of most variables. The most consistent predictor is company size, but 
even there, contradictory evidence was found in a few cases. These findings are 
discussed in more detail in Section 4.6 Controls, where I provide a rationale for the 
choice of the control variables I used in the regression model of the current study. 
 
The prior literature on explanatory variables described focused on research either in 
the US, UK or Europe, or in countries in the Middle East, South Asia and South 
America, and China and Egypt. It is not clear whether existing models developed in 
other domains would sufficiently explain the behaviour of JSE-listed companies. This 
leads to the second primary objective of this study, namely to develop a regression 
model that explains the quality of the online IR practices of JSE-listed companies and 
test the thesis hypothesis. 
 
In the next section, I present the hypothesis that attempts to explain the online IR 
quality of JSE-listed companies. This hypothesis assumes an equity market with low 
turnover, excellent protection of minority shareholder interests and strict enforcement 
of disclosure regulations, as described in Section 4.3.2 Disclosure regulations of the 
JSE. 
4.5. Shareholder familiarity hypothesis 
This study builds on the work of Bushee and Noe (2000) regarding the association 
between disclosure quality and shareholders’ investment horizon. The prior literature, 
discussed in Section 2.2.5.2 Shareholders’ investment horizon, points out how 
disclosure quality and increases in disclosure quality can attract different clienteles of 
institutional investors, based on their investment horizon. Bushee (1998:310) classifies 
institutional investors into three groups: transient (short-term, frequent traders), 
dedicated (long-term, large investments), and quasi-indexers (invest in index, buy-and-
hold).  
 
Bushee and Noe (2000) investigated the question of whether the disclosure quality 
(AIMR ratings) of a company is associated with the type of institutional investor it 
attracts. The AIMR ratings they used were based on three types of disclosure: annual 
reports, interim reports and IR activities. They ran regression models with institutional 
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owner type as the dependent variable and disclosure quality as the independent 
variable (plus controls). Disclosure quality was positively associated with transient and 
quasi-indexer institutions (Bushee & Noe, 2000:185). Regarding dedicated investors, 
Bushee and Noe (2000:185) remark: 
The level of dedicated ownership is unrelated to AIMR disclosure rankings, 
consistent with our arguments that this type of institution does not value the 
benefits of more forthcoming disclosure. 
 
In further robustness tests, dedicated institutional investors were insensitive to any of 
the three components of the disclosure score (Bushee & Noe, 2000:187). When they 
ran the regressions on changes in disclosure quality, it affected the holdings of 
transient and quasi-indexers. However, regarding dedicated investors, they comment: 
Finally, consistent with the levels analysis, there are no significant associations 
between changes in dedicated institutional ownership and changes in AIMR 
disclosure rankings. Both sets of results imply that the large, stable ownership 
positions of dedicated institutions likely provide them direct channels of information 
from firms and limit any benefit of public disclosure. (Bushee & Noe, 2000:190)25 
 
The FCLT initiative describes the information-gathering activities of long-term investors 
as follows: 
Long-term investors tend to be knowledgeable about the industry as well as the 
company’s management and strategy. Typically, they spend meaningful amounts 
of time analyzing and modeling the company before meeting with management. 
Long-term investors tend to make calculated long-term decisions that show a focus 
on longer-term value creation rather than quarterly or annual EPS. (FCLT, 
2015:22) 
 
Huang and Petkevich (2016) examined the relation between institutional investment 
horizons and companies’ financing and investment decisions. They found that 
differences in how companies invest and finance their investments are associated with 
the investment horizons of their institutional investors. Huang and Petkevich explain 
the phenomenon as being the result of the different information preferences of long- 
versus short-horizon investors. They posit that long-term institutional investors are 
“interested in seeing decisions and improvements that potentially create value through 
fundamentals” (Huang and Petkevich 2016:1018). Long-term investors are less 
concerned about short-term mispricing and more interested in the long-term value. 
                                             
25 Bushee and Noe (2000) study was conducted before the implementation of Reg. FD in October 2000, 
whose purpose was to reduce private information channels (see Section 4.3.1 for a discussion on 
whether this was successful). 
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That leads long-term investors to be interested in value-enhancing information, which 
Huang and Petkevich (2016:1019) describe as “(i) costlier, (ii) more user-specific, and 
(iii) less efficiently captured in security prices than value-neutral information”.  
 
If one considers that the role of an IR department is to communicate a company’s long-
term sustainable value proposition, it follows that long-term investors would particularly 
be interested in the communications from the IR department, especially in the post Reg 
FD environment, which prohibits private value-relevant disclosures. 
 
However, there is also evidence that long-term investors do not have superior 
information about the future performance of their investee companies. Yan and Zhang 
(2009) examined the relationship between the investment horizon of institutional 
investors and future stock returns. They reported a significant positive relation between 
total institutional ownership and future returns, but this was almost entirely driven by 
short-horizon investors (Yan & Zhang, 2009:895). They remark that there is no 
evidence that long-horizon investor holdings or trading is indicative of future long-term 
share returns (Yan & Zhang, 2009:896). Maffett (2012) extended the work of Yan and 
Zhang (2009) by showing that in opaque information environments, transient 
institutional investors achieve higher returns by trading on their privately gathered 
information. In the post-Reg FD regime, Serafeim (2015:41) found an association 
between long-horizon investors and integrated reporting quality. This contradicts the 
findings of Bushee and Noe (2000) that long-horizon investors are neutral to disclosure 
quality. Huang and Petkevich (2016:1021) remark that the debate regarding who is 
better informed than who is still not settled, and that it is still unclear through which 
channels better informed investors are informed (Huang & Petkevich, 2016:1052). 
 
In a disclosure environment where private value-relevant disclosures are prohibited 
(for example, in terms of Regulations 3.4 to 3.8 of the JSE Listings Requirements since 
1 September 2003, or Reg FD of the SEC since 1 October 2000), one would assume 
that long-term shareholders would pressure management for more public disclosure, 
since their private channels have been blocked. Alternatively, long-term shareholders 
might be satisfied with the current level of public disclosure, as they still have access 
to private information from management, or they have superior information processing 
capabilities to make sense of the information publicly disclosed, as well as their own 
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research into industry trends, markets, etc. Taking into consideration the high ranking 
South Africa received for the protection of minority rights (WEF, 2012), I assumed that 
private disclosures of value-relevant information are not provided by JSE-listed 
companies, and that all investor types have to make do with the same public 
information. I suggest another reason why long-term shareholders might be satisfied 
with a poorer public disclosure environment: they are familiar with the investee 
company’s risks and rewards, and management’s record of accomplishment over the 
long period of the investment relationship.  
 
Long-horizon investors’ information environment consequently consists of their own 
information which they gathered themselves (FCLT, 2015; Huang & Petkevich, 2016) 
and the information cumulatively provided publicly by the investee company. The 
present study therefore hypothesises that shareholder familiarity (operationalised by a 
lagged measure of ownership stability, averaged over a period of nine years) is 
associated with the quality of the online IR practices of JSE-listed companies. This 
argument can also be supported from a signalling theory perspective: company 
management would have little incentive to increase voluntary public disclosure or 
invest in best practice IR if the same shareholder identities persist period after period. 
Companies with predominantly long-horizon investors would therefore adapt their IR 
information mainly to their investors’ low information requirements. 
 
As described in Sections 2.2.5.2 and 4.3.1, other research on institutional investor 
horizons as an explanatory variable was the following: 
 R&D spending: Bushee (1998:330) has found that where transient institutional 
investors have high ownership, there is a higher likelihood that management will 
cut R&D spending to increase earnings.  
 Mergers and acquisitions: Gaspar et al. (2005:148,149) reported that high investor 
turnover in target (bidder) companies elicits a lower (higher) control premium (a 
difference of three per cent) accepted (offered), compared to companies with low 
investor turnover. 
 Cost of equity: Attig et al. (2013:456) have shown that the presence of institutional 
investors with long-term investment horizons results in lower costs of equity. They 
propose that this is due to improved monitoring of management, and that this 
 Chapter 4 – Long horizons and shareholder familiarity 124 
 
 
occurs where investors are able to obtain higher quality information about a 
company. 
 Investments and how they are financed: Huang and Petkevich (2016) found 
differences in how companies invested and financed their investments, associated 
with the investment horizon of their institutional investors. They argue that long-
term institutional investors are “interested in seeing decisions and improvements 
that potentially create value through fundamentals” (Huang & Petkevich, 
2016:1018). Long-term investors are less concerned about short-term mispricing 
and are more interested in the long-term value. 
 Future share returns: Yan and Zhang (2009:895) reported a significant positive 
relation between total institutional ownership and future returns, but noted that this 
is almost entirely driven by short-horizon investors. They found no evidence that 
long-horizon investor holdings or trading are indicative of future long-term share 
returns (Yan & Zhang 2009:896). 
 Investments in property, plant and equipment: Souder et al. (2016:1212), referring 
to ‘capital patience’, found that companies whose expected useful lives of property, 
plant and equipment was lower than the industry average had a lower return on 
assets. This was exacerbated when the companies’ investors had low capital 
patience (a short investment horizon). 
 Release of bad news: Ke, Petroni and Yu (2008) established that prior to Reg FD, 
transient institutional investors sold off shares a quarter immediately before bad 
news broke (after a serious of quarterly earnings increases). However, after Reg 
FD came in effect, the abnormal selling off before bad news breaks stopped.  
 Filing for bankruptcy: Ramalingegowda (2014) reported that long-horizon 
institutional investors sold off significantly fewer investments in firms with 
impending bankruptcy after the implementation of Reg FD than before. In the period 
before Reg FD, these investors would use their private information to project 
potential bankruptcy, and sell their holdings at least a quarter before the bankruptcy 
filing took place. 
 
Two other studies investigated the effect of disclosure quality (as an explanatory 
variable) on companies’ investor clientele in respect of investment horizon (as the 
dependent variable): 
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 Bushee and Noe (2000:185) found that disclosure quality (AIMR ratings) was 
positively associated with transient and quasi-indexer institutions, but insignificant 
for dedicated long-horizon investors. 
 In contrast to Bushee and Noe (2000), Serafeim (2015:41) reported that in his 
study, long-horizon investors were associated with integrated reporting quality.  
 
Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca (2014) found that the presence of directors 
appointed to boards or audit committees by pressure-sensitive institutional investors 
(banking and insurance companies, which also have a business relationship with the 
investee, hence the pressure) was positively related to mandatory disclosure quality, 
measured by obtaining an unqualified audit opinion. However, their study was based 
on type of institutional investor, not investment horizon, and the dependent variable 
was audited information quality, not voluntary disclosure.  
 
Thus, as far as I could ascertain, the current study is the first study to investigate the 
association between investment horizon (with shareholder stability as the explanatory 
variable) and voluntary disclosure (online IR disclosure practices as the dependent 
variable). Furthermore, the studies described above tested their hypotheses in the 
liquid US equity market. As pointed out in Section 4.2 Characteristics of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), the JSE is characterised by high ownership 
concentration and illiquid markets, especially for large holdings (JSE, 2014).  
 
It is important to distinguish between shareholder (owner) stability (a time-based 
measure) and ownership structure (a class-based measure). The following example 
illustrates this: if Institutional Shareholder “A” (who holds 12 per cent of the shares) 
sold its holding to Institutional Shareholder “B”, the ownership structure analysis would 
indicate before and after the change that institutional shareholders as a class hold 12 
per cent of the shares. On the other hand, assuming no other sales in the secondary 
market took place, the share turnover would be 12 per cent of outstanding shares. The 
shareholder identity of 12 per cent of the shares changed from “A” to “B”. It is relevant 
from the present study’s perspective that 88 per cent of shareholder identities did not 
change (were stable). Huang and Petkevich (2016:1020) have a similar view, stating, 
“Institutional ownerships are empirically persistent over time, and changes in 
ownership present actions of a small fraction of the institutional ownership of a stock.” 
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It is also essential to distinguish between the present study’s shareholder stability 
measure and the free float percentage (another class-based measure), which was 
used as predictor or control variable in many of the studies described in Table 4.1 
Factors associated with online investor relations practice quality. The free float 
percentage measures the percentage of outstanding shares available to be traded 
freely (excluding directors’ shareholding, restricted block-holdings, and controlling or 
de facto controlling, shareholding). It describes a class of shareholder. The free float 
percentage also fails to capture changes in ownership of the larger owners, as 
illustrated before. The shareholder stability measure of the present study therefore 
includes turnover of all classes of shareholders. 
 
I therefore frame the hypothesis in the null format as follows: 
H0 =  There is no association between voluntary communications quality (proxied by 
online IR quality) and shareholder familiarity (proxied by shareholder stability). 
 
I tested the hypothesis of shareholder familiarity in the South African equity market, 
because, to the best of my knowledge, no prior research has been published that 
investigated the possible drivers of online IR practices in South Africa. Two multi-
country studies included South Africa (Debreceny et al. 2002; Bollen et al. 2006). 
Debreceny et al. (2002) included the top 30 South African companies, based on market 
capitalisation (at the end of 1998) and Bollen et al. (2006) included the top 40 
companies based on market capitalisation (in October 2002). The disclosure scores 
for South Africa were published, but they did not publish the results of their models as 
applied to South African companies separately. Both studies included only the largest 
companies of the JSE and can therefore not be representative of the disclosure 
behaviour of the more than 300 companies listed on the main board of the JSE. 
 
I tested the hypothesis with an OLS regression. In the next section, I discuss the control 
variables for the regression model, synthesized from the prior literature discussed in 
Section 4.4 Prior literature on predictors of online investor relations quality. 
4.6. Controls 
As the number of studies investigating factors that are associated with voluntary 
disclosure behaviour increased, the results started converging on the same variables, 
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appearing in most regression models as control variables (see Section 4.4 Prior 
literature on predictors of online investor relations quality). The number of control and 
dummy variables (loss of degrees of freedom) that the sample size of 205 companies 
could bear was limited, taking into consideration that this was a cross-sectional study. 
For each control variable I assumed a statistically significant relationship between the 
variable and the quality of online IR without making a prediction about direction (two-
tailed tests have more power to detect relationships than directional one-tailed tests). 
A brief description is provided below for the control and dummy variables selected for 
this study’s regression model. 
4.6.1. Size 
The theoretical foundation for the size of companies as predictors is that larger 
companies have more slack resources to spend on communications, and that the 
incremental cost of generating information for their website is minimal (Marston & Polei, 
2004). Mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) could also explain why most 
large organisations follow the first adopters’ practices. All the explanatory studies 
discussed in Section 4.4 employed size in their models. With the exception of a few 
studies, most found a significantly positive association between disclosure quality and 
size, whether measured as market capitalisation, total assets, or sales. However, 
Abdelsalam et al. (2007) reported that size (total assets) was only significantly 
positively associated with the dependent variable for ‘credibility’ disclosures, but not 
for the presentation, content or total score. Although Kelton and Yang (2008) found 
size significant for their total sample, it was no longer significant for the bottom half of 
the sample (‘smaller’ companies) when they split the sample along the median. Gandía 
(2008), Desoky (2009), Nurunnabi and Hossain (2012), Turrent and Ariza (2012), and 
Jankensgård (2015) could not confirm that size was a significant determinant of web 
disclosures. Lack of significance could be explained by too much homogeneity in 
respect of size in the samples (selecting mostly large companies).  
4.6.2. Ownership structure 
One of the problems inherent in any agency relationship is whether the agent 
(management) is acting in the best interests of the principals (the shareholders). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) argue that having concentrated ownership, in the form of shareholding by block-
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holders and institutional investors, serves as an efficient mechanism for monitoring 
management, for example, they can threaten to sell their shareholding if they are 
unsatisfied with management’s actions (McCahery, Sautner & Starks, 2016) and 
institutional shareholders prevent real earnings manipulation (Sakaki, Jackson & Jory, 
2017). Signalling theory then proposes that management who thus become the focus 
of the scrutiny engages in increased voluntary disclosure in order to signal its 
trustworthiness and competence. Another avenue through which institutional 
shareholders exercise their monitoring role is by replacing managers that do not 
perform sufficiently or with whom they disagree on strategy. If management resists the 
direction provided by the institutional shareholders, it usually leads to a proxy contest 
to dislodge the incumbent management. Baginski, Clinton and Mcguire (2014) report 
that in a proxy contest involving its tenure, management tends to increase the 
frequency of its forward-looking disclosures and the tone is also more positive. 
However, this reverts to prior levels after the contest (Baginski et al., 2014:1010). This 
school proposes a positive association between institutional ownership and voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
An opposing view is that these shareholders have direct channels of communication 
with management (such as one-on-one conversations, or investor days) and that 
therefore voluntary disclosure occurs less in companies with high concentrations of 
institutional shareholders and block-holders, especially long-term investors (Bushee & 
Noe, 2000; Ramalingegowda, 2014). Cormier et al. (2010:327) state, “since the 
dominant shareholders have access to the information they need, closely held firms 
are expected to be unresponsive to public investors’ monitoring costs.” To put this 
another way, companies with low concentrated holdings, or high dispersion (free float) 
would disclose more publicly in order to reduce the monitoring and information 
acquisition costs of individual or retail shareholders. This school argues that there is a 
negative association between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure, or a 
positive association between free float and voluntary disclosure. Many of these studies 
were conducted before the introduction of Ref FD on 23 October 2000 (SEC, 2000) 
and similar regulations in the UK and Europe, or in emerging economies with low 
protection of minority interests (such as Egypt). Since the introduction of regulations to 
provide equal access to information, institutional shareholders and block-holders have 
lost their ‘inside track’ to value-relevant information. For a more detailed discussion of 
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Reg FD and private access by analysts and institutional shareholders, see Section 
4.3.1 Regulation Fair Disclosure (US). 
 
The relationship between ownership structure and the quality of online IR has been 
empirically investigated by various authors, with differing results. Kelton and Yang 
(2008), Cormier et al. (2010), Dâmaso and Lourenço (2011), Turrent and Ariza (2012), 
and Dolinšek et al. (2014) used percentage shareholding by the major shareholder or 
those owning more than ten per cent (or five per cent in some cases) as an indicator 
of ownership concentration and found a significantly negative relationship with web-
based disclosure quality. No association between ownership concentration 
(shareholders holding more than five per cent) and the level of Internet disclosure (full 
model) was reported by Abdelsalam et al. (2007). However, in Abdelsalam et al.’s 
reduced model, ownership concentration became marginally significant, with a 
negative association with extent of content disclosures. By contrast, Andrikopoulos et 
al. (2013) found a positive association between disclosure and the percentage of a 
company’s shares held by the largest shareholder. They argue that even with a 
controlling shareholder, the capital of the minority shareholders is needed, and that 
management therefore increases signalling to reassure minority shareholders. 
Similarly, Alali and Romero (2012) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) found a significantly 
positive association between the percentage shares owned by the largest 
shareholders and the extent of disclosure.  
 
Marston and Polei (2004), Desoky (2009) and Boubaker et al. (2012) used free float in 
their models and found that free float was significantly positively associated with levels 
of disclosure. The proportion of shares held by individual (retail) investors had a 
positive coefficient in the study by Bollen, Hassink and Bozic (2006). The number of 
shareholders, which is an alternative measure for dispersion, also had a positive 
relationship with online disclosure quality in the study by AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012). 
However, Gandía (2008), Bozcuk (2012) and Pozniak (2013) found no significant 
relationship for free float as an indicator of online disclosure quality. 
Separation of ownership and control is prevalent in South Africa. Steyn and Stainbank 
(2013:323) reported that in 2010, 54 per cent of JSE-listed companies were controlled 
by dominant shareholders, in other words, one or more shareholders with a holding of 
at least 25 per cent. Orsagh et al. (2013:138) reported that 21.7 per cent of 46 large 
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South African companies (included in an international index such as the Russell 1000 
or S&P 500) had a controlling shareholder. Section 64 of the Companies Act no. 71 
(RSA, 2008) requires only a 25 per cent shareholding and three shareholders to form 
a quorum which can pass resolutions in the presence of further dispersed 
shareholding. That implies that control of a company can be held at 25 per cent if the 
rest of the shareholding is very diffuse. 
4.6.3. Industry 
Most of the prior studies included industry as a variable. Mimetic isomorphism 
proposes that over time, organisations in the same industry tend to mimic each other’s 
behaviour (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Some studies controlled for specific industries, 
for example, manufacturing (Abdelsalam et al., 2012), consumer goods or IT (Gandía, 
2008), finance (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2012), or mining industry (Dâmaso & Lourenço, 
2011). Others (Bonsón & Escobar, 2006; Alali & Romero, 2012; Dolinšek et al., 2014; 
Mohamed & Basuony, 2014) controlled for any industry effect. Results were 
contradictory, as can be seen from Section 4.4 Prior literature on predictors of online 
investor relations quality. For the sake of brevity, I do not repeat these findings here. 
4.6.4. Age 
Companies that had their first or main listing more recently are more used to dealing 
with the press, analysts, and institutional shareholders. Hence, their practices may be 
more in line with IR best practices. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that recently listed 
firms have an incentive to disclose more, as they want to retain the confidence of the 
investors. Gandía (2008) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) found a significant negative 
association for age: younger companies disclose better. By contrast, Nurunnabi and 
Hossain (2012) found no significant effect for the age of the company.  
4.6.5. Profitability (performance) 
Voluntary disclosure is an important means for management to communicate a 
company’s performance to outside investors to alleviate information asymmetry and 
reduce agency conflicts, according to Healy and Palepu (2001). They remark that “the 
Internet provide[s] management with the opportunity to access all investors and to 
provide daily updates of important information” (Healy & Palepu, 2001:432). Healy and 
Palepu (2001:421) further propose that 
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…given the risk of job loss accompanying poor stock and earnings performance, 
managers use corporate disclosures to reduce the likelihood of undervaluation and 
to explain away poor earnings performance. 
 
Baginski et al. (2014:1010) have found evidence that supports Healy and Palepu’s 
proposition above, noting that managers who are the subject of a proxy fight to replace 
them tend to increase the frequency of their forward-looking disclosures temporarily (if 
they fend off the proxy replacement bid, frequency returns to pre-proxy fight levels). 
Signalling theory can also explain why managers of profitable companies engage in 
voluntary disclosure, namely to signal their competence and reliability.  
 
Profitability, usually measured as return on assets or return on equity, is also popular 
as a predictor of voluntary online disclosure quality studies, but was only found to be 
significant (and positive) for the model by Andrikopoulos et al. (2013). Marston and 
Polei (2004), Abdelsalam et al. (2007), Gandía (2008), Desoky (2009), Dâmaso and 
Lourenço (2011), Uyar (2012), Nurunnabi and Hossain (2012), Turrent and Ariza 
(2012), and Ghasempour and Yusof (2014) found no significant relationship between 
disclosure quality and company profitability. The findings of the majority of studies that 
show no significance are counter-intuitive, as one would expect high-profitability 
companies to boast about their performance through increased disclosure. It might be 
that profitability is also correlated to size or industry, which may reduce the power of 
this control variable. The case for profitability as a predictor of voluntary disclosure is 
therefore still in debate. 
4.6.6. Leverage (or risk) 
Another accounting variable, financial risk, is usually measured as the debt to equity 
ratio, or debt to total assets or the leverage ratio. Higher debt levels increase a 
company’s risk profile (information and default risk) and lead to higher cost of debt, 
which can be mitigated by increased disclosure (Sengupta, 1998). Andrikopoulos et al. 
(2013) found a significant positive relationship between leverage and disclosure for 
international shipping companies, in line with Sengupta’s (1998) argument. 
 
However, Alali and Romero (2012), Samaha et al. (2012), Turrent and Ariza (2012), 
Fuertes-Callén et al. (2014) and Mohamed and Basuony (2014) could not find any 
significant relationship between leverage and disclosure levels. Leverage was also not 
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significant in Jankensgård’s (2015) model of web disclosure, although issuance of a 
bond in the financial year was significantly and positively related to the disclosure 
ratings. A financial status variable, based on the company’s Z-score (developed by 
Altman) was also included in Jankensgård’s (2015) model. The results of his model for 
web disclosure indicate that companies with weaker financial status disclose 
significantly more. This is consistent with the risk that a higher leverage ratio tries to 
encapsulate.  
 
Cormier et al. (2010) and Dâmaso and Lourenço (2011) found a significant negative 
association between online disclosure and leverage. Their explanation is that leverage 
increases financial risk and that leads to management’s disclosing less information to 
the public. Similar to Jankensgård (2015), Cormier et al. (2010) also included a 
systematic risk variable measured by the company’s beta. Beta was found to be 
associated significantly positively with web disclosure quality. Marston and Polei 
(2004) did not find any statistical significance for beta. A study of South African 
companies found that the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual report was 
significantly negatively associated with cost of debt (Guidara, Khlif & Jarboui, 2014).  
4.6.7. Big4 auditor 
Although voluntary disclosure is not currently audited, prior studies (Bonsón & 
Escobar, 2006; Kelton & Yang, 2008; Boubaker et al., 2012; Nurunnabi & Hossain, 
2012) have found significant positive associations between having a Big4 audit firm 
(Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG or PwC) and online disclosure quality. Having a Big4 
audit firm is an indicator of general disclosure quality. However, Alali and Romero 
(2012), AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) and Samaha et al. (2012) did not find any 
significance for auditor type.  
 
Schedule 15 of the JSE Listings Requirements contains regulations that listed 
companies may only use accredited auditors and advisors that the JSE deem fit for 
auditing a listed company (JSE, 2011a). The accredited firms must provide evidence 
that their personnel are familiar with IFRS. During the period that relates to the present 
study’s content analyses of the websites, 28 audit firms were accredited (JSE, 2011b) 
and companies in the sample appointed 14 of these firms – the Big4 and ten other 
firms.  
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4.6.8. Dual listing 
Listing on another exchange was discussed in Chapter 2 as one of the methods to 
raise the visibility of a company with investors (based on Merton’s 1987 Investor 
Recognition Hypothesis). Companies domiciled in low disclosure and low enforcement 
countries have to increase their reporting quality in order to be listed on the US or UK 
exchanges. Being listed on a foreign stock exchange (in addition to the local exchange) 
was found to be significantly positive for online financial reporting quality by Debreceny 
et al. (2002), Bollen et al. (2006), Desoky (2009), Cormier et al. (2010) and Fuertes-
Callén et al. (2014). The Global Competitiveness Report of the WEF (2012:325)26 
ranked South Africa first out of 144 countries for the strength of its auditing and 
reporting standards, the efficacy of corporate boards and regulation of its securities 
exchanges. Although South African companies’ reporting standards are already of 
extremely high quality, the benefit of improved voluntary disclosure would follow from 
having international institutional shareholders who expect the same type of disclosure 
as from UK or US companies.  
4.6.9. Issued new shares 
Companies that want to expand can turn to the equity market and raise funds by a 
further issue of shares, also known as a seasoned equity offer. This affords them the 
opportunity to disclose additional information in respect of the prospective expansion 
project, as well as historical information that provides a track record of their successful 
management of shareholders’ funds. Ettredge et al. (2002) and Boubaker et al. (2012) 
found that companies that were net issuers of stock or bonds in the previous year had 
better disclosure scores. On the other hand, Kelton and Yang (2008), Cormier et al. 
(2010), AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) and Jankensgård (2015) found no significant 
relationship with new issues of shares and web disclosures. It is therefore unclear what 
the direction of the association would be. 
                                             
26 I used the 2012 report, as this coincides with the period when the disclosures on the websites were 
reviewed. The WEF’s 2014-2015 rankings for South Africa are the same, except for the efficacy of 
boards, which is now rated third. 
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4.7. Proposed model of online investor relations practices in South 
Africa 
Taking into account the hypothesis and the control variables identified above, the 
following regression equation is proposed to model voluntary disclosure behaviour via 
online IR practices for companies listed on the JSE: 
 
Disclosure = α + β1ShareholderFamiliarity + β2Size + β3OwnershipConcentration + 
β4Industry + β5Age + β6Profitability + β7Leverage + β8Big4Auditor + 
β9DualListing + β10IssueNew + ε  
4.8. Summary and conclusion 
This chapter started by demonstrating how the JSE differs from other capital markets 
in respect of its size (smaller), share turnover (lower) and concentration of 
shareholders (higher). Although the IMF classifies South Africa as an emerging market 
and developing economy, the WEF ranks it first in many areas such as the operation 
of its stock market and reporting standards. It also ranks high for protection of 
shareholders’ rights. Therefore, the JSE can be classified as a hybrid market.  
 
Reg FD was introduced to the US equity markets in October 2000. That led to major 
changes in the disclosure environment in the US. Evidence was discussed that 
indicated that institutional investors could not trade on private information anymore. 
However, contradictory evidence was also found, suggesting that private information 
is still being divulged to analysts and institutional shareholders. The information may 
not be value-relevant at face value, but taken together with other information, it may 
become relevant. The regulations against private disclosure instituted by the JSE were 
also discussed. It was noted that the JSE published additional guidance to companies 
on how to conduct questions and answer sessions from analysts. 
 
A large body of prior studies into factors that affect online IR quality was reviewed. 
Most of the factors employed showed mixed results for significance in various studies. 
In particular, it is still unknown which factors explain online IR in South Africa. That led 
to the choice of the second primary objective of this study, namely to model online IR 
disclosure practices in South Africa.  
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The effect of institutional investment horizon on the behaviour of companies was 
discussed next. Conflicting findings were presented regarding long-horizon investors’ 
access to private information. Some studies found that long-horizon investors had 
superior information-gathering expertise regarding their investments and their 
industries. The shareholder familiarity hypothesis was introduced, which argues that 
long-horizon investors in JSE companies are satisfied with a low disclosure 
environment because they are familiar with the risks and rewards of their investee 
companies, and have sufficient information-gathering prowess of their own. The last 
section of this chapter discussed the motivation for the choice of control variables 
included in the regression model. The chapter concluded with the mathematical 
regression model for the online IR quality of JSE-listed companies: 
 
Disclosure = α + β1ShareholderFamiliarity + β2Size + β3OwnershipConcentration + 
β4Industry + β5Age + β6Profitability + β7Leverage + β8Big4Auditor + β9DualListing + 
β10IssueNew + ε 
 
In the next chapter, the methodology used to achieve the research objectives is 
described. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapters discussed the framework and background for the thesis in 
terms of the substantial number of theories that support the communication of 
voluntary information, and the prior research done in the area of online financial 
communication. Chapter 4 presented the hypothesis development for the regression 
model. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a rationale for the research design 
choice employed in this study to reach the two primary objectives. These two primary 
objectives were firstly, determining the quality of the online IR practices of JSE-listed 
companies, and secondly, developing a regression model that explains the difference 
in quality of these practices and which tests the thesis hypothesis.  
 
This chapter starts by setting out the research paradigm most closely aligned with my 
views on the research process. Thereafter, the research objectives are discussed 
again, and this is followed by a research design suitable for the achievement of the 
objectives. The sample selection is then discussed in detail. The content analysis 
section describes how the measurement instrument, or checklist, was developed and 
tested. The coding rules are described with specific emphasis on what is required 
before an item can be marked as being present. The operationalisation of the variables 
in the regression model is described in detail, as well as the sources for the data, in 
order for the study to be replicable. The last section describes the procedures used to 
ensure validity and reliability, and the limitations of the study. 
5.2. Research paradigm 
Laughlin (1995) developed a useful three-dimensional model of the range of research 
paradigms used in the social sciences. Each paradigm has a distinct set of theory, 
methodology and change characteristics. Where different schools of thought can be 
placed into the three-dimensional model depends on whether each school views its 
research as having high, medium, or low theory, methodology, or change 
characteristics. Laughlin (1995:68) defines the levels for each characteristic as follows: 
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The “theory” dimension refers to high to low levels of usage of prior theorizing 
before undertaking any investigation. The “methodology” dimension ranges from 
high to low levels of theoretical closure on the methods of investigation. The 
“change” dimension relates to high to low levels of critique with regard to the 
status quo and the need for change in the phenomena being investigated. 
The variables that define each characteristic are summarised in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1: Some key characteristics of the dominant schools of thought 
 High/high/lowa Medium/medium/mediuma Low/low/lowa 
Theory 
characteristics: 
High Medium Low 
Ontological 
belief: 
Generalised world 
waiting to be 
discovered 
‘Skeletal’ generalisations 
possible 
Generalisations may 
not be there to be 
discovered 
Role of theory: Definable theory with 
hypotheses to test 
‘Skeletal’ theory with some 
broad understanding of 
relationships 
Ill-defined theory – no 
prior hypotheses 
Methodology 
characteristics: 
High Medium Low 
Role of observer 
and human 
nature belief: 
Observer independent 
and irrelevant 
Observer important and 
always part of the process 
of discovery 
Observer important 
and always part of the 
process of discovery 
Nature of 
method: 
Structured, quantitative 
method 
Definable approach, but 
subject to refinement in 
actual situations, invariable 
qualitative 
Unstructured, ill-
defined, qualitative 
approach 
Data sought: Cross-sectional data 
used, usually at one 
point in time and 
selectively gathered, 
tied to hypotheses 
Longitudinal, case study 
based. Heavily descriptive, 
but also analytical 
Longitudinal, case 
study based. Heavily 
descriptive 
Conclusions 
derived: 
Tight conclusions 
about findings 
Reasonably conclusive, tied 
to “skeletal” theory and 
empirical richness 
Ill-defined and 
inconclusive 
conclusions, but 
empirically rich in 
detail 
Validity criteria: Statistical inferences Meanings: researchers + 
researched 
Meanings: researched
Change 
characteristics: 
Low Medium Low 
 Low emphasis on 
changing status quo 
Medium emphasis: open to 
radical change and 
maintenance of status quo 
Low emphasis on 
changing status quo 
a Theory, methodology and change ordering 
Source: Laughlin (1995:80) 
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Note that in the three dominant schools of thought presented in Table 5.1, the ‘Change 
characteristics’ is never higher than ‘Medium’. Other minority schools of thought might 
pursue aggressive agendas for change. In the next three sections, I define and 
motivate the present study’s position in terms of each of the three main characteristics 
of research. 
5.2.1. Theory characteristics 
According to Laughlin (1995:66), the theory dimension of a study relates to 
…the level of prior theorising and prior theories that can legitimately be brought to 
the empirical investigation […]. High levels of prior theorizing are indicative of an 
assumed material world (which exists distinct from the observers’ projections and 
bias), which, despite empirical variety, has high levels of generality and order and 
has been well researched through previous studies. 
I agree with the ontological viewpoint that the world (including the people and objects 
in it) is real and that generalisations can be made about it. The discussions in Chapters 
2, 3 and 4 indicate that the theory surrounding voluntary disclosures and investors’ 
information needs is extensive, and that in-depth research has been done on the topic 
by previous researchers. This thesis would therefore fall into the high category 
regarding its theory characteristics. 
5.2.2. Methodology characteristics 
The methodological characteristics describe the way in which the research in a study 
is actually conducted. The investigation is either “defined according to some theoretical 
model of how the observer should see or is more reliant on the implicit perceptual 
powers of the individual observer” (Laughlin, 1995:67). The more prescriptive the 
research method, the less the impact of the researcher on the research process in 
terms of subjectivity and bias. At the other end of the scale, the researcher is free to 
explore in any manner (method) he/she sees fit to use, while acknowledging that 
subjectivity and involvement may play a role in the discovery of new knowledge about 
the objects under investigation.  
 
Although this thesis strives to uncover new knowledge, the methods I employed, 
namely disclosure scores and regression analysis, have been widely used in prior 
studies (see Section 3.7.3 for South African disclosure studies and Section 4.4 for 
regression analysis studies in other countries). Procedures were put in place (as 
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discussed in Section 5.8 Reliability, validity and limitations) to limit subjectivity during 
content analysis conducted for this study. The methodology used is highly prescriptive 
and structured. Results were quantified. Considering all these characteristics, the 
thesis falls into the high category regarding its methodological characteristics. 
5.2.3. Change characteristics 
Change “refers to attitudes by the researcher concerning the worth or otherwise of 
maintaining the current situation that is being investigated as well as views about the 
necessity for actually doing something about this situation” (Laughlin, 1995:67). As 
discussed in Section 1.8.2 Contribution to practice, it is envisaged that the results of 
this study will be used to change companies’ behaviour and to promote the role of IR 
in the financial reporting process, specifically for the domain of online IR on the 
company website. As I would not want to be overly optimistic about my ability to effect 
change in actual online IR practices, I would characterise the thesis as belonging to 
the low level regarding change characteristics. On the theoretical contribution front, I 
hope the research will make a higher change contribution to the way voluntary 
disclosure behaviour is thought about in different equity markets. 
5.3. Research objectives 
The study has two primary objectives. These are discussed below. 
5.3.1. Quality of online investor relations practices 
The first primary objective of this study was to determine the overall quality of the online 
IR practices of JSE-listed companies, as measured against international best practice 
guidelines. Flowing from that, a secondary research objective was to arrive at a 
conclusion regarding the stage of development of JSE-listed companies’ online IR 
practices, in terms of Hedlin’s (1999) model.  
5.3.2. Modelling online investor relations practices in South Africa 
The second primary objective of the study was to develop a regression model that 
explains the quality of online IR in the unique JSE equity market. In Sections 4.4 and 
4.5, I described models that were used in other domains to explain online IR quality 
and presented the present study’s shareholder familiarity hypothesis. The following 
mathematical model was proposed: 
 Chapter 5 – Design and Methodology 140 
 
 
Disclosure = α + β1ShareholderFamiliarity + β2Size + β3OwnershipConcentration + 
β4Industry + β5Age + β6Profitability + β7Leverage + β8Big4Auditor + 
β9DualListing + β10IssueNew + ε 
5.4. Research design 
5.1.1. First primary objective 
According to Mouton (2001:55), a research design is a plan or blueprint of how a 
researcher intends to conduct a study. Hofstee (2006:113) refers to it as the naming 
and discussion of the overall approach used to test the thesis statement(s).  
 
The main factor that influenced design choice was my view of online IR as a 
programme (system) implemented by a company to achieve certain outcomes. The 
desired outcomes are twofold: to improve disclosure (voluntary information items) to 
investors, and to improve the company’s share performance. This system view is in 
line with Cronjé’s (2007:138,258) conclusion that voluntary disclosure is generated by 
a system that is separate from the system that generates statutory disclosures, but that 
sometimes overlaps with it. He confirms, “both systems are responsible for the 
disclosure of relevant information in minimising the risks of stakeholders” (Cronjé, 
2007:138).  
 
Cronjé (2007:259) found that, in contrast to mandatory financial information, 
discretionary information is generated by an open system that interacts with and reacts 
freely to feedback from user groups. Bloomfield’s (2008:434) views are in line with 
Cronjé’s description of an ‘open system’: 
Both natural languages and accounting methods change constantly because of a 
variety of forces, including changes in communication technology, interaction with 
other cultures, and changes in the subject matter to be discussed and the decisions 
to be made. (Bloomfield, 2008:434)  
Laughlin (1987) is also of the opinion that in a social life-world, accounting and money 
form a system to steer the actions of people and organisations. The accounting system 
“is actually related to other social contextual variables” (Laughlin, 1987:488). 
Accounting systems and mandatory reporting requirements form part of what DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) call coercive forces in their work on institutional isomorphism (why 
organisations tend to become like one another) – they regard increased 
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professionalization of employees (for example, the requirement that financial directors 
and CFOs should be chartered accountants) as a form of normative isomorphism. 
 
From these systems perspectives, I argue that the implementation of online IR as a 
practice to channel financial and other information is a programme (system) 
implemented to improve the investor-targeted communication processes of a 
company. By listening to the information demands of society (investors and other 
stakeholders), a company acknowledges its social contextual variables as proposed 
by Laughlin (1987).  
 
I therefore attempted to reach the first primary objective (determining the quality of 
online IR practices) by using a programme evaluation design adopted from the social 
sciences. According to De Vos, Strydom, Fouché and Delport (2005:108), evaluation 
research methodology can be used to assess, amongst other things, the design, 
implementation, and applicability of social interventions. For the purposes of this study, 
I regarded the existence of an online IR programme as an intervention.  
 
Mouton (2001:158-161) also lists implementation (process) evaluation as a valid 
research design. Von Kardoff (2004:137) argues that evaluation research is a scientific 
response to the following requirements: 
 Evaluation research checks the effectiveness, efficiency, and goal-attainment of, 
inter alia, social programmes, measures, models and laws, interventions, technical 
innovations and organisational changes in complex and constantly self-
regenerating environments.   
The literature review chapters of this study have shown that financial 
communication and the technologies employed in this communication process are 
constantly changing, complex environments. An online IR programme is an 
intervention to streamline the communication process, to make it accessible to 
everybody with an Internet connection, and to deliver a coordinated message about 
a company as an investment vehicle. 
 The results of evaluation research are expected to provide support in decision-
making and planning and to assist in better monitoring, higher rationality, and 
improved quality of products, and to provide arguments for a legitimate pursuit of 
goals and interests.   
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It is proposed that publication of the results of this study may enhance the credibility 
of the online IR function as an important part of the financial communications supply 
chain and which may also lead to improved quality in the practice in South Africa. 
This view is in line with the arguments of Cronjé (2007) and Laughlin (1987) that 
accounting systems and organisations go through iterative processes that are 
informed by their social contexts. 
I therefore regarded a programme evaluation research design as suitable to investigate 
the quality of online IR programmes to ascertain the extent to which these are adapted 
for the South African capital market and broadband environment in which JSE-listed 
companies operate. The primary data for this study’s first primary objective were 
therefore gathered by reviewing the websites of the companies selected for inclusion 
in the sample for the presence or absence of certain information items, presentation 
technologies, and usability features, according to a checklist. 
5.1.2. Second primary objective 
In order to achieve the second primary objective (to develop a model for online IR 
practices and test the hypothesis), the research design I chose was the development 
and testing of a regression model. The literature review and findings of prior studies 
informed the selection of the independent variables. Explanatory analysis by means of 
regression modelling is a widely used research design in the area of web-based 
financial and non-financial voluntary disclosures (Bollen et al., 2006; Abdelsalam et al., 
2007; Boubaker et al., 2012; Nurunnabi & Hossain, 2012; Uyar, 2012; Botti, Boubaker, 
Hamrouni & Solonandrasana, 2014; Satta et al., 2015).  
5.5. Sample 
I used the INETBFA database of JSE-listed companies to determine the sample and 
collect the stock exchange data for the descriptive and regression statistics. I extracted 
a list of 338 companies whose ordinary shares were listed on the JSE Main Board on 
1 June 2012.27 In order to compare the results from this study with those of similar 
studies I decided to extract three samples, which then also formed a composite 
sample.  
                                             
27 Property Income Funds were excluded from the population as they behave more like exchange-traded 
funds (ETFs) than single ordinary equity securities. 
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The first sample was based on companies being listed at least ten years in order to 
compute the independent variable of interest (shareholder stability) over a long enough 
period to eliminate periodic unusual trading behaviour, such as the 2003 and 2007/8 
financial market upheavals. The list of companies on 1 June 2012 (338) was filtered to 
identify only those companies that were already listed on 30 June 2002. In total, 188 
companies had already been listed on 30 June 2002. This sample contained large and 
small companies from a variety of sectors. 
 
The second sample was selected with the purpose of comparing the results for the 
largest companies on the JSE with the results of similar studies in other countries and 
in South Africa. Geerings et al. (2003), Uyar (2012), and Yanjie and Wan (2013) used 
samples of 30 to 50 of the largest companies on various exchanges. The largest 
sample of 110 companies from the top quartile of the London Stock Exchange was 
used by Abdelsalam et al. (2007). Nurunnabi and Hossain (2012) selected all 83 
companies on the Bangladeshi Stock Exchanges (Dhaka and Chittagong). In South 
Africa, Nel (2004) and Nel and Baard (2006, 2007) respectively selected the top 40 
and top 50 companies on the JSE. Roberts (1999), Venter (2002) and Barac (2004) 
selected the top 100 companies listed on the JSE, although the realised samples with 
websites were slightly lower. Nkonki (2012) also based their analysis of Integrated 
Reporting on the JSE Top 100 (based on market capitalisation). 
 
The most popular measure of size in previous studies was usually market capitalisation 
or turnover. Given that the present study focuses on the investors and characteristics 
of the stock exchange, I considered market capitalisation a more appropriate measure 
than turnover. The 189 companies already identified were then ranked in terms of 
market capitalisation (high to low). This ranking was then compared to a separate 
ranking (high to low) of market capitalisation of all JSE companies listed on 
31 December 2011, (the ranking on 31 December was used in other studies to 
determine the top 100). Because I anticipated that some companies might be excluded 
from the final sample because they are pure investment holding companies, this 
selection was drawn to include the largest 112 companies instead of only the largest 
100, in order for substitution to be possible where necessary. This comparison added 
another 25 companies to the initial list of 188 companies. 
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For the purposes of supplemental analysis of the regression models without industry 
effects, it was decided to compile a further sample, namely a census of one of the nine 
main industry sectors of the JSE. As the regression model contains a large number of 
independent variables, it had to be a large sector for the analyses to be reliable. Due 
to the relatively small number of companies listed on the JSE, this eliminated most 
industry sectors. Therefore, I decided to combine the ‘Consumer goods’ and 
‘Consumer services’ sectors of the JSE. Furthermore, Bowen (2006) suggests that 
consumer companies have a particular problem with the Internet, as they experience 
a marketing versus corporate communication conflict. This conflict arises because 
companies selling directly to consumers initially used their company website for online 
transactions with customers. The corporate divisions in those companies (which 
include the IR department) then struggled to establish non-selling sections on the 
company’s website. Bowen (2006) also found that many such companies tended to 
relegate their IR sections to links at the bottom of the main home page, which required 
investors to scroll down to find it, or they established separate websites, one for selling, 
and another for other corporate information (Bowen, 2006).  
 
The complete list of all the companies on the JSE on 1 June 2012 was then sorted per 
main sector. The consumer goods and consumer services sectors totalled 24 and 41 
companies respectively. Comparing this selection to the combined list of companies 
required a further ten companies to be added to the selection in order to achieve 
complete representation of the consumer goods and services sectors.  
 
The total raw selection then came to 223 companies. Seven pure investment holding 
companies and two dual listed securities (Investec PLC and Mondi PLC) were 
excluded because their equivalent South African share was already included in the 
sample. Six smaller companies did not have websites, and two websites were 
unavailable during the period when the analysis was done. One company was also 
excluded because it had delisted since the raw sample was drawn and when the 
primary data were collected. That left 205 companies (61 per cent of the population of 
338) whose websites and IR pages were assessed for content, method of presentation 
and usability (as summarised in Table 5.2).  
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Table 5.2: Sample selection 
Step followed Number of 
companies
First draw – Listed before Sept 2002 188
To complete – Top 100 (included highest 112 per market capitalisation) 25
To complete – consumer goods and services sector 10
Raw selection 223
Delisted -1
Pure investment and holding -7
Dual listed (SA share already in raw selection)  -2
Site unavailable -2
No website -6
Final sample for assessment of online IR practices 205
 
The total market capitalisation of the selection was R6.3 trillion (R1012), representing 
97 per cent of the R6.5 trillion market capitalisation of all listed ordinary equity on the 
JSE on 1 June 2012. Although a random sample was not calculated, the selection was 
wide and large enough to provide information on JSE companies’ behaviour and 
characteristics.  The list of companies in the sample is available in Appendix B. 
5.6. Content analysis 
Assessing what is posted on companies’ websites implies that the content needs to be 
analysed. Mouton (2001:105) describes selecting and analysing texts as a key data 
collection method, with content analysis as a subgroup of this method. Content refers 
to words, meanings, pictures, symbols, themes or any message that can be 
communicated (Mouton, 2001:165). Mouton (2001:166) notes that one of the typical 
applications for content analysis as a research methodology is the analysis of public 
documents such as company annual reports. According to Holsti (1969:2), 
…[c]ontent analysis is a multipurpose research method developed specifically for 
investigating any problem in which the content of communication serves as the 
basis of inference. 
In addition, Du Plooy (2009:213) describes content analysis as a “methodology applied 
to explore, describe, and infer characteristics of messages”. Mayring (2004:266) states 
that the goal of content analysis is the systematic examination of communicative 
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material. In the context of the thesis, the whole content of the IR website is deemed a 
message consisting of many parts.  
 
Content analysis can be used to describe the characteristics of content (Holsti, 
1969:42-67; Mayring, 2004:267) by doing the following: 
 Describing trends in communication content – Du Plooy (2009:213) explains that a 
common use of content analysis is to record the frequencies with which certain 
symbols or themes appear in messages. In the present study, after analysing the 
data, conclusions are drawn about the state of current online IR communications 
compared to that found in prior studies by other researchers. This should highlight 
general developing trends over time, although not necessarily of the same 
population. 
 Auditing communication content against standards – Du Plooy (2009:348) 
concludes that content analysis over a period of a month or two can be undertaken 
of communications disseminated by an organisation as part of a public relations 
audit. An extensive literature review was done and discussed in the previous 
chapters. From this, the disclosure checklist was compiled to represent a standard 
to be used for online investor communications. This is discussed in more detail in 
Section 5.6.1 Measurement instrument and categories. The content analysis 
should therefore reveal whether companies are conforming to the standard. 
Holsti (1969:118) defines the context unit as the largest body of content that may be 
searched to characterise a recording unit. In the present study, the context unit was 
the entire company website. Companies structure the architecture of their websites 
differently. Some information is contained on the home page, other information on the 
investors’ page etc. Different names are used; for example, some companies call the 
pages where most of the information useful to investors is found ‘Investors’, others call 
those pages ‘Financials’. In order to be fair to the companies, in each case, the whole 
website was therefore scrutinized for the items on the checklist (see Section 5.6.1 
Measurement instrument and categories).  
 
The type of content analysis used for the present study conforms to what Mayring calls 
structuring content analysis. This technique seeks to “filter out particular aspects of the 
material … or to assess the material according to particular criteria” (Mayring, 
2004:269). The context units were assessed according to particular criteria determined 
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in advance, in other words, the measurement instrument. Therefore, not all information 
or messages in the context units were analysed or coded, but only those determined 
beforehand.  
5.6.1. Measurement instrument and categories 
Previous studies on web-based or online IR practices employed self-constructed 
checklists (or the self-constructed checklists of previous researchers) to evaluate the 
information which was published, and the formats in which the information was 
presented (Hedlin, 1999; Marston & Empson, 2003; Barac, 2004; Rowbottom et al., 
2005; Hodge & Pronk, 2006; Nothnagel, 2006; Nel & Baard, 2006, 2007; Bollen et al., 
2006; Cormier, Ledoux & Magnan, 2009; Cormier et al., 2010; Boubaker et al., 2012; 
Uyar, 2012; Nurunnabi & Hossain, 2012; Botti et al., 2014). However, for this study, it 
was decided to use guidelines developed by website usability experts and tailored 
specifically for online IR practices. 
 
The checklist was thus compiled from the second edition of Designing websites to 
maximize investor relations usability – guidelines for investor relations (IR) on 
corporate websites” by Loranger and Nielsen (2009). Loranger and Nielsen (2009) 
compiled their guidelines after analysing 94 websites and observing 63 users (finance 
professionals and individual investors) in usability studies (2009:4). Usability is defined 
by ISO 9241-11 as “the extent to which a system can be used by specified users to 
achieve a specified goal with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified 
context of use” (ISO, 1998). Research by the Nielsen Norman Group into the usability 
of websites found that websites should attract a visitor’s attention within ten seconds; 
otherwise, visitors would leave the site in increasing numbers during the next 20 
seconds. The focus of usability guidelines is therefore on getting the user to the right 
information swiftly and making it easy for them to view and use the information (Nielsen 
2011).  
 
Abdelsalam et al. (2007:11) used the 2003 first edition of Loranger and Nielsen’s 
Guidelines as their measurement instrument. Loranger and Nielsen (2009:7) reported 
that after a period of six years between their two IR usability studies, investors 
continued to view/use websites in the same way. However, they noted that 
presentation features such as webcasts for analyst presentations were much more 
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prevalent (Loranger & Nielsen, 2009:7). This is in line with presentation features’ 
becoming more advanced as the bandwidth in countries expanded over time.  
 
To ensure validity of the measurement instrument, I cross-checked Loranger and 
Nielsen’s (2009) guidelines specifically with those of the UK IRS (2012) and the higher-
tier recommendations for annual report disclosure that users indicated they wanted in 
the Beattie and Pratt (2002) study. In reviewing prior studies, described in Section 4.4 
Prior literature on predictors of online investor relations quality, I also observed that the 
present study’s checklist covered at least those items contained in the more limited, 
self-constructed checklists (see also Table 6.1 for a comparison of the number of 
checklist items of a few studies). I concluded that the Loranger and Nielsen’s (2009) 
guidelines were complete and comprehensive, especially with regard to presentation 
and usability guidelines and suitable for the present study.  
 
The 103 guidelines compiled by Loranger and Nielsen (2009:29-193) were converted 
to questions/statements that accommodate a ‘present/not present’ answer. For 
example, Guideline 101 (Loranger & Nielsen, 2009:192) requires that for each IR 
contact, the time zone and hours of availability be provided. This facilitates connecting 
an investor in another time zone with the IR department of the company. In the 
measurement instrument used for the present study, this became two separate items, 
namely the time zone is provided (e.g. Greenwich Mean Time + 1 hour), and the hours 
of availability are provided. I did not use any Likert-style questions requiring opinion or 
interpretation, nor thematic coding in the conventional sense of qualitative research 
studies. All questions/statements referred to features that were electronically either 
present on a website or not, and were observable with the human eye.  
 
The final number of items included in the checklist came to 201. The total included 
content items (for example, a description of the main products or services of the 
company), presentation items (for example, a webcast of the annual general meeting 
is available), as well as usability items (for example, e.g. the size in megabytes of 
Portable Document Format (PDF) files are provided next to the description of a 
downloadable PDF file, enabling users to gauge how long the download will take, 
depending on their own bandwidth). Checklist items were grouped into 11 categories: 
 Getting to corporate information,  
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 Company information,  
 Shareholder information,  
 Share charts,  
 Financial and other reports,  
 HTML and PDF reports,  
 Calendar of IR events,  
 Presentations to investors, Contacting the IR department,  
 General usability, and  
 International aspects. 
 
See Appendix C for the complete disclosure checklist.  
 
The final checklist was then converted to an online format in LimeSurvey. This brought 
the following benefits: 
 Checks and balances were built into the checklist that assisted in ensuring internal 
consistency. Certain items only opened up if a previous item was indicated as 
present – for example, detailed features of an interactive stock chart only opened 
up if such a stock chart was ticked as present.  
 Having fewer items to tick saved time and speeded up the data collection process.  
 Further guidance and hints were also provided for certain items to clarify the 
analysis (for an example, see Figure 5.1). 
 Surveys could not be submitted unless all the required items were answered, 
ensuring that there was no missing data. 
 The survey data were exported to MS Excel, which made capturing the data of 
manual checklists unnecessary and eliminated capturing errors. 
Using LimeSurvey as a checklist-capturing tool is a methodological contribution from 
this study that can also be adopted by other researchers employing checklists. 
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Company Information 
General information about the company, its products, directors etc. Also includes 
general communication by the company, i.e. press releases. 
 
12 [b1]1. Is the following information available on the company's website (usually 
under 'Overview', 'About us' or 'Who we are' and sometimes on the ‘Home’ page)? 
 
This should be available as menu items or clickable links leading to HTML 
webpages, or contained in subsections of a webpage. 
 
You should select 'NO' if you found it per chance somewhere in a presentation or 
financial report and it is only available in the presentation/report. * 
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: 
  Yes No 
The corporate overview ('Overview', 'About us', 
'Who we are' or on 'Home' page) explicitly states 
what the organisation does in plain language. 
  
Key corporate facts in the company overview 
are visually scanable, e.g. locations, number of 
employees etc. 
  
More detailed company facts are available under 
'Fact Sheet' or 'Company Snapshot'.   
 
 Figure 5.1: Example of guidance provided in the LimeSurvey checklist 
5.6.2. Timeframe of content analysis 
Two factors determined the timing of the content analysis. Firstly, there was a systemic 
shock to the disclosure environment in South Africa, and, secondly, I required funding 
for carrying out the content analysis.  
 
The systemic shock came with the implementation of the King III Code (IoD, 2009) 
which required that an integrated report be produced for all financial years beginning 
on or after 1 March 2010 on an apply or explain basis. During this period of uncertainty 
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for the preparers of integrated reports, both the Integrated Reporting Committee (IRC) 
of South Africa and the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) issued 
discussion papers (IIRC, 2011; IRC, 2011). Both these discussion papers provided 
guidelines for the additional information that companies needed to source, and for 
disclosure regarding their business models, risks, sustainability, outlook, etc. As 
already mentioned in Section 1.1 Background, and described more fully in Section 2.3 
Investors’ information needs, this information has been demanded by investors as far 
back as the Jenkins Report in 1994 (AICPA, 1994). I assumed that IR departments 
would leverage the information-generating process for their Integrated Report and 
communicate the same information on the IR webpages of the company (if they did 
not already disclose it before). As with any new process, time is required to improve 
compliance. I decided that 2011 would be too soon to investigate the online IR 
practices of the JSE-listed companies after this regulatory change. 
 
Prior studies in South Africa (Venter, 2002; Barac, 2004; Nel & Baard, 2006, 2007) 
limited their studies to the largest 40 or 100 companies. In the present study, I wanted 
to capture behaviours across different sized companies. To increase the strength of 
the regression analysis, I required a much larger sample. However, for comparative 
purposes, the website content analysis had to take place in as short a time as possible. 
Given the extensive checklist, this required that more than one person would be 
required to do the content analysis. The progress of the study was therefore delayed 
until funding could be obtained. In 2012, funding was received from Unisa’s Master’s 
and Doctoral Support Programme. The funding would expire in December 2012 if I did 
not use it. I therefore decided to proceed with the content analysis. I negotiated with 
Unisa’s Bureau for Market Research for access to their Computer Laboratory. This 
provided me with the equipment and Internet access for conducting the content 
analysis of the websites. Access to the laboratory was available during the third quarter 
of 2012. The content analysis therefore took place from July 2012 to mid-September 
2012. 
5.6.3. Pilot and data gathering 
Any visitor to websites can attest to the fact that website content changes rapidly. 
McMillan (2000:85), in an analysis of published website research, found that, given 
continuous changes in the online content of websites, rapid data collection is essential. 
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Similarly, Sangster and Tyrrall (2004:316) advise that “data collection will almost 
certainly have to be done reasonably quickly…[or] the web will have moved on”. It was 
therefore imperative that the assessment of the websites be completed in the shortest 
time possible in order to increase comparability of the websites in terms of the available 
Internet technology and regulatory aspects. To shorten the content analysis period, 
and to cover more companies than just the top 100 during the time that the facilities of 
Unisa’s Bureau of Market Research were available to me, I decided to employ four 
post-graduate finance students, selected from the top of their class, to analyse the 
websites, using the online LimeSurvey checklist.  
 
These students played a dual role in that they also proxied for private investors. Section 
4.3.2 Disclosure regulations of the JSE described how the Internet has levelled the 
playing field for private investors by making information available to all market players 
simultaneously. Hodge, Kennedy and Maines (2004), Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy and 
Pronk (2007), Janvrin, Pinsker and Mascha (2013), and Basoglu and Hess (2014) 
argue that using graduate business students as a proxy for non-professional (private) 
investors is a valid methodological choice. Cormier et al. (2010) and Baral and 
Pokharel (2016) also used students for their website content analysis, but provided no 
further information about the students. Using post-graduate finance students therefore 
infused the results of the content analysis with the experience of private investors.  
 
Training on the use of the LimeSurvey format was provided over three days at the 
Bureau for Market Research facilities. First, the students and I assessed the website 
of an international company, BASF, together, as an example of excellent online IR 
(BASF previously won awards from the IRS of the UK). Thereafter the students 
individually assessed the website of a South African company, Kumba Iron Ore, which 
was rated Excellent for its integrated reporting disclosure practices by Ernst and Young 
(2012:3, 2013:5). This assessment was done using a printout of the checklist. We then 
reviewed the results together and clarified uncertainties. The students then reviewed 
a second JSE-listed company on their own. This company had a very limited website, 
so that the students could see the difference between an extensive website and a 
perfunctory website. The results of each student’s checklist were once again reviewed 
together.  
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After this training, the companies in the sample were randomly allocated to the 
students, and they proceeded to review the websites from July to mid-September 
2012, using the online LimeSurvey format. The content analysis of the individual 
websites was executed by toggling between the company website window and the 
LimeSurvey checklist window. If the students encountered any uncertainties, they 
contacted me. We then accessed the company website together and came to a joint 
decision.  
5.6.4. Coding 
The concept of ‘present on the website’ in this study needs clarification. The King III 
Code (IOD, 2009) requires the production of an integrated report from financial years 
beginning on and after 1 March 2010. In Section 3.4 Role of the Investor Relations (IR) 
department, I have pointed out how the various definitions for IR were very similar to 
the first aim of the Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRC, 2013), that is to improve 
communication with investors. Several of the present study’s content checklist items 
can also be described as complying with the spirit of the King III requirements for the 
integrated report. For example, the guideline “Acknowledge the challenges your 
company faces and explain the company’s plan to address them” (Loranger & Nielsen, 
2009:58), is similar to recommended Practice 9.2.4: 
The board should ensure that the positive and negative impacts of the company’s 
operations and plans to improve the positives and eradicate or ameliorate the 
negatives in the financial year ahead are conveyed in the integrated report. (IoD, 
2009:50)  
Furthermore, Ernst & Young (2012) and Nkonki (2012) reported that South Africa’s 
Top 100 companies were making good progress with implementing the King III Code 
reporting requirements (in either an ‘extended annual report’, an additional social 
responsibility report or an integrated report). Given these findings, it was therefore 
reasonable to expect that many of the items in the present study’s checklist would also 
be disclosed in a company’s integrated report. However, for the purposes of the 
present study, a distinction needed to be made between disclosing information in an 
integrated report (or similar report), whether in PDF or HTML format, and disclosing 
information on the IR pages of the website itself – this study is not about the 
completeness of integrated reporting, but about the use of the Internet as an IR 
communication channel.  
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In line with Cormier et al. (2010:330), an item was only ticked as ‘present’ if it was 
available on the company’s website as a clickable menu item leading to an HTML 
webpage with the information. For example, the tab ‘About Us’ may contain a menu of 
information about the company, and one item may be ‘Our Team’. Clicking on ‘Our 
Team’ takes users to a webpage with that name where users can find short biographies 
and photos of the board of directors. Alternatively, if they click on ‘Our Team’ inside 
the IR pages, and that takes them directly to the place inside the PDF or HTML annual 
or integrated report where the directors’ biographies and pictures are provided, the 
item was ticked as ‘present’. However, the item was not ‘ticked’ present if directors’ 
biographies and pictures were only present in the PDF or HTML annual or integrated 
report, with no links back to the IR webpages, and the user had to use the website’s 
‘Search box’ to find the information inside the integrated or annual report.  
 
The point of departure for effective online IR is presenting information that users will 
be interested in on the webpages themselves as ‘permanent’ information (much like 
the permanent information about an audit client) that is separate from financial and 
other reports available on the website. Information items were scored ‘1’ and the 
absence of an item was scored ‘0’. Best practice items that were not applicable to all 
companies in the sample (for example, information on American Depository Receipts) 
were not included in the maximum number of points available.28  
 
A further focus of this study was on how well the presentation features of the Internet 
were used to communicate with investors (and other stakeholders). This analysis was 
required to determine whether companies had moved into Stage III of Hedlin’s (1999) 
model, where Internet features are used which cannot be incorporated into printed 
communication material. Certain items, such as video tours of operations, interactive 
stock charts, social media links and links to brokers’ consensus, were scored with a ‘2’ 
if present, as it demonstrated additional effort to use the Internet’s unique capabilities 
to communicate with investors. This weighting toward technology items is consistent 
with Bollen et al. (2006), Abdelsalam et al. (2007), Chang et al. (2008) and Cormier et 
al. (2009). Other checklist items addressed usability, for example, indicating the size 
                                             
28 The information was gathered (scored with text indicators ‘yes’ or ‘n/a’), but not counted as part of the 
disclosure score, as it was not numerical.  
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of any downloadable file or indicating the office hours of the South African IR 
department in different time zones for international investors. 
 
Finally, it was assumed that it was possible for each company to comply with each of 
the 201 recommended best practices for online IR, if they wanted to. If, for example, a 
company did not have an interactive share chart, I did not exclude those points from 
the total score, thereby artificially inflating the company’s disclosure score. The point 
of a checklist based on best practices is that every company should be applying those 
practices. The results of the regression analysis described in Chapter 7 point out which 
company characteristics are associated with non-compliance.  
 
A subtotal was calculated for each of the 11 categories and then an overall disclosure 
score (DS) was calculated, expressed as a percentage of the maximum available 
marks of 244. The total count for company j for category c with z number of items was 
calculated as follows: 
 
Categoryjc = ∑ Scorejzi=1  
 
The total online IR DS for company j over all 11 categories (201 items) was calculated 
as follows: 
 
DSj = 
∑ Categoryjc
11
i=1
244
  or 
∑ Scorej201i=1
244
 
 
DS formed the dependent variable in the regression model that was developed to test 
the hypothesis that shareholder stability is associated with the quality of online IR 
practices.  
 
Finally, the LimeSurvey results were exported to MS Excel. After reviewing the data 
for completeness in MS Excel, they were imported into version 23 of the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software for further analyses.  
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5.7. Regression model 
Section 5.6.4 Coding described how the DS was determined. The DS was the 
dependent variable in the regression equation. The variable of interest was 
shareholder familiarity, which was proxied by the shareholder stability variable. Unlike, 
Bushee (1998), Bushee and Noe (2000), Gaspar et al. (2005), Yan and Zhang (2009), 
Ramalingegowda (2014) and Huang and Petkevich (2016), I did not have access to 
the portfolios of JSE companies’ institutional investors (South African or overseas) to 
calculate their portfolio turnover in order for the institutional shareholder to be classified 
as transient, dedicated or quasi-indexers. Instead, I used the turnover or churn ratio of 
each JSE company’s outstanding shares to calculate a measure for stability, which is 
indicative of an average investment horizon of its shareholders. Huang and Petkevich 
(2016:1023) observe “Intuitively, a higher average churn rate implies a shorter 
investment horizon.” Share turnover (‘trading intensity’) was also employed by Souder 
et al. (2016) to obtain their ‘capital patience’ measure of investor horizon. Souder et al. 
(2016:1209) remark “…firms with less frequently traded shares typically have investors 
with greater tolerance for long-term investments.”  
 
The share turnover (trading) volume information was obtained for each company from 
INETBFA. To ensure that I captured a long-term profile of shareholder stability, I first 
calculated the share turnover ratio for each full year from 1 July 2002 up to 30 June 
2011. The calculation of the share turnover for share ‘x’ for one year is as follows: 
 
∑ Daily volume of share 'x' sold for the full 12 months
∑Daily outstanding number of shares for share 'x' for the full 12 months
∑Trading days in the full 12 months
 Equation (1) 
 
Note that some companies had annual share turnover ratios of more than one, in other 
words, they ‘turned over’ their number of outstanding shares more than once. For 
example: 
 the total volume of shares sold was 3.25 million shares; 
 the year had 240 trading days; and  
 the outstanding number of shares was 3 million for each of the first 160 days and 
3.1 million per day for the last 80 days. 
In that case,  
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Share turnover ratio for share ‘x’ in year y = 
3.25
ሾሺ3×160ሻ+(3.1×80)ሿ
ሺ160+80ሻ
 = 1.071 
In line with Lee, Strong and Zhu (2014:745), I only included companies with trading for 
at least 12 months as the initial trading after a listing (heightened market interest, as 
well as sponsoring investors selling off in the secondary market to take profit soon after 
listing) is not representative of the long-term trading of the share.  
 
The long-term share turnover ratio is the following: 
 
∑Equation ሺ1ሻ for each full year listed
∑Number of full years listed
 Equation (2) 
 
Using the average turnover for a nine-year period eliminated short-term fluctuations. 
The long-term ratio captures the percentage of shareholders that have been with the 
company for a long while and that are deemed familiar with the company. The nine-
year period (1 July 2002 to 30 June 2011) also covered the pre- and post-2007/8 
financial crises, when volume traded might have been unusual. Note that I excluded or 
lagged one year between the turnover data and when the DS was compiled with 
content analysis. I use a lagged variable to minimise the effect of potential endogeneity 
between the stability measure (average trading prior to July 2011) and the disclosure 
behaviour a year later (the DS after July 2012). Other researchers that also applied 
lagging to create temporal differences between the dependent and independent 
variable are Chen, Lim and Lobo (2016), Souder et al. (2016), Tan, Xu, Liu and Zeng 
(2015) and Yan and Zhang (2009). 
 
I then used a reverse coding procedure to convert the turnover ratio into a measure for 
stability: the higher the turnover of a share, the lower the stability in ownership. The 
results of Equation (2) were sorted from large to small in order to find the highest 
turnover ratio, which was 1.41284 for Mondi Ltd. In Equation (3), I then used the next 
whole number, ‘two’, to determine the shareholder stability ratio by subtracting the 
average annual turnover derived in Equation (2) from two. This was done for each 
company in the sample. Souder et al. (2016) also employed reverse coding to obtain 
their ‘capital patience’ measure, but they subtracted an industry average turnover 
(instead of an upper range value), with results above and below the industry average.  
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Shareholder stability ratio (STAB9_lag) = 2 - Equation (2) Equation (3) 
 
The operationalisation and data sources of the independent variables are specified in 
Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Variables – operationalisation and data sources 
Variable Operationalisation Data source 
DS The disclosure score (DS) was obtained from 
the content analysis of each company’s website 
according to the checklist. The distribution of the 
raw scores were considered normal for a sample 
larger than 200, the z-scores for skewness and 
kurtosis being less than 2.58 (Field, 2009:139). 
Visual observation of the distribution with fitted 
curve confirmed that the distribution was good. 
No transformation was applied. 
Hand collected via 
content analysis of 
company website 
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF To improve the distribution curve for the stability 
measure, ‘STAB9_lag’ (as calculated in 
Equation (1) to (3) above) was first ranked 
according to fractions between 0 and 1. The 
case that had a ranking value of 1 was replaced 
with a value = 1-(1/205), because the next step 
can only work with values smaller than one 
(Templeton, 2011:50). 
These fractional rankings were then transformed 
with the Inverse Distribution Function 
(IDF.Normal), where the mean = 0 and the 
standard deviation = 1. The resulting distribution 
was then normal. 
Underlying turnover 
data from INETBFA
Controls:   
MCAPbillions Market capitalisation from FTSE/JSE Index 
composition during June 2012, in R109. 
JSE, 2012 
LNCAP062012 In order to improve normality of the distribution, 
‘MCAPbillions’ was transformed to its natural 
logarithm. 
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Variable Operationalisation Data source 
Age Date that the company started trading on the 
JSE relative to 30 June 2012, in full years 
(months and days dropped). 
INETBFA. System 
missing information 
on listing date was 
hand collected 
from the 
company’s 
website. 
LNAGE A natural logarithm transformation was applied 
to ‘Age’ to achieve normality of the distribution. 
 
RoaA Return on average total assets ratio for the 
financial year ending at least three months 
before 1 July 2012 (the start of the fieldwork). 
Average total assets were calculated as the 
average of the opening and closing total assets 
for the period.  
The lagged period of three months was to allow 
for preparing the audited financials of March 
2012 financial year-ends. 
INETBFA from the 
standardised 
financial 
statements. 
RoaA_win Five outliers in each tail distorted the distribution 
of ‘ROaA’ and these cases’ values were 
winsorized (Tukey, 1962:19; Lei & Li, 2016:534; 
Souder et al., 2016:1208) 
 
DE Debt to equity ratio for the financial year ending 
at least three months before 1 July 2012 (the 
start of the fieldwork). 
The lagged period of three months is to allow for 
preparing the audited financials of March 2012 
financial year-ends. 
INETBFA from the 
published financial 
statements. 
 
LNDE_Pub In order to improve the distribution, the natural 
logarithm was used to transform this variable. 
 
Big4Auditor Dummy variable coded ‘1’ if auditors were 
Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG or 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, otherwise ‘0’. 
INETBFA 
DualList Dummy variable coded ‘1’ if the company’s 
shares were also listed on another stock 
exchange, otherwise ‘0’. 
JSE 
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Variable Operationalisation Data source 
IND Dummy variable coded ‘1’ to ‘9’ for the nine 
main sectors of the JSE. Telecommunications 
(three companies), oil & gas (two companies), 
and health services (seven companies) had too 
few cases to justify being in separate industry 
classes. These companies’ main segments were 
reviewed in their annual reports, and reclassified 
into industrial, technology, or consumer 
services. The final statistical analyses were 
therefore done with six industry classifications. 
In the regression analysis, basic materials 
became the reference category. The coefficients 
of the other five industry variables therefore 
represent the difference to the constant. 
INETBFA and 
annual reports 
ISSUE Dummy variable coded ‘1’ if company had new 
issue of shares during the preceding 24 months 
before 1 July 2012. First, I calculated the 
change in issued number of shares from one 
year to the next. Then I identified those 
companies that had a change greater than five 
per cent. Changes in issued shares smaller than 
five per cent were ‘allowed’ to accommodate 
changes due to employee shareowner schemes 
(Jankensgård, 2015:869). Changes that were 
flagged were then manually confirmed with 
company documents as relating to additional 
issue of shares to the public or existing 
shareholders. 
INETBFA, and 
company 
documents on JSE 
SENS. 
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Variable Operationalisation Data source 
Ownership 
concentration (OC): 
It is problematic in South Africa to obtain reliable 
information on the percentage of restricted 
shareholdings due to the prevalent use of 
nominee companies. Although INETBFA 
discloses directors’ shareholding in various line 
items, percentages are not always consistent, 
which brings into question the reliability of this 
metric. Although I started to gather directors’ 
shareholding percentages, I eventually 
abandoned this avenue.  
Information on free float is also difficult to gather 
as the JSE only publishes quarterly changes in 
free float indicators for index constituents, and 
not a complete list with current free float 
percentages.  
I therefore used the board independence 
indicator from the Orbis database of Bureau van 
Dijk as a measure of ownership concentration. I 
used the Independence Indicator for the last 
period recorded before 1 July 2012 as a 
measure of ownership concentration. The 
classifications were: 
Orbis database; 
Bureau van Dijk, 
2016 
 
None >25% A = Attached to any company with known 
recorded shareholders none of whom have more 
than 25% direct or total ownership. This was 
coded ‘None >25%’, and is a rough indicator of 
a company with more dispersed shareholding. 
One or more >25% B = Attached to any company with known 
recorded shareholders, none of whom had an 
ownership percentage (direct, total or calculated 
total) over 50%, but which had one or more 
shareholders with an ownership percentage 
above 25%. This was coded ‘One or more 
>25%’, and is indicative of a company with 
substantial block-holdings. 
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Variable Operationalisation Data source 
Controlled C = Attached to any company with one recorded 
shareholder with a total or a calculated total 
ownership over 50%. 
D = Allocated to any company with one recorded 
shareholder with a direct ownership of over 
50%. Branches and foreign companies were 
also indicated using indicator ‘D’. As there were 
very few Cs, I grouped Cs and Ds together, as 
these companies are ‘Controlled’. 
 Eight cases were indicated with ‘U’ as ‘uncertain’ 
by Orbis. I referred to each case’s annual report, 
specifically the Shareholder Profiles, and 
considered the shareholding of the top 
shareholders disclosed there. A code was 
assigned based on that information. 
In the regression analysis, None >25% became 
the reference category. The coefficients of the 
other two ownership concentration variables are 
therefore the difference in the constant. 
 
The regression model and variables are therefore specified as follows: 
 
DS = α + β1FR_STAB9_lag_IDF + β2LNCAP062012 + β3OC + β4IND + β5LNAGE + 
β6RoaA_win + β7LNDE_Pub + β8Big4Auditor + β9DualListed + β10ISSUE + ε 
 
All statistical tests and analyses were conducted in the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS), version 23. Various steps were performed to ensure that the 
requirements for employing OLS were not transgressed and that the output values 
were acceptable:  
 The histograms of all continuous independent variables with a normal curve fitted 
indicated that the transformations of the respective continuous variables were 
successful.  
 The histogram of the regression model residuals and the scatterplot of the 
standardized residuals plotted against the standardized predicted values visually 
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confirmed that there were no further undiscovered relationships between the 
variables in the regression model.  
 The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity of the residuals (p=0.887) indicated 
that the null hypothesis of constant variance of the residuals could be accepted. 
Regressing the model residuals on the 15 variables of the model (p=0.697) also 
indicated constant variance in the residuals. The null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity could therefore be accepted.  
 None of the independent variables correlated perfectly (see the univariate results 
in Section 7.4 Univariate analyses). 
 Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were all below 2.5, which are well below ten or 
even five, and indicates that collinearity was not an issue (see the regression output 
in the multivariate results in Sections 7.5 to 7.7) (Field, 2009:224). 
 Reference categories were used for the two categorical variables that had more 
than three categories: 
o For ownership concentration, ‘None >25%’ (representing more dispersed 
shareholders) was the reference category. 
o For industry, the ‘Basic materials’ sector was the reference category. 
 The OLS was run on cross-sectional data for one point in time, so there was no 
need for firm and year fixed effects. The Durbin-Watson statistic for serial 
correlation of the residuals was therefore not applicable. 
 As a final control, I verified from the output tables in SPSS that the lower and upper 
bounds at a 95 per cent confidence level for the coefficients of all the significant 
predictors did not cross zero, meaning that the lower bound coefficient value being 
negative whilst the upper bound coefficient value being positive. 
Tables and graphs for the outputs are available in Appendix D. 
5.8. Reliability, validity and limitations  
De Vos et al. (2005:163) define reliability as “the extent to which independent 
administration of the same instrument (or highly similar instruments) consistently yields 
the same (or similar) results under comparable conditions”. The four graduate finance 
students that assessed the websites had three days of extensive training on using the 
measurement instrument (checklist). I assisted whenever there was uncertainty during 
the content analysis of the 205 companies in the sample. The checklist items tested 
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for the presence or absence of certain information, as well as presentation formats 
(HTML, PDF, video). This did not require deep insight or considered judgement. As 
these were top-class finance graduate students, it can safely be assumed that they 
understood what to look for, and would recognize it after three days’ training. The 
checklist contained no questions involving perceptions or feelings that are ordinarily 
measured on a Likert-type scale. Therefore, this study is not classified as an opinion 
survey of some latent construct.  
 
Checklist items were grouped into 11 categories. The nature of the checklist item 
(guideline) determined in which category it would fall. There was no ambiguity about it 
– for example, ‘The stock chart displays the date’ fell into the share charts category. 
This grouping into categories was determined upfront by me and there was no need 
for the students to make a judgement each time. The coding rules were very 
straightforward (present or not) and the electronic measurement instrument in 
LimeSurvey contained additional guidelines.  
 
Holsti (1969:143) argues that if the purpose of a study is mainly descriptive, content 
validity can usually be established through the informed judgement of the 
investigator(s). The first research objective of this study was to determine what the 
online IR practices of JSE-listed companies are, and this would be classified as a 
descriptive objective. The measurement instrument was verified by comparing two 
expert guidelines for best online IR practices (Loranger & Nielsen, 2009; IRS, 2012) to 
each other, as well as information items from the Beattie and Pratt (2002) study. 
Reviewing checklist items in previous studies, as discussed in Section 4.4 Prior 
literature on predictors of online investor relations quality, also confirmed that the 
present study’s checklist measured at least the same information as other studies, but 
in more detail. I am therefore confident that the checklist was valid for measuring the 
quality of JSE-listed companies’ online IR activities.  
 
Reliability of the financial information for the independent variables was increased by 
sourcing it from INETBFA and Bureau van Dijk, both leading providers of financial and 
JSE information in South Africa. The reliability and validity of the regression model 
developed to test the hypothesis was enhanced by using the assistance of a trained 
statistician to assist with the data analyses. Running the analyses in SPSS software 
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also ensured that the process was structured, as the test statistics indicate when 
certain assumptions are violated. 
 
Section 5.7 Regression model already described what transformations were required 
to improve the normal distribution of the variables. Chapter 7 Results and discussion 
of the regression model, elaborates on the measures taken to comply with the 
requirements for running an OLS regression and the robustness tests undertaken. 
 
The main limitation of the study is the fact that websites, by their nature, change 
continually. There was no facility to save or preserve complete websites ‘as is’. 
Copyright protection might also be a problem if one attempted to do this. It is therefore 
not possible to verify the results after the fact. However, this applies equally to all the 
prior studies discussed in the literature review in Sections 3.7.3 and 4.4. The exception 
is Abdelsalam et al. (2007), who saved the websites they used with an Internet Explorer 
functionality that is no longer available. 
 
I acknowledge that assessing each website only once is a potential shortcoming. 
However, I contend that the students acted as proxies for private investors from the 
general population, who might also have overlooked some information if they had 
participated in the survey. It is in fact a feature of good usability that users should be 
able to find information quickly and easily. Nel and Baard (2007) remark that time spent 
to evaluate websites was limited to 15 minutes per company as “important information 
should be available easily and at first glance”. The method of data collection in the 
present study therefore erred on the conservative side by perhaps accepting that an 
item is not present, when in fact it was, and could be found by further searching on the 
website (which is not the point of usability). Barac (2004:3) similarly acknowledged that 
despite best efforts information might be overlooked and that her results were likely an 
underestimate rather than an overestimate of actual reporting. Given the quality of the 
post-graduate finance students (from the top of their class), the three-day intensive 
training provided and the additional guidance in the electronic checklist, it is doubtful 
whether a second review of the websites would yield a different result.  
 
Other limitations of the study are the following: 
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 It was a cross-sectional study measuring variables at a point in time for 205 
companies. Repeating the study for more years could provide more data points that 
would improve the effect size of the sample. 
 An assumption was made that even though private meetings might take place 
between companies and their large investors, no value-relevant information are 
disclosed in these meetings which is not already in the public domain. I rely here 
on the reputation of the JSE as a highly regarded exchange and for its protection 
of minority rights (WEF, 2012:325), which would include minorities having equal 
access to information. Furthermore, most CFO’s of JSE-listed companies are 
members of professional accountancy bodies whose members are required to 
abide with high ethical standards regarding compliance with laws and being fair. 
 This study focused only on the information requirements of investors and did not 
include information required by other stakeholders, such as trade unions, 
environmental groups, or the government. In some cases, the information items 
might overlap in any case. In terms of what sustainability means, it is in the long-
term interest of the shareholders that a company not only addresses economic 
issues, but also environmental, social and governance issues. The measuring 
instrument did check whether or not companies provided a sustainability or 
corporate social responsibility report or integrated report. However, it was not the 
purpose to evaluate the content of these reports in depth. 
 The focus was a selection of South African companies listed on the main board of 
the JSE. Non-listed companies were excluded, as investors in those companies are 
aware of the risks of non-tradability, etc. Investors in small non-listed companies 
would normally be directly involved in the management of the company or have 
direct access to management in order to gain the necessary information. 
Information asymmetry was therefore not applicable in their case. 
 As I explained in the background to this study, the content analysis was limited to 
the dissemination of information on companies’ websites by the IR department. It 
therefore excluded other forms of communicating information, such as printed 
annual reports, printed press releases, or emails to investors, and other sources of 
information about a company, such as articles in the financial press. To the extent 
that electronic copies of annual reports and press releases are available on the 
website, they were included. Investor Days and Results Conference Calls are also 
means by which an IR department can communicate with investment professionals. 
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However, as this study focused on publicly available information that private 
investors can access, it was only assessed if it was placed as a webcasts on the 
website (with or without a transcription and slides). The website was the only 
communication channel used to assess the quality of IR practices for the purposes 
of this study. 
5.9. Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, I described my epistemological and ontological view of the world and 
the research process used to observe that world. A rationale was provided for choosing 
the programme evaluation research design as the most appropriate method to 
establish the quality of the online IR practices of JSE-listed companies. In Table 5.4 
the two primary objectives are summarised, as well as the research design to 
accomplish those objectives. 
 
Table 5.4: Summary of research objectives and research design 
Research objectives Research designs 
1. Determine the quality of the voluntary 
communications of JSE-listed 
companies as manifested by their 
online IR practices. 
1.1. Reach a conclusion regarding the 
stage of development of South 
African online IR (using Hedlin’s 
model). 
Content analyses of the websites. 
2. Develop a model that explains the 
quality of the online IR practices of 
JSE-listed companies and test the 
thesis hypothesis:  
OLS regression model. 
 
H0 = There is no association between 
voluntary communications quality 
(proxied by online IR quality) and 
shareholder familiarity (proxied by 
shareholder stability). 
DS = α + β1ShareholderFamiliarity + β2Size 
+ β3OwnershipConcentration + β4Industry 
+ β5Age + β6Profitability + β7Leverage + 
β8Big4Auditor + β9DualListing + 
β10IssueNew + ε 
Source: Author 
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A sample of 205 companies was selected from the JSE main board in various stages, 
resulting in three subsamples: companies listed for longer than 10 years, companies 
in the top 100 according to their market capitalisation, and companies belonging to the 
consumer goods and services sector. The checklist used as a measurement 
instrument was based on the guidelines of Loranger and Nielsen (2009). The checklist 
was verified for its validity and completeness against the IRS of the UK’s guidelines 
and a previous study on users’ requirements for annual reports (Beattie and Pratt, 
2002). Content analysis was conducted by four post-graduate finance students from 
July to mid-September 2012 with financing from Unisa’s Masters and Doctoral Support 
Programme.  
 
The operationalisation for the test and control variables in the regression model was 
described. Most continuous variables needed to be transformed to obtain a better 
distribution. Information about the companies was obtained from INETBFA and Bureau 
van Dijk. In this chapter, I also outlined the procedures employed to improve the validity 
and reliability of the statistical analyses. The main limitation of the study (as of most 
similar studies) is that the websites could not be saved or recreated at another point in 
time in order to reassess them.  
 
The results from the website content analysis are discussed in the next chapter. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION FROM 
THE CONTENT ANALYSIS 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter described the methodology followed to accomplish the primary 
research objectives of this study. In this chapter, the findings in respect of the first 
primary objective – determining the quality of online IR in South Africa – are discussed. 
Overall results for the full sample and the top 100 companies are discussed first. I 
compare these results to those of similar studies in other countries, bearing in mind 
differences in economic development and bandwidth speeds. Thereafter, the results 
per category and the top and bottom five guidelines in terms of compliance, in each 
category are described in more detail. The chapter ends with conclusions regarding 
the stage of online IR in South Africa, as required by the secondary research objective. 
6.2. Overall findings for 205 companies and top 100 companies 
The frequencies and descriptive statistics based on the comprehensive disclosure 
score for each of the 205 websites analysed, as well as the top 100 companies are 
presented in Figure 6.1. The mean score for the total selection is 39.78 per cent, with 
a standard deviation of 13.55 per cent. The graph clearly indicates a wide distribution. 
The mode, based on binning in five per cent increments, for the full sample is located 
between 30 and 35 per cent and contains 30 companies. The distribution is slightly 
negatively skewed, with a negative kurtosis due to the wide distribution of scores. The 
mean score for the top 100 companies is higher at 47.85 per cent, with a slightly lower 
standard deviation of 11.26 per cent. The top 100 mode, based on binning in five per 
cent increments, is located between 55 and 60 per cent and contains 21 companies. 
The shift to higher scores led to an increase in the negative skewness of the top 100 
distribution. Within the top 100 companies, it would seem that normative isomorphism 
might be playing a role as the scores are higher, with a smaller standard deviation and 
a mode of 21 companies lying between 55 and 60 per cent. The mode, based on 
individual scores, is 61.07 for both the full sample and the top 100 companies and 
consists of five companies. 
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 205 Top 100
Mean 0.3978 0.4785
Std Error 0.0095 0.0113
Median 0.3975 0.5123
Mode 0.6107 0.6107
Std Deviation 0.1355 0.1126
Kurtosis -0.8478 -0.3831
Skewness -0.0365 -0.5475
Minimum 0.0410 0.1189
Maximum 0.6639 0.6639
N  205 100 
 
Figure 6.1: Frequencies and descriptive statistics for the total online IR scores 
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As argued in Section 3.7.3 Disclosure on South African corporate websites, I expected 
South African companies to perform well, based on the Ernst and Young (2012), Nkonki 
(2012) and WEF (2012) findings. The overall mean score of 39.78 per cent was therefore 
disappointing. The lower performance of the South African companies in the current study 
may be attributed to the fact that the study included 205 companies, and not only the top 
100. Roberts (1999), Venter (2002), Barac (2004) and Nel and Baard (2006, 2007) did not 
report composite IR scores as these initial studies were exploratory.  
 
When the scores are grouped per market capitalisation, the effect is slightly better for the 
larger companies. Figure 6.2 indicates that the mean score for the top 50 companies per 
market capitalisation was 50.5 per cent, versus 28.3 per cent for the bottom 55 companies. 
It seems that companies with a smaller market capitalisation did not make much of an 
effort to use their website to communicate effectively with investors. The results for the 
top 100 companies was also unsatisfactory, in that 49 of the top 100 companies scored 
below 50 per cent – the lowest score in this group was 11.9 per cent.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Average score per market capitalisation grouping 
 
The average score of 47.85 per cent for the top 100 companies is slightly below the 
promising findings of Ernst and Young (2012) and Nkonki (2012) regarding integrated 
reporting disclosure practices of the top 100 companies.  For larger companies there 
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seems to be synergy between information disclosed on the company’s website and the 
content of its integrated report. One possible explanation for the much lower IR scores of 
smaller companies in the present study’s sample may be that their CFOs and IR 
departments were focusing on adapting to the integrated reporting requirements of the 
King III Code (IoD, 2009) over the previous two years, and neglected the website as a 
communication channel. One hopes to see synergies from the integrated report of smaller 
companies flowing to the website in future, as many of the content items of the integrated 
report (such as risks and future plans) also occur in the IR best practice guidelines (IRS, 
2012; Loranger & Nielsen, 2009) and should in any case be communicated in the 
integrated report. In Section 7.5, I report on the multivariate regression model and the 
result of the hypothesis test regarding the role that shareholder familiarity plays in 
depressing the information environment of companies. 
 
In Table 6.1, the study’s total disclosure score is presented, together with those of a 
selection of reported studies from other countries that used checklists containing more 
than 35 items. In terms of comprehensiveness, the present study’s checklist has most in 
common with the study of Abdelsalam et al. (2007), which reported incorporating items 
from Loranger and Nielsen’s earlier guidelines published in 2003 – note that the present 
study’s checklist is based on Loranger and Nielsen’s (2009) guidelines.  
 
In respect of its financial institutions, South Africa was ranked first in the 2012-2013 Global 
Competitiveness Index (WEF, 2012:325) for its regulation of securities exchanges, 
together with the strength of its auditing and reporting standards, and the efficacy of its 
corporate boards. The soundness of banks and availability of financial services were both 
ranked second. Financing through the local equity market was ranked third. Given this 
institutional regime, one would expect a disclosure score of higher than 39.78 per cent, 
and more in line with the disclosure scores found in the UK and US studies which contain 
the world’s leading stock exchanges. The score of the present study’s top 100 companies 
are better, but still not comparable to that of Abdelsalam et al.’s (2007) UK study (110 
companies), as well as the later results of Yanyie and Wan (2013) for the UK (top 30 
companies) and the US (Dow30).  
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Table 6.1: Comparison to online disclosure scores of international studies 
Study Exchange Primary data 
gathering29  
No. of companies No. of 
items in 
checklist 
Disclosure 
score and 
standard 
deviation  
IMF 
class30  
Download 
speed31 
Abdelsalam 
et al. (2007) 
London Mid 2005 
110 from top 
quartile (market 
cap) 
143 66% (9%) AE Not available. 
Oldest – Jan 
2008:4 Mbps 
Desoky 
(2009) 
Egyptian Feb 2008 57 companies 
from three indices 39 37% (31%) EMDE 0.5 Mbps 
Uyar (2012) Istanbul Feb 2009 All 14 from 
Governance 
Index; 
29 random (rest of 
exchange) 
67 
54%  
(SD not 
reported) 
EMDE 
2.55 Mbps 
Nurunnabi & 
Hossain 
(2012) 
Dhaka and 
Chittagong 
(Bangladesh) 
Dec 2009 All 83 with 
websites 56 32% (20%) EMDE 0.48 Mbps 
Yanjie & 
Wan (2013) 
USA 
Ja
n 
– 
Ju
ly
 2
01
2 12.9 Mbps DOW30 
76 
60% (6%) AE 
UK 14.6 Mbps top 30 from 
FTSE100 60% (6%) AE 
Hong Kong 36.91 Mbps Hang Seng Index 
(48) 33% (9%) AE 
China 6.69 Mbps CNINFO40 31% (10%) EMDE 
This study Johannesburg July –  
mid-Sept 2012 205 various 201 
40% (14%) 
EMDE 
3.29 Mbps top 100 48% (11%) 
 
Being listed on a foreign stock exchange (in addition to the local exchange) was found to 
be significantly positive for online financial reporting quality by Debreceny, Gray and 
Rahman (2002), Bollen et al. (2006) and Desoky (2009). Of the top 100 JSE-listed 
companies, 27 were also listed on UK, US or European exchanges.32 Although the South 
African top 100 companies’ mean score of 47.85 per cent is slightly better than the full 
                                             
29 The studies are listed according to the dates on which the primary data was collected (via content 
 analyses of the websites), not according to when the results were finally published. 
30 AE = Advanced Economy; EMDE = Emerging Market and Developing Economies (IMF, 2014:163-165) 
31 Average download speed is given in Mbps per country during the data collection period (Ookla, 2014). 
 Data is only available from January 2008 onward. 
32 These 27 companies do not necessarily form part of the top 30 or top 100 of those foreign exchanges, 
 given that their market capitalisations are much higher– see Section 4.2. 
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sample’s score, it is still low, given that more than a quarter are also listed on major 
overseas stock exchanges. The present study’s comparatively poorer results are probably 
related to the difference in the market capitalisation of the companies included in the 
studies of Debreceny, Gray and Rahman (2002), Bollen et al. (2006) and Desoky (2009), 
which considered much larger companies. The results of the regression model (see 
Section 7.5) provide more clarity on the role of size and listings on foreign exchanges in 
a multivariate analysis of the factors associated with the quality of online IR practices in 
South Africa. 
 
In the context of South Africa’s economic classification as an emerging market and 
developing economy (EMDE) (IMF, 2014:163–165), the average disclosure score of all 
205 companies is better than those reported in all other EMDE countries, except Turkey. 
In general, it also seems that the scores achieved in studies in the emerging markets were 
lower, and displayed greater variability in companies’ IR relations. It seems that again, 
size in terms of market capitalisation may have an influence, since the DOW30 and 
FTSE100 companies in advanced economies, are much larger in terms of their market 
capitalisation than the JSE and other EMDE companies.  
 
Finally, considering the effect of available bandwidth at the time of the individual surveys, 
South Africa performed worse than the UK and the USA (Yanjie & Wan, 2013). These 
countries’ available bandwidths were almost four times higher than South Africa’s in 2012 
(the study period). Comparative bandwidth data had only become publicly available on 
the NetIndex (Ookla, 2014) for countries from January 2008. Therefore, I had to assume 
that the bandwidth for Abdelsalam et al.’s (2007) earlier UK study during mid-2005 would 
have been lower than the four megabytes per second (Mbps) reported in January 2008. 
The average score of the South African top 100 companies (47.85 per cent) at an available 
bandwidth of 3.29 Mbps is lower than the 66 per cent score of the 110 UK companies 
reported in Abdelsalam et al. (2007). South Africa performed better than the other 
developing countries, which had lower available bandwidth, notably Egypt, Turkey and 
Bangladesh, and even China, who had higher bandwidth. A country’s available bandwidth 
therefore also seems to play a definite role in the extent to which the features of the 
Internet can be used for online IR.  
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The main findings per category will be discussed next. 
6.3. Main findings per category 
This section provides more detail on how companies performed in each of the 11 broad 
categories of online IR practices. The results are summarised in Figure 6.3. The 
categories that achieved the best scores were ‘Getting to corporate information’ (96 per 
cent) and ‘General usability’ (76 per cent). The low overall mean score is mostly due to 
low ratings for the categories ‘Presentations’ (19 per cent), ‘Contacting the IR department’ 
(19 per cent), ‘Calendar of IR events’ (31 per cent), and the ‘Share details’ (33 per cent). 
These categories also had high standard deviations, which reflect wide disparities 
between companies’ practices. The top 100 companies performed between nine and 11 
per cent better in these categories, but still scored below 50 per cent. 
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Figure 6.3: Online IR scores per main category 
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corporate
info
Company
information
Shareholde
r info
Share
charts
Fin & other
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PDF
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usability
Internation
al aspects
Average score 205 95.9% 43.4% 32.6% 42.0% 37.3% 44.7% 31.3% 19.3% 19.0% 75.5% 54.4%
Standard Deviation 205 12.2% 16.2% 20.1% 33.2% 14.9% 20.3% 30.7% 17.9% 23.6% 11.9% 15.8%
Average score Top 100 97.3% 49.2% 41.4% 56.1% 44.1% 55.7% 44.9% 28.2% 28.7% 80.7% 55.0%
Number of guidelines 7 32 28 18 26 14 6 34 16 18 2
Maximum marks 9 43 31 21 48 14 7 35 16 18 2
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The results for each category are now discussed in more detail. 
6.3.1. Getting to corporate information 
Figure 6.4 presents the distribution in scores for the category ‘Getting to corporate 
information’. Companies did very well in getting users to visit their websites and the IR 
webpages, as 188 companies scored above 80 per cent. This resulted in a mean score 
of 95.93 per cent. 
  
Mean  
0.9593 
Std Error  
0.0085 
Median  
1.0000 
Mode  
1.0000 
Std Deviation  
0.1224 
Sample Variance  
0.0150 
Kurtosis  
12.4761 
Skewness   -3.5447 
Range  
0.6667 
Minimum  
0.3333 
Maximum  
1.0000 
N 205
Figure 6.4: Frequencies and descriptive statistics: Getting to corporate 
information 
 
The scores for the individual guidelines are presented in Table 6.2. It was easy to find 
the company’s website address (URL) by guessing the web address, or the browser 
search engine listed the correct address in the search results under the top three 
results (top result = 92.7 per cent, second result = 3.9 per cent, third result = 3.4 per 
cent). All the companies hosted their websites on their own site, which is an indication 
2 7 8
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of the maturity of website development in the South African corporate environment. 
With regard to communicating with investors, it is important that the IR pages are 
separated from the other pages of the company website (95.1 per cent) and that 
investors can find the IR link easily on the ‘Home’ page with one click (94.6 per cent). 
In 93.7 per cent of websites, the IR link was easy to see. An IR link was present on 
every page of the website in 94.1 per cent of the websites, or there was a link to the 
IR pages from at least the ‘About Us’ or the ‘Overview’ pages (2.6 per cent). Six 
companies had no links from either the website’s ‘Home’ page, or the ‘About 
Us’/’Overview’ pages. 
 
Table 6.2: Guidelines: Getting to corporate information 
Guideline % compliance 
URL easy to guess 99.5 
Top three Google search result 100.0 
Own site (not hosted) 100.0 
IR pages separate from commercial pages, etc. 95.1 
One click to ‘IR Home’ page from website ‘Home’ page 94.6 
IR link easy to notice 93.7 
IR link on every page, or 94.1 
Link to IR in ‘About Us’/’Overview’ 2.9 
 
6.3.2. Company information 
Results for the category ‘Company information’ are presented in Figure 6.5. This 
grouping contains information about the company’s products, risks and strategies, why 
one should invest in it, the board of directors, news and press releases, social 
networking and means to stay updated about what is happening in the company. The 
mean for this group of guidelines was only 43.39 per cent. This is disappointing, as this 
is the area where an investor would normally look for non-financial voluntary 
information (apart from CSR/Sustainability reporting, which should be available under 
‘Reports’ or ‘CSR’). In addition, this area contains most of the guidelines that would 
describe the governance of the company. Investors have been asking for these types 
of information to make their investment decisions since the Jenkins report (AICPA, 
1994). In Section 3.4, the primary role of the IR department was defined as 
communication that “enables a full appreciation of the company’s business activities, 
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strategy and prospects and allows the market to make an informed judgement about 
the fair value and appropriate ownership of a company” (IRS, 2013). Irrespective of the 
fact that King III (IoD, 2009) recommendations only came into effect in 2010, South 
African IR officers and CFOs that take transparency and accountability seriously, 
should have disclosed this value-relevant information to their investors.  
 
The five most applied guidelines for company information in terms of compliance are 
presented in Table 6.3. In this sample, 97 per cent of companies made it very clear 
what the company did and 92 per cent gave a more detailed description of the main 
product or service segments in the group. In a similar vein, key facts about the 
company (locations, number of employees) were offered in one place and were easy 
to scan in 84 per cent of cases. These guidelines are intended to ensure that the 
investors at least understand the market in which a company operates. Providing a 
fuller picture, 56 per cent of companies described their value proposition (strategic 
plans, new products, and business outlook; not tabulated). However, only 35 per cent 
acknowledged the challenges or risks the company faced, and how the board planned 
to address it (not tabulated). These guidelines should be followed better as companies 
begin to comply more fully with the Integrated Reporting principles. Under the ‘Board 
of directors’ menu, 91 per cent and 89 per cent of companies offered the names and 
titles of directors respectively. Short biographies of each director were provided by 77 
per cent of companies (not tabulated). Compliance with these guidelines is crucial in 
creating confidence in the investor regarding the skills and experience of the 
management of the company. 
 
Table 6.3 also shows compliance with the five least applied guidelines. Under the 
board of directors menu, no companies provided downloadable, high-quality photos of 
directors for use in press articles or transcripts of speeches by directors.33 Only one 
per cent of companies provided downloadable presentations given by specific directors 
under their profiles. Links to company blogs were provided in six per cent of cases, 
which is an indication that companies do recognise the social media trend (although 
this was not as strong in 2012 as it is now). In addition, 24 per cent of companies 
provided links to various social media sites (not tabulated). It is also disappointing that 
                                             
33 Photos of directors were provided by 70.2 per cent of the companies in the sample, but this is not 
 the same as downloadable photos in a ‘press kit’. 
 Chapter 6 – Results and discussion from the content analysis  180 
 
 
only 11 per cent of companies provided a downloadable fact sheet or company 
snapshot. It would enable the user to save the file on their computers without needing 
to refer to the company website every time, or printing a hard copy. Online fact sheets 
were provided by 29 per cent of companies (not tabulated). 
 
Mean      0.4339 
Std Error      0.0113 
Median      0.4419 
Mode      0.4186 
Std Deviation      0.1615 
Sample Variance      0.0261 
Kurtosis    -0.2905 
Skewness    -0.3300 
Range      0.7907 
Minimum      0.0233 
Maximum      0.8140 
N    205 
 
Figure 6.5: Frequencies and descriptive statistics: Company information 
 
Table 6.3: Selected guidelines: Company information  
Top five % Bottom five %
Clear what company does 97.1 Downloadable director photos 0
Product/service segments 
explained 
93.7
Transcripts of speeches by director 0
Director’s name 90.7 Download presentations by director 1.0
Director’s title 89.3 Link to company blog 5.9
Key facts scanable 84.3 Fact sheet/snapshot downloadable 10.7
 
6.3.3. Shareholder information 
Figure 6.6 displays the results for the guidelines on ‘Shareholder information’. 
Guidelines in this category address the availability of a share quote, shareholder 
distributions, dividend policy, details of analysts following the company, and who the 
company’s corporate advisors are. The average score was again disappointing, at only 
32.57 per cent. About ten per cent of the sample, 21 companies, displayed no share 
details and forms the mode for this distribution. 
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Mean  0.3257 
Std Error  0.0141 
Median  0.3226 
Mode (n=21)  0.0000  
Std Deviation  0.2015 
Sample Variance  0.0406 
Kurtosis  -0.5817 
Skewness  0.1752 
Range  0.8710 
Minimum 0.0000  
Maximum  0.8710 
N 205
Figure 6.6: Frequencies and descriptive statistics: Shareholder information 
 
The five most applied guidelines regarding ‘Shareholder information’ are presented in 
Table 6.4. These five guidelines relate to the provision of a share quote on the 
company’s home page, reflecting the latest trading price for the share. This is one of 
the key pieces of information that any investor would be looking for when accessing 
the website, but only 71 per cent of companies provided such a quote. The share quote 
should be an interactive feature, reflecting the latest updated price (usually there is 
some lag, for example, fifteen minutes). The latest price was provided by 65 per cent 
of companies, 61 per cent provided the date, and 57 per cent provided the volume 
traded so far for the day. Only 62 per cent of companies included their share’s ticker 
symbol for each of the exchanges on which it is traded. This information would enable 
investors to access a third party site if they needed more information, as most shares 
are referenced by their three-character ticker symbol. 
 
Table 6.4: Selected guidelines: Shareholder information 
Top five % Bottom five %
Share quote highly visible 70.7 Dividend policy described 5.9
Latest trading price displayed 65.4 Analyst email address 6.3
Ticker symbol provided 62.0 Explain how to buy a share 6.8
Updated: date 61.5 Link to Brokers’ Consensus 10.2
Volume traded 57.1 International format for analyst’s 
telephone number 11.2
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The five guidelines with the lowest compliance in the ‘Shareholder information’ 
category are also in Table 6.4. The guideline calling for describing the company’s 
dividend policy had the lowest compliance, at only six per cent. For many retail 
investors, this is an important piece of information, which influences their decision to 
invest in a company. Companies should make more effort to describe their dividend 
policies. Providing contact details of analysts following the company and links to 
brokers’ consensus on third party sites would enable investors to contact the analysts 
and enhance the credibility of the website, as external confirmation can be obtained. 
However, only six per cent of companies provided the email address of analysts 
following their company and only ten per cent provided links to the brokers’ consensus. 
In the same category, only 11 per cent provided the local analysts’ telephone details 
in international format (for ease of use by international investors). Companies should 
not only cater for the large or institutional shareholders, but should also accommodate 
smaller retail investors. For this purpose, explaining how their share can be bought is 
very useful. However, only seven per cent provided this information. 
6.3.4. Share charts 
Another useful tool for investors is a share chart that reflects the performance of the 
share over time and which should allow comparison to relevant indices and even 
competitors’ shares. Figure 6.7 reflects the performance of companies in the category 
‘Share charts’. A disappointing one third of companies (67 out of 205) had no share 
chart, which contributed to the low average score of 42 per cent. A share chart was 
provided by 59 per cent of all companies on their own website (although data is 
provided by INETBFA or similar service providers) and 12 per cent provided a link to a 
third party site (four per cent had both options) (not tabulated). Companies can choose 
to provide an interactive chart, whose inputs the user can change, or a static chart – 
37 per cent presented a static chart on their own website and five per cent provided a 
link to a static chart on a service provider’s website (not tabulated). Only a third of 
companies provided an interactive chart on their own website; nine per cent linked to 
an interactive chart on another site (not tabulated). 
 
For five guidelines most complied with in this category, see Table 6.5. Companies that 
supplied a share chart also complied with the basic guidelines for making the graph 
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visually attractive and easy to interpret. However, it is disappointing that only 61 per 
cent of companies indicated the date when the share chart was last updated.  
 
Mean     0.4204 
Std Error     0.0232 
Median     0.4762 
Mode (n = 67)    0.0000  
Std Deviation     0.3322 
Sample Variance     0.1104 
Kurtosis   -1.4918 
Skewness   -0.1314 
Range     0.9524 
Minimum 0.0000  
Maximum     0.9524 
N 205
Figure 6.7: Frequencies and descriptive statistics: Share charts 
 
The five least complied with guidelines for share charts are also presented in Table 
6.5. Only six per cent of companies provided a downloadable share price history. This 
feature is useful to those private investors that do not have paid access to other sites 
that provide share data. The next four guidelines with low compliance related to the 
provision of interactive share charts. Investors like to compare a company’s share 
performance to that of its competitors, but only 19 per cent of companies in the sample 
provided that facility. The performance of a share should also be judged against 
general indicators and indices – this information was provided by only a quarter of the 
companies. Analysts have access to their own specialist graphing tools, which 
incorporate moving averages, Bollinger bands, price channels, etc. and they are 
trained to interpret these graphs. Advanced functions such as these should not be 
available on the share chart provided by a company for primary use by retail investors. 
However, 30 per cent of companies catered for advanced needs and skills, ignoring 
this guideline. Only 38 per cent of companies provided the option to plot trading 
volumes together with the share price, which is useful for interpreting large moves in 
the share’s price.  
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Table 6.5: Selected guidelines: Share charts 
Top five % Bottom five %
Chart legends close to lines 66.3 Share price history downloadable 6.0
Chart numbers rounded off 65.8 Interactive charts: 
 Competitors’ share price can be 
plotted 18.8
Chart high contrast colours used 61.1  Relevant indices can be plotted 25.0
Chart date updated 59.6  Specialist (analyst) options not offered 29.8
Chart axis clearly labelled 52.9  Trading volumes can be plotted 38.0
 
6.3.5. Financial and other reports 
Figure 6.8 provides the compliance data for the category ‘Financial and other reports’. 
This category’s scoring was weighted towards hyperlinked reports. The mean score is 
only 37.33 per cent, which can be attributed mostly to the fact that companies continue 
to provide financial reports in PDF format, instead of in HTML or other electronic 
formats.  
 
Mean 0.3733
Std Error 0.0104
Median 0.3750
Mode 0.2083
Std Deviation 0.1488
Sample Variance 0.0222
Kurtosis -0.8671
Skewness 0.2258
Range 0.7500
Minimum 0.0000
Maximum 0.7500
N 205
 
Figure 6.8: Frequencies and descriptive statistics: Financial and other reports 
 
Table 6.6 presents the different presentation formats companies used for their annual 
and other reports. As can be expected, most companies provided an annual report (89 
per cent) and an interim report (84 per cent). Only two of the 205 companies provided 
neither an annual nor an integrated report, although one of these at least provided the 
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annual financial statements and commentary. (The other company was incorporated 
in Zimbabwe, and was very small.) I also expected a higher compliance rate (67 per 
cent) for the integrated report, as it was mandatory for all companies to prepare one 
for financial years starting on or after 1 March 2010. Companies could at least have 
posted the PDF version, but only 64 per cent of them did so. A possible explanation 
could be that some companies divided the information required by the integrated report 
between the annual report and a CSR report. Just over half, 51 per cent, of companies 
provided a separate CSR report. Notably, more companies provided an HTML version 
of the CSR report (36 per cent) rather than a PDF version (32 per cent). Furthermore, 
11 per cent of companies provided quarterly reports. Overall, this study found a ratio 
of approximately 2:1 for PDF to HTML for all 205 companies’ reports. 
 
Table 6.6: Format of financial and other reports provided 
 Top 100 N = 205 
Available # HTML PDF E-book Available # HTML PDF E-book 
Annual report  91% 65% 88% 4% 89% 42% 86% 4%
Interim report 87% 46% 85% 1% 84% 29% 82% * 
Integrated report 81% 62% 77% 3% 67% 38% 64% 3%
CSR report 69% 49% 46% 51% 36% 32% 
Quarterly report 15% 7% 12% 1% 11% 4% 9% * 
# Columns do not add up to 100% as companies provided more than one format. 
* The result for the one company that did provide an e-book for these reports does not reflect, as it 
amounts to less than 0.5 per cent. 
 
The top 100 companies performed better, especially in providing integrated and CSR 
reports. As in the full sample, the top 100 companies provided more CSR reports in 
HTML than PDF. Analysis of the top 100 companies indicates a higher application of 
HTML (although PDF still dominated), especially for the integrated report, which is the 
newer reporting format. The ratio of HTML to PDF reports overall was also much better 
for the top 100 companies. This is probably because larger companies have more 
resources available to invest in the development of HTML webpages. 
 
If one compares the annual and integrated report presentation formats for this study 
with those of previous studies of South African companies, an interesting trend seems 
to emerge from Table 6.7. Note that all the prior studies listed, excluding those by 
Barac (2004) and Loxton (2003), refer to financial statements and not to the annual 
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report, which is a much more comprehensive document and over time has grown to 
hefty proportions. The earliest research by Lymer et al. (1999) found that HTML was 
more prevalent than PDF. Their study was based on the top 30 companies and was 
conducted at a time when the Internet was first becoming a popular communication 
tool. Financial statements in HTML format were provided by 69 per cent of the 
companies. A possible reason for this high rate could be that early adopters of 
technology were eager to experiment with HTML reports. It would also not have been 
an onerous project to convert the smaller number of pages of typically shorter financial 
statements than those presented today to HTML.  
 
All subsequent studies have found the opposite, namely that PDF was more prevalent 
than HTML. The prevalence of HTML has declined slightly over time and has remained 
around or just above 60 per cent. When I compare the present study’s findings for the 
top 100 companies’ integrated report formats with the annual report formats reported 
by Barac (2004:13), in a study conducted more than nine and a half years earlier, I find 
that they are virtually identical. I concluded that despite increases in bandwidth over 
the past decade, even the larger companies have not yet moved to interactive HTML 
as their preferred method of presenting reports on the company’s website.  
 
Table 6.7: Comparison of largest companies’ report presentation formats 
N With website Analysis period HTML# PDF# 
Lymer et al. (1999)  30 26 Nov 1998–Feb 1999 69%* 50%* 
Venter (2002)   100 85 Jan 2002 63%* 78%* 
Loxton (2003)  40 40 Aug–Sept 2002 18%* 98% 
Barac (2004)   100 87 Jan–Feb 2003 62% 78% 
Nel (2004)   50 50 March 2004 62%*@ 100%*
Current study: Annual 
Reports  
100 100 Jul–Sept 2012 65% 88% 
Current study: Integrated 
Reports 
100 100 Jul–Sept 2012 62% 77% 
# All percentages in these columns are based on companies with websites. 
* Percentages relate to financial statements only, not full annual reports. 
@ Includes ‘interactive financial statements’. 
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Companies also provided financial statements in downloadable format (see Table 6.8). 
Downloadable documents enable users to manipulate the information on their own 
hardware, without re-entering information. Nel (2004:8) found that of the top 50 
companies, only 26 per cent provided MS Excel statements. The current finding of 44 
to 45 per cent is therefore a considerable improvement, given the larger sample. Once 
again, the top 100 companies scored about ten per cent better in this regard. However, 
given that most, if not all, companies would have their financial statements internally 
available in spreadsheet format in any case, it is not clear why more companies do not 
give users access to information in this user-friendly format. 
 
Table 6.8: Availability of financial statements in MS Excel 
Statement N = 205 top 100 
Comprehensive income 45% 55% 
Financial position 45% 56% 
Changes in equity 44% 53% 
Cash flow  44% 54% 
 
No reports in eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) could be found, even 
though eight of the companies in the study are members of the XBRL-SA jurisdiction 
(XBRL SA, n.d.). It seems their XBRL reports are not available on their publicly 
accessible websites, or that these reports were still under development. According to 
the international XBRL organisation’s website  
“XBRL allows the creation of reusable, authoritative definitions, called taxonomies, 
which capture the meaning contained in all the reporting terms used in a business 
report, as well as the relationships between all the terms…XBRL makes reporting 
more accurate and more efficient, as it does not require users to re-enter 
information. It allows unique tags to be associated with reported facts” (XBRL, 
n.d.).34  
 
The five most adhered to guidelines are presented in Table 6.9. Almost all companies 
indicated the reporting currency for monetary amounts and rounded figures to reduce 
clutter. In the present study’s sample, 98 per cent of companies grouped similar reports 
                                             
34 See https://www.xbrl.org/the-standard/what/an-introduction-to-xbrl/ for more background. See 
http://za.xbrl.org/home/join-us/xbrl-sa-working-group-members/ for more information on the South 
African working group. 
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together. Latest reports and results were listed first in order that users can find them 
first by 97 per cent of companies. Financial reports were grouped together under a 
descriptive name on the IR pages so the investors can find them easily (95 per cent). 
Companies were doing the basics right. 
 
Table 6.9 also provides details of the five least adhered to guidelines for financial and 
other reports. Only four per cent of companies offered comparisons of key figures for 
competitors or the industry in order to allow investors to judge their size and 
performance. Key figures should also be provided in some major foreign currency so 
that overseas investors can quickly grasp the scale of figures – only 15 per cent of the 
sample provided key financial figures in currencies other than ZAR (not tabulated). 
Furthermore, only four per cent of companies indicated the date on which the exchange 
rate was pegged for conversion and five per cent indicated the exchange rate that was 
used for the conversion. Nine per cent of companies allowed visitors to customise 
some aspect of the available reports and 13 per cent provided key historical data, such 
as turnover or earnings per share in downloadable spreadsheet format. This would 
assist investors to graph trends, etc. without having to key figures in again. Although 
compliance with the latter two guidelines compliance was still low, it is encouraging 
that some companies were making an attempt to provide their information in user-
friendly formats. 
 
Table 6.9: Selected guidelines: Financial and other reports 
Top five % Bottom five % 
Indicate reporting currency 99.0 Offers comparisons to competitors or 
industry statistics 3.4
Figures are rounded 98.5 Exchange rate determined on ‘date’ 4.4
Similar reports grouped together 97.6 Exchange rate provided for figures in 
other currencies 5.4
Latest reports listed first 97.1 Users can customise reports 8.8
Financial reports grouped together 
under Reports or Financials 94.6
Key historical data downloadable in 
spreadsheet 13.1
 
Overall, for this category it seemed that companies were providing their financial and 
other reports, but that they were not making much effort to contextualise the figures in 
terms of their competitors or their own previous history. 
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6.3.6. HTML and PDF reports 
Presenting financial and other reports on the website is also subject to certain usability 
guidelines. The results for the category ‘HTML and PDF reports’ are presented in 
Figure 6.9. The average of 44.67 per cent is low, especially if one considers that HTML 
and PDF are not new technologies for presenting documents or information. The mode 
is 28.57 per cent, which is indicative of a low level of compliance. 
 
Mean 0.4467
Std Error 0.0142
Median 0.4286
Mode 0.2857
Std Deviation 0.2033
Sample Variance 0.0413
Kurtosis -1.1017
Skewness 0.1887
Range 0.9286
Minimum 0.0000
Maximum 0.9286
N 205
 
Figure 6.9: Frequencies and descriptive statistics: HTML and PDF reports 
 
As Table 6.6 shows, PDF is the dominant method of presenting annual, interim, 
integrated, and quarterly reports. It is therefore encouraging to see high compliance 
with the first three guidelines for PDF documents, as set out in Table 6.10. However, 
only 63 per cent of companies indicated the page count or MB size of the PDF 
document, which serves as an indication to users as to how long it will take to download 
the file. Only 55 per cent of companies provided HTML reports which contained a topic 
on one webpage (scroll up or down), or, if a topic was split over multiple pages (similar 
to a hard copy report), navigation was provided to move back or forward, the number 
of pages was indicated and there was an option to jump to any page. 
 
The five guidelines which were least complied with are also presented in Table 6.10. 
The first three guidelines relate to each other. Large PDF files should be provided in 
smaller downloadable files so that a user does not have to wait too long for the 
download and can download only the required sections. Financial reports are usually 
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very large, but only 16 per cent of companies provided this option. Only eight per cent 
of all companies provided the megabyte (MB) size of the smaller files, and only 13 per 
cent indicated the name of the smaller file. HTML reports should be described as 
‘online’ and PDF as ‘print’ documents to distinguish their respective roles. However, 
only 22 per cent of companies complied with this. In an online environment, such as a 
company’s website, users should be using the online tailored file (HTML) instead of 
the PDF file. For that purpose, HTML reports should be listed first if documents are 
provided in different formats. However, only 29 per cent of companies listed the HTML 
document first. Listing the PDF document first might perpetuate the demand for having 
the PDF file on the website instead of weaning users from print-equivalent documents. 
 
Table 6.10: Selected guidelines: Presentation of HTML and PDF reports  
Top five # % Bottom five # % 
PDF opens in legible font size 95.1 When large document split up: 
 Size of smaller PDF files provided 8.3
Table of content at beginning of PDF 93.7  Smaller PDF files described 13.2
Description of PDF file content on 
webpage 90.2
Large PDF files downloadable in 
sections 16.1
PDF Page count or MB size next to icon 63.4 Report described as ‘print’ or ‘online’ 22.0
Topic complete on one HTML page, or 
navigation provided when split over more 
than one page 54.6 
HTML reports listed first 28.8
# HTML guidelines were assessed for any financial report available in HTML format. PDF guidelines were 
assessed for any financial report available in PDF format. Therefore, response rates are greater than 
those in Table 6.7 are. Some companies provided the annual report in HTML format and the Interim report 
in PDF. 
 
6.3.7. Calendar of investor relations events 
The dispersion of scores for the category ‘Calendar of IR events’ is presented in Figure 
6.10. The average of 31.32 per cent is very low. This is mostly the result of the fact that 
88 companies (43 per cent of 205) had no calendar of IR events. These 88 companies 
also formed the mode for the distribution. The calendar of IR events is used to indicate 
when a company is hosting an event to communicate results or general presentations 
about the company as an investment. For investors who want to trade in the share, it 
is important to be among the first to receive potential value-relevant information. A first-
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time visitor to the company’s site would therefore go to the calendar of events to find 
out about these events (and expect be able to register to receive future alerts about 
events). 
Mean  0.3129 
Std Error  0.0214 
Median  0.2857 
Mode (n=88)  0.0000
Std Deviation  0.3069 
Sample Variance  0.0942 
Kurtosis  -1.2719 
Skewness  0.3196 
Range  1.0000 
Minimum  0.0000
Maximum  1.0000 
N 205
Figure 6.10: Frequencies and descriptive statistics: Calendar of IR events 
 
The results for the individual guidelines are presented in Table 6.11. Half of the 
companies listed future event dates (and not only past events). However, only 17 per 
cent provided an alert service, which means that they lose an opportunity for 
communicating with potential investors. Half also complied with the guideline to group 
the events by year, with the current year listed first, and then within each year, in 
calendar order. In respect of future events, information should also be provided of the 
purpose (agenda), who is invited, the venue and how to participate (attend in person 
or register for a webcast). Only 27 per cent of companies provided this information. 
Lastly, only ten per cent of the calendar of IR events had a function that allowed it to 
be exported to common calendar software such as MS Outlook. 
 
Table 6.11: Guidelines: Calendar of IR events  
% 
Future or expected event dates listed 49.3
Current year listed first, then Jan to Dec 49.3
Description of who, where, agenda 26.8
Offers Alert service for future events 17.1
Calendar exportable to calendar software 9.8
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6.3.8. Presentations to investors 
Performance in the next category, ‘Presentations to investors’, is presented in Figure 
6.11. This category covers presentations for results announcements, ‘road shows’ to 
analysts and institutional shareholders or debt providers, the annual general meeting 
(AGM), conference calls to analysts and the financial press. It also includes general 
guidelines for transmitting live events such as webcasts of conference calls or the 
AGM. In general, compliance with guidelines for this area was very weak. It requires 
using advanced technology on the website (as opposed to just posting a PDF 
document or news release). It therefore requires investment in technology and in other 
resources to manage live events. The average compliance for this category was only 
19.32 per cent, and 31 companies (15 per cent) had no presentations on their websites. 
These 31 companies also formed the mode for this distribution. 
  
Mean     0.1932 
Std Error     0.0125 
Median     0.1429 
Mode (n=31) 0.0000  
Std Deviation     0.1786 
Sample Variance     0.0319 
Kurtosis   -0.1740 
Skewness     0.8798 
Range     0.7143 
Minimum 0.0000  
Maximum     0.7143 
N 205
 
Figure 6.11: Frequencies and descriptive statistics: Presentations to investors 
 
Regarding the five guidelines not complied with, as indicated in Table 6.12, it is 
encouraging that 75 per cent of companies made results announcements in some form 
on their website (the most popular format was a PDF of the results announcement 
press release, 49 per cent). The next three guidelines all refer to MS Powerpoint slides 
and handouts/booklets of presentations. Compliance in respect of these three usability 
guidelines was around 60 per cent. Half of the companies grouped all the material of 
an event together in one place, giving users the option to decide which to access. 
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The results for the five guidelines with the lowest compliance are also presented in 
Table 6.12. No companies explained to those who visited their website what a podcast 
or vodcast is. In particular, older people might not know what these are and may miss 
an opportunity for a more enriching communication interaction with the company. 
Guidelines for allowing shareholders virtual access to the AGM if they cannot attend in 
person were very poor. Only one company provided a transcript of its AGM 
proceedings. Two companies provided a vodcast of their AGM and three companies 
provided a podcast of the event. Conference calls with analysts or the financial media 
were transcribed by only four companies. Compliance with another 14 guidelines was 
below ten per cent. This area needs attention from IR practitioners.  
 
Table 6.12: Selected guidelines: Presentations to investors  
Top five % Bottom five % 
Results announcements available (in any 
form) 75.1
Explains to website visitors what 
‘podcast’ and ‘vodcast’ mean 0.0
MS Powerpoint slides and booklets for 
presentations:  
Available for AGM: 
 
 When opened online, the default font 
size is readable 
62.5  Transcription of audio track 0.5
 Indicates total number of pages or 
slides and current progress 
59.5  Video 1.0
 Avoids dark colours for background 
of handout or slides (reduce ink 
consumption during printing) 
59.5  Audio 1.5
Groups all materials of same the event 
together 50% 
Conference call is transcribed 2.0
 
Although 75 per cent of companies included results announcements on their website 
in some form, companies still had a long way to go in harnessing the power of the 
Internet for communicating with investors. 
6.3.9. Contacting the investor relations department 
Figure 6.12 contains the results for the category ‘Contacting the IR department’. It is 
important for investors and the financial press to be able to get hold of the IR 
department directly in case they require additional information, especially if the rest of 
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the website and IR pages are not well developed. It is not sufficient to provide only a 
general info@company.co.za address or general switchboard telephone extension. 
Disappointingly, 100 companies (49 per cent) provided no IR-specific contact details 
and scored zero. As a result, the mean for this category was very low, at 18.99 per 
cent. These 100 companies also formed the mode for this distribution. 
 
Mean     0.1899 
Std Error     0.0165 
Median     0.0625 
Mode (n=100) 0.0000  
Std Deviation     0.2363 
Sample 
Variance     0.0558 
Kurtosis   -1.2014 
Skewness     0.7198 
Range     0.6875 
Minimum 0.0000  
Maximum     0.6875 
N   205 
 
Figure 6.12: Frequencies and descriptive statistics: Contacting the IR 
department 
 
Table 6.13: Selected guidelines: Contacting the IR department  
Top five % Bottom five % 
Some IR contact details provided 55.6 Contact/working hours of IR 
department 0.0
IR department telephone number 34.6 Time zone differences 0.0
IR department email address 33.2 Indicate email response time 0.0
Full name of IR officer 32.7 Invitation to contact the Board and top 
management 5.4
International format telephone 
number 32.7
Offers Contact Form in addition to 
email 
7.3
 
The five guidelines with the highest compliance for this category are available in Table 
6.13. Of the companies, 56 per cent provided some IR contact details. Only 35 per 
cent of companies provided the IR department’s telephone number, and 33 per cent 
provided a general IR email address. The full name of the IR officer was only provided 
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by a third of companies. Only 21 per cent provided the specific email address of the IR 
officer (not tabulated). The international format for telephone numbers (indicating 
country code), for investors, the financial press, or analysts phoning from overseas, 
was provided by 32 per cent of companies.  
 
Table 6.13 also shows compliance for with the five least adhered to guidelines. No 
companies provided details on the operational hours of their IR departments, nor did 
they indicate differences in time zone for investors from overseas. Response times to 
email enquiries were also not provided. Only 11 companies (five per cent) invited 
investors or analysts to contact the board and top management with their queries. Only 
seven per cent of companies provided a contact form on the IR contacts page for 
automation of routine questions or requests. 
 
Overall, compliance in this category was very disappointing. This calls for further 
research on the perceived reluctance of IR departments to engage with investors and 
other stakeholders. The lack of quality in the rest of the online IR pages contributes 
further to this concern. 
6.3.10. General usability 
The results of the category ‘General usability’ are presented in Figure 6.13. These 
guidelines address general web usability. Compliance was good, resulting in a mean 
of 75.53 per cent and a mode of 77.78 per cent. Companies obviously brought their 
experience in other parts of their company website to the IR webpages. 
Mean      0.7553 
Std Error      0.0083 
Median      0.7778 
Mode      0.7778 
Std Deviation      0.1187 
Sample Variance      0.0141 
Kurtosis      0.6841 
Skewness     -0.5511 
Range      0.6667 
Minimum      0.2778 
Maximum      0.9444 
N   205 
 
Figure 6.13: Frequencies and descriptive statistics: General usability 
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Compliance with the five most adhered to guidelines was very high, as can be seen 
from Table 6.14. All the websites listed menu items in order of importance and not 
alphabetically. Webpages had specific hyperlinks only once per page (204 
companies). The IR pages of the sites contained the minimum of moving or revolving 
images in 99 per cent of cases. Plug-in icons for print, playing a video, or downloading 
files should be the same size as the text that describes the name of the file (99 per 
cent of companies complied). The purpose of IR pages is not to sell the company’s 
products or services, and therefore these pages should not contain advertising. Almost 
all (98 per cent) of the companies complied with this guideline.  
 
From Table 6.14, one can see that companies are still not paying attention to making 
their websites accessible to visually impaired people. Only six per cent provided 
accessibility options. Navigation was aided by change in colour of visited hyperlinks 
(39 per cent) and orientation of the visitor by highlighting current tabs or providing page 
tracking (61 per cent). If a user wanted to print HTML pages, print-friendly versions 
were offered and indicated with a print icon by 48 per cent of companies. Moreover, 
51 per cent of companies provided a site map where users could view the structure of 
the website and find the menu item where they anticipated the information should be.  
 
Table 6.14: Selected guidelines: General usability 
Top five % Bottom five % 
Menu items listed in priority order, not 
alphabetically 100.0
Accessibility options 6.3
Links only once on page 99.5 Visited links change colour 38.5
Content static (minimum Flash) 99.0 Print friendly options 47.8
Plug-in icon same size as text 99.0 Site map 51.7
Facts, no ads in IR pages 98.5 Page tracking/orientation 60.5
 
6.3.11. International aspects 
Table 6.15 contains two additional guidelines addressing international aspects. Of 
these South African companies, 20 companies provided some of their webpages in 
additional languages such as Afrikaans, French, Portuguese, and German. 
Unfortunately, no African language sites were available. Almost all companies spelled 
out the names of months and did not use numerals, e.g. Feb, or February instead of 
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02. This should help avoid confusion in respect of dates between the mm/dd/yyyy and 
dd/mm/yyyy conventions. 
 
Table 6.15: Guidelines: International aspects 
Guideline % 
Information available in other languages 9.8
Spells month, not number only 99.0
 
6.4. Stage of online IR in South Africa 
A secondary research objective of this study was to determine at what stage of online 
IR adoption South African companies were. Hedlin (1999) predicted that as the Internet 
gains acceptance as a channel for IR activities, over time, companies will come to 
prefer using HTML reports, due to the additional features (such as hyperlinks) that 
HTML offers, as well as cost savings that would arise from not producing bulky hard 
copy AFS. The Internet also facilitates providing material that cannot be replicated in 
a printed report, such as webcasts, videos of plant facilities, and downloadable 
spreadsheets. From Table 6.6, it is clear that there is a continued preference in South 
Africa among the largest companies for PDF rather than HTML. This finding is contrary 
to expectation, especially as Internet bandwidth has increased in the last decade. For 
the rest of the sample, the preference for PDF was even more pronounced. For the 
total sample, the preference for PDF over HTML reports was about 2:1.  
 
The adoption rate of Internet-enhanced features on IR websites and web usability 
features was also poor. The following categories, which contained the most guidelines 
relating to technology and usability, actually had modes of zero for the frequency 
dispersion: 
 Share charts – 67 companies (33 per cent) 
 Calendar of IR events – 88 companies (43 per cent) 
 Presentations to investors – 31 companies (15 per cent) 
 Contacting the IR department – 100 companies (49 per cent) 
 
Therefore, in respect of the study’s secondary research objective, I must conclude that 
the majority of South African companies remain in the second stage of Hedlin’s (1999) 
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model for adopting the Internet for IR practices. A large portion of IR departments 
seemed to treat the company website as a repository for print-equivalent (PDF) 
documents, and made no a real effort to engage and communicate with investors via 
the website. Present findings indicate that little has changed since Barac (2004:18) 
concluded that South African companies treat their websites as mere ‘bulletin boards’. 
 
An explanation for this study’s finding of a low adoption rate could be the inclusion of 
“smaller” market capitalisation companies that do not invest so much in their IR 
activities. Industry affiliation could also explain differences. The influence of 
shareholder investment horizon on the companies’ voluntary disclosure behaviour 
should also be considered. In Chapter 7, the investor stability hypothesis is 
investigated in the presence of other company characteristics that, according to the 
prior literature (as reviewed in Section 4.4 Prior literature on predictors of online 
investor relations quality), may be associated with online IR quality.   
6.5. Summary and conclusion 
The first primary objective was to determine the quality of JSE-listed online IR 
practices. The companies’ websites were measured against international best practice 
guidelines for online IR. The total average online IR score for all 205 companies was 
a disappointing 39.78 per cent, with a relatively large standard deviation (13.55 per 
cent), indicating a wide array of practices. The top 100 companies performed slightly 
better, with an average of 47.85 per cent. This low average for the large companies is 
the result of 49 of the top 100 companies’ scoring below 50 per cent. It seems that the 
good ratings achieved for integrated reports, as found by Ernst & Young (2012) and 
Nkonki (2012) did not extend to information and usability features available on the 
websites outside of these reports. The average for the bottom 105 companies was 32.1 
per cent. In comparison to the results of other international studies, South African 
companies performed better than companies in other emerging and developing 
economies, but performed worse than companies in advanced economies, where size 
is probably the main differentiator. 
 
There was also large variability in the compliance rate between the different categories. 
The categories that achieved the best scores were ‘Getting to corporate information’ 
(96 per cent) and ‘General usability’ (76 per cent). These categories contain guidelines 
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that are synergized from the rest of the company’s website design, and the high scores 
are therefore not surprizing. The low overall mean score is mostly due to low ratings 
for the categories ‘Presentations to investors’ (19 per cent), ‘Contacting the IR 
department’ (19 per cent), ‘Calendar of IR events’ (31 per cent), and the ‘Shareholder 
information’ details (33 per cent). These categories also had high standard deviations, 
reflecting wide disparities between companies’ practices. The top 100 companies 
performed between nine and 11 per cent better in these categories, but still scored 
below 50 per cent.  
 
A secondary research objective of this study was to form an opinion on the 
development stage of online IR of JSE-listed companies. Despite advances in Internet 
technologies and available bandwidth, the findings indicate that many of the sampled 
companies still did not use the unique features of the Internet for communication. PDF 
annual and integrated reports were almost twice as prevalent as their HTML 
equivalents. Four categories – those that contained the most guidelines relating to 
technology and usability – actually had modes of zero for their frequency distribution: 
‘Share charts’ (33 per cent), ‘Calendar of IR events’ (43 per cent), ‘Presentations to 
investors’ (15 per cent) and ‘Contacting the IR department’ (49 per cent). It is further 
disconcerting, given the low scores in the other categories that just under half of the 
IR departments did not attempt to make themselves available for visitors to the website. 
Given the low adoption rate of Internet technology, I concluded that JSE-listed 
companies in the present study’s sample have not yet moved to the third stage of 
Hedlin’s (1999) model for online IR practices.  
 
In the next chapter, I present the results of the regression model. This elucidates what 
company characteristics play a role in the low level of voluntary disclosures, as 
manifested by the low average online IR disclosure scores. 
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 CHAPTER 7 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE REGRESSION 
MODEL 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the results from the content analysis were described. The poor 
overall performance, differences between groups based on market capitalisation and 
wide standard deviation required further analysis to determine why the disclosure 
practices differed so much between the companies. In Section 4.5 Shareholder 
familiarity hypothesis, I hypothesised that shareholder familiarity may play a role. The 
hypothesis in the null format is as follows: 
 
H0 =  There is no association between voluntary communications quality (proxied by 
online IR quality) and shareholder familiarity (proxied by shareholder stability). 
 
The second primary objective of this study was therefore to determine whether 
shareholders’ familiarity with the investee company (proxied by the stability measure) 
reduces the need for extensive voluntary disclosure practices. The hypothesis was 
tested with an OLS regression that included controls for certain market and company 
specific characteristics. As I explained in the methodology chapter, Section 5.7 
Regression model, some of the independent variables had to be transformed to their 
natural log or fractional ranking in order to improve the normal distribution of the 
variable, but more importantly, to ensure heteroscedasticity of the residuals, which is 
a prerequisite for employing OLS. The histograms, with fitted normal curve, of the 
untransformed data, the transformed data and the residuals plot are provided in 
Appendix D. The total online IR score from the content analysis formed the dependent 
variable for the regression model’s results in this chapter.  
 
I present the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables first, and then a 
comparison of the categorical variables. This is followed by the univariate results, the 
results from the OLS regression for the main model and the final model, and the results 
from a few robustness tests. 
 Chapter 7 – Results and discussion of the regression model 201 
 
 
7.2. Descriptive statistics 
As described in Section 5.7 Regression model, all the continuous independent 
variables had to be transformed to improve their distributions in order for an OLS 
regression to be applied. Histograms with normal curves fitted are available in the 
Appendix D, showing that the transformations were successful. The descriptive 
statistics for the continuous and categorical variables are discussed separately. 
 
I also compare the present study’s results to those of other recent studies from 
emerging economies in the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent, South America and 
Africa north of the Sahara. It would add little if any value to compare the descriptive 
characteristics of studies ten years or older to the statistics in this study. Furthermore, 
most of the older studies were done in developed economies such as the economies 
in the US, UK and Europe which reduced comparability of descriptive results (their 
regression results may still be useful, as they model behaviour of all the variables 
together).  
7.2.1. Continuous variables 
Table 7.1 contains the descriptive statistics for the raw and transformed continuous 
variables of the sample. For practical reasons, only the raw variables are discussed 
thereafter. 
 
Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics: Continuous variables 
Variable N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
DS 205 0.3978009 0.04098 0.66393 0.13548196
STAB9_lag (based on full years) 202# 1.6245377 0.58716 1.99867 0.30099046
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF 202# 0.0128 -2.58 2.58 0.99408
MCAPbillions 205 31.16256 0.031 812.411 86.705455
LNCAP062012 205 22.1826 17.24 27.42 2.20021
Age (full years) 205 26.11 1 117 21.892
LNAGE 205 2.9108 0.00 4.76 0.90699
RoaA (Return on average assets) 205 8.3547 -98.44 80.21 15.73980
RoaA_win 205 8.6459 -19.38 34.64 10.87553
DE (Debt-to-equity) 205 2.4726 0.01 164.99 11.81064
LNDE_Pub 205 -0.1819 -4.85 5.11 1.25251
Valid N (listwise) 202# 
# Three companies were listed for less than a full year in 
2011 
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As shown in the previous chapter, the average DS is 39.78 per cent, and the 
distribution of scores is quite wide, resulting in a standard deviation of 13.55 per cent. 
The joint best performers were Anglo American PLC and Barloworld Ltd, and the worst 
performer was Cafca Ltd. The mean for the proxy for familiarity, STAB9_lag, was 1.62. 
This measure was calculated by subtracting from two the average of the nine annual 
share turnover percentages for the years from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2011. This 
implies that only 37 per cent of outstanding shares turned over (changed owners) on 
average over the nine years. This confirms the impression that the JSE is an illiquid 
market, as described in Section 4.2 Characteristics of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE).  
 
Mondi Ltd had the lowest familiarity measure (58.72 per cent), which indicates an 
average turnover ratio of 1.41 times its outstanding shares over the nine years. As a 
very large company, Mondi Ltd was also in the JSE’s Top40 index in June 2012 (JSE, 
2012). However, despite being the most traded share in the present sample, Mondi Ltd 
only ranked 162 for quality of its online IR practices. These contradictory metrics clearly 
highlights the importance of considering all the variables together in a multivariate 
model, as I do later on. The most stable ownership profile (1.9987) was observed for 
Cafca Ltd, which turned over less than 0.13 per cent of its shares, and had the lowest 
disclosure score.  
 
Figure 7.1 reflects the inverse distributions of stability and turnover for the lagged nine 
years (2003 to 2011). 
 
Figure 7.1: Share turnover mirrors stability 
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The average market capitalisation (ordinary equity) of the sample group in June 2012 
was R31.16 billion. The smallest company was Cafca Ltd, and the largest was British 
American Tobacco PLC. There is a very large standard deviation of R86.71 billion. 
This can be attributed to the dominance in numbers of companies with a market 
capitalisation of less than R40 billion, and the small number of companies with a market 
capitalisation of more than R200 billion. Figure 7.2 illustrates the skewed distribution 
(which was corrected with the natural logarithmic transformation). For a comparison of 
the size of the JSE to other exchanges, see Section 4.2 Characteristics of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Distribution of market capitalisation in R billions 
 
The average age of companies in the sample on 30 June 2012 was 26.11 years. This 
is young compared to the 63.62 years of Slovenian companies (Dolinšek, Tominc & 
Skerbinjek, 2014:850), but comparable to the 20.73 of Jordanian companies 
(AbuGhazaleh et al., 2012:218). By contrast, Satta, Parola, Profumo and Penco 
(2015:158) report the average list age of Italian companies as 8.91 years. Lee et al. 
(2014:746) calculate the average age of the US-listed stocks in their sample in two 
periods to be 18.24 and 20.1 years.  
 
The standard deviation of 21.89 years for the present study’s JSE sample is large, as 
can be seen from the distribution in Figure 7.3. Three companies in the sample were 
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listed for one full year only35 by 30 June 2012 (Rand Merchant Insurance Holdings, 
Royal Bafokeng Platinum and Curro Holdings Ltd). The oldest company listed was 
DRDGold Ltd (117 years); the second oldest (115 years) was SABMiller Plc (if one 
includes its previous incarnation, South African Breweries).  
 
 
Figure 7.3: Distribution of number of full years listed 
 
The average profitability of the sample, based on return on average assets, was 8.35 
per cent for the latest financial year, ending at least three months before 1 July 2012. 
The standard deviation was large, at 15.74 per cent. The minimum for this variable 
was a loss of 98.44 per cent (Bauba Platinum Ltd). The loss percentages of the bottom 
five performers were winsorized to the loss of the sixth worst performer, whose loss 
was 19.38 per cent. Kumba Iron Ore Ltd was the most profitable company, at 80.21 
per cent. The profit percentages of the best five performers were winsorized to the 
profit of the sixth best performer (34.64 per cent). Figure 7.4 presents the 
untransformed distribution of the sample’s profitability.  
 
Mohamed and Basuony (2014:72) reported an average return on assets of 3.5 per cent 
for companies listed in Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. Turrent and Ariza (2012:20) found 
                                             
35 These three companies are therefore excluded whenever an analysis was done with the 
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF variable, as they had less than a full year’s trading in the July 2010-June 2011 
year. The FR_STAB9_lag_IDF variable only included full years’ trading as already explained. 
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an average return on assets for Mexican companies of 11 per cent, whilst that of 
Spanish companies’ returns was five per cent. Alali and Romero (2012:164) reported 
a return on assets of 7.5 per cent for Argentinian companies. These are given as 
examples, but a comparison of profitability is not very insightful here, as sample sizes 
and collection periods differ widely between the different studies (market and economic 
conditions also changed). These metrics are compared in context when the regression 
results of this study are compared to prior studies later on in this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 7.4: Distribution of return on average assets 
 
The debt-to-equity ratio of the sample was 2.47 on average for the latest financial year, 
ending at least three months before 1 July 2012. The company with the lowest ratio 
was RMB Holdings Ltd, and that with the highest ratio was Fairvest Property Holdings 
Ltd (it is not unusual for listed property developers to be highly geared – for example, 
Growthpoint Property Ltd has the next highest debt-to-equity ratio of 31.96). The 
standard deviation was large at 11.81. When I excluded the two upper outliers, the 
mean improved to 1.51 and the standard deviation improves to 2.21, but the normal 
curve was still distorted, as can be seen in Figure 7.5. Note that the natural logarithm 
transformation was successful in improving the distribution, including all 205 data 
points. Histograms of all the transformed variables are available in Appendix D.  
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Mohamed and Basuony (2014:72) reported an equity-to-assets ratio of 0.54, which 
translates into a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.85 for Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. For Egyptian 
companies, Samaha et al. (2012:153) found a debt-to-equity ratio of 1.51. A debt-to-
asset ratio of 0.66 was reported for Iranian companies by Ghasempour and Yusof 
(2014:49). These are given as examples, but a comparison of leverage is not very 
insightful here, as the sample sizes and collection periods differed widely between the 
different studies, and market and economic conditions changed. These metrics are 
compared in context when the regression results of this study are compared to prior 
studies later on in this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Debt-to-equity ratio (excluding Fairvest and Growthpoint) 
7.2.2. Categorical variables 
Table 7.2 contains the frequencies for the categorical control variables. Each variable 
is discussed separately. 
 
Considering ownership concentration first, it is clear that 20.5 per cent of the 
companies in the sample are controlled by one shareholder, either directly, or, in total, 
indirectly. In a further 21 per cent, one shareholder holds, or more shareholders hold, 
a minimum of 25 per cent of the shares. These are extremely high levels of 
concentration, which support prior assessments by Orsagh, Schacht and Allen (2013), 
Steyn and Stainbank (2013) and the JSE (2014). Similarly, high concentrations were 
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found for Canadian companies by Cormier et al. (2010), where shareholders owning 
ten per cent or more constituted 59 per cent of the ownership structure (Cormier et al., 
2010:334). The present study’s ownership concentration measure from the Orbis 
database started very high, at 25 per cent, which understates the percentage 
concentration, compared to Cormier’s study, which started at ten per cent. 
 
Table 7.2: Descriptive statistics: Categorical variables 
Variable N % 
OC (Ownership concentration): 
 Controlled 42 20.5
 One or more >25% 43 21.0
 None >25% 120 58.5
Industry: 
 Basic materials 42 20.5
 Consumer goods 22 10.7
 Consumer services 42 20.5
 Financials 40 19.5
 Industrials 47 22.9
 Technology 12 5.9
Big4 auditors: 
 Big4 auditor 169 82.4
 Non-Big4 auditor 36 17.6
Dual listed: 
 Dual listed 48 23.4
 Only JSE 157 76.6
ISSUE (Issued new shares in the 
 previous 24 months): 
 Additional equity listed 59 28.8
 No additional equity listed 146 71.2
 
Regarding industry, there was a good distribution between the six industries – only 
‘Consumer goods’ and ‘Technology’ were on the low side, but still had more than five 
companies each, satisfying the minimum requirement for analysis between categories. 
The vast majority (82.4 per cent) of companies in the sample were audited by a Big4 
audit firm. This is comparable to the findings of Mohamed and Basuony (2014:72), 
who reported Big4 auditing for 80 per cent of their sample in Qatar, Oman and Bahrain, 
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and the findings of Alali and Romero (2012:164), who reported 75 per cent for 
Argentinian companies. However, Samaha et al. (2012:154) reported the use of Big4 
audit firms for only 49.2 per cent of Egyptian firms with websites. Nurunnabi and 
Hussain (2012:28) similarly found that only 54 per cent of Bangladeshi firms were 
audited by a Big4 audit firm.  
 
In terms of dual listing, most of the companies were listed on the JSE only (76.6 per 
cent), but just under a quarter (23.4 per cent) was also listed on additional exchanges. 
Egyptian companies had a much lower rate (14.8 per cent) of dual listing (Samaha et 
al., 2012:154). Cormier et al. (2010:334) reported that 45 per cent of Canadian 
companies (excluding financial companies) were dual listed in the US.  
 
Additional equity was listed in the previous 24 months by 28.8 per cent of the 
companies in the present study’s sample. Jankensgård (2015:15) reported that 14.4 
per cent of Swedish companies in his sample raised new equity in the previous year 
and 5.4 per cent issued corporate bonds. New financing (debt or equity) were raised 
by nine per cent of Canadian firms (Cormier et al., 2010:334).  
 
In the next section, I discuss the comparison of mean DS between the categorical 
variables in the model in order to establish whether there are significant differences 
between the mean DS of the groups. 
7.3. Comparison of mean disclosures scores of categorical variables 
The comparisons of the mean DS of the categorical variables were done by way of 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Before ANOVAs can be used, certain 
assumptions have to be satisfied. The first assumption is independence of groups. This 
requirement was satisfied by the manner in which the sample was selected. Each 
company in the sample was independent from the others, and the companies’ scores 
did not depend on each other. The second assumption is that the dependent 
continuous variable is normally distributed. In Section 5.7 Regression model, I 
described how the normality of DS was verified. The first two assumptions apply to all 
the ANOVAs in this section, and are not addressed again. The last assumption is 
homogenous variances within each group. This was tested with Levene’s test and the 
test score is reported separately in each discussion. 
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Table 7.3 shows that the mean DS for the ‘Controlled’ group was 37.43 per cent, which 
was lower than for the other two groups. Both the ‘One or more >25%’ and ‘None 
>25%’ performed marginally better than the sample average of 39.78 per cent. The 
assumption of homogenous variances in each group was accepted (Levene F(2, 202) 
=.001, p>0.01). The one-way ANOVA test score (F(2, 202) =0.794, p>0.05) indicates 
that there were no significant differences between the average DS of the different 
ownership concentration groupings. Thus, it seems that ownership concentration did 
not play a role in the quality of the online IR practices. This is assessed again in the 
multivariate analysis. 
 
Table 7.3: Disclosure score and ownership concentration 
DS N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
Controlled 42 0.3743169 0.13924917 0.02148661 0.04098 0.61066
One or more >25% 43 0.4027831 0.13902051 0.02120043 0.14754 0.66393
None >25% 120 0.4042350 0.13311304 0.01215150 0.08197 0.66393
Total 205 0.3978009 0.13548196 0.00946247 0.04098 0.66393
 
There is a range of disclosure scores between the different industries, as can be seen 
in Table 7.4. Companies in the ‘Basic materials’ industry performed the best, with an 
average DS of 43.61 per cent. As one of the main sectors contributing to South Africa’s 
GDP (see Section 4.2 Characteristics of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)) 
and one subject to a lot of political and societal scrutiny, it is important that these 
companies are very transparent in their communications. The lowest mean was found 
for the ‘Technology’ industry, which was also the smallest. It is very interesting that this 
sector performed almost five per cent worse than the sample average, when one would 
intuitively expect the technology sector to be better at using technology to 
communicate with investors than other sectors would be. 
 
The assumption of homogenous variances within each industry was accepted (Levene 
F(5, 199) =0.001, p>0.01). The one-way ANOVA test score (F(5, 199) = 1.383, p>0.05) 
indicates that there was no statistically significant difference between the disclosure 
behaviour of the different industries. Bowen’s (2006) suggestion that consumer 
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companies experience a conflict between their online selling and IR intentions on their 
websites, is therefore rejected in the South African context as the ‘Consumer goods’ 
and ‘Consumer services’ companies did not perform significantly different to any of the 
other companies in terms of IR quality. The finding of no statistically significant 
difference between industries is tested again in the presence of other variables in 
Section 7.5 Multivariate analyses (full model) and Section 7.7.3 Consumer goods and 
services companies only. 
 
Table 7.4: Disclosure score and industry 
DS N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
Basic materials 42 0.4360851 0.14439780 0.02228106 0.15984 0.66393
Consumer goods 22 0.3891580 0.12659495 0.02699013 0.14754 0.61066
Consumer services 42 0.4088603 0.13887545 0.02142895 0.11885 0.61475
Financials 40 0.3943648 0.13024294 0.02059322 0.08197 0.59426
Industrials 47 0.3730380 0.13283640 0.01937618 0.04098 0.66393
Technology 12 0.3493852 0.12184206 0.03517277 0.20902 0.58197
Total 205 0.3978009 0.13548196 0.00946247 0.04098 0.66393
 
Table 7.5 indicates that there was a difference of 14 percentage points between the 
DS of companies audited by one of the Big4 audit firms and the DS of those audited 
by one of the other JSE-accredited audit firms. The assumption of homogenous 
variances within each auditor type was rejected (Levene F(203) = 7.501, p<0.01). The 
Independent Samples Test score was thus obtained assuming no equal variances, and 
the test result (t(62.955) = -7.316, p<0.01) indicated that there was a statistically 
significant difference between the disclosure behaviour of companies audited by a Big4 
firm and that of those audited by other firms. This seems to confirm that auditing firms 
with a higher local and international reputation influence their clients to improve their 
voluntary disclosure on the Internet as well. Whether this significance holds up in a 
multivariate scenario is tested again later. 
 
As Table 7.5 shows, dual-listed companies had a mean DS that was 12 percentage 
points better than the DS of companies listed only on the JSE. The assumption of 
homogenous variances within each group was accepted (Levene F(203) =0.049, 
p>0.01). The Independent Samples Test score was thus obtained assuming equal 
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variances, and the test (t(203) = -5.785, p<0.01) indicated that there were statistically 
significant differences between the disclosure behaviour of companies listed on more 
than one exchange and those listed only on the JSE. Companies that were dual-listed 
on foreign exchanges probably have more foreign institutional investors who expect 
these companies to engage in the same level of IR as companies listed in the US or 
UK. Whether this significance holds up in a multivariate scenario is tested again later. 
 
Table 7.5: Disclosure score and auditor, listing status and new issues of shares 
DS N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum
Non-Big4 Auditor 36 0.2811931 0.09951160 0.01658527 0.08197 0.59836
Big4 Auditor 169 0.4226404 0.12919451 0.00993804 0.04098 0.66393
Total 205 0.3978009 0.13548196 0.00946247 0.04098 0.66393
Listed on JSE only 157 0.3696878 0.12429015 0.00991943 0.08197 0.61885
Dual listed 48 0.4897541 0.13084472 0.01888581 0.04098 0.66393
Total 205 0.3978009 0.13548196 0.00946247 0.04098 0.66393
No additional equity issued 146 0.4021727 0.13791730 0.01141412 0.11885 0.66393
Additional equity issued 59 0.3869825 0.12976948 0.01689455 0.04098 0.58607
Total 205 0.3978009 0.13548196 0.00946247 0.04098 0.66393
 
Lastly, from Table 7.5, we can see that the mean DS between companies that issued 
new equity during the last 24 months and those that had no new equity issues did not 
differ much. The assumption of homogenous variances within each group was 
accepted (Levene F(203) =0.983, p>0.01). The Independent Samples Test score was 
thus obtained assuming equal variances, and the test (t(203) =0.726, p>0.01) indicated 
that there were no statistically significant differences between the disclosure behaviour 
of companies that recently issued new equity and that of those that did not. Whether 
this insignificance holds in a multivariate scenario is tested again later. 
 
Correlations between all the variables in the regression model is presented and 
discussed in the following section. 
7.4. Univariate analyses 
Table 7.6 contains the univariate correlations. I discuss the correlations below, looking 
at the dependent variable (DS) column first.  
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The measure of shareholder familiarity, proxied by the stability measure 
(FR_STAB9_lag_IDF) was moderately correlated with DS and significant at a 0.01 
level. The sign was also as expected; the more stable the shareholding, the lower the 
quality of the IR practices.  
 
The association for size (natural logarithm of market capitalisation) was strongly 
positive and significant at a 0.01 level, and in conformance with expectation. Larger 
companies have more slack resources to spend on their online presence and other 
disclosure features. Size had the largest correlation from all the variables.  
Industry was only weakly negatively correlated with the DS and significant at a 0.05 
level.  
 
Profitability was only weakly positively significant at a 0.05 level. In line with the 
Independent Samples T-test, the use of Big4 auditors and being dual-listed were 
moderately positively correlated with disclosure, and significant at a 0.01 level.  
 
OC, LNAGE, LNDE_Pub and ISSUE were not significantly associated with online IR 
quality. These findings are consistent with the prior literature, which reported conflicting 
significance for these variables and online IR quality. 
 
There were also correlations between the independent variables, which raises the 
issue of collinearity. Fortunately, there was no perfect collinearity between any of the 
independent variables. The highest correlation, -0.563, was between 
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF and LNCAP062012 (p<0.01), which is still below 0.9, the point at 
which collinearity becomes a problem (Field, 2009:233). The use of Big4 auditors was 
also moderately correlated with LNCAP062012 and significant at a 0.01 level. This is 
consistent with the practice that large companies are audited by Big4 auditors. The 
other independent variables were only weakly correlated with each other.  
 
Interestingly, OC was only weakly (r = -0.203) correlated with ownership stability, 
although significant at a 0.01 level. The negative sign of the association was expected; 
the more dispersed ownership becomes, the more the stability decreases as trading in 
a share increases with the increase in dispersion. The Variance Inflation Factions are 
reported later, with the multivariate regression.  
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Table 7.6: Univariate correlations (Pearson, two-tailed) 
Variable DS 
FR_STAB9
_lag_IDF 
LNCAP0620
12 OC Industry LNAGE RoaA_win LNDE_Pub 
Big4 
Auditors 
Dual 
Listed ISSUE 
DS 1           
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF -0.521** 1          
LNCAP062012 0.665** -0.563** 1         
OC 0.079 -0.203** 0.005 1        
Industry -0.168* 0.021 -0.212** 0.185** 1       
LNAGE -0.093 -0.009 0.018 -0.107 -0.036 1      
RoaA_win 0.149* -0.068 0.286** 0.078 -0.104 -0.069 1     
LNDE_Pub 0.058 -0.155* 0.039 0.043 0.243** 0.093 -0.167* 1    
Big4 Auditors 0.398** -0.239** 0.404** -0.037 -0.158* 0.036 0.107 -0.093 1   
Dual Listed 0.376** -0.101 0.352** -0.032 -0.284** 0.066 -0.062 -0.055 0.225** 1  
ISSUE -0.051 0.034 -0.090 0.115 0.038 -0.142* -0.159* -0.028 -0.046 -0.046 1 
** Correlation significant at a 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation significant at a 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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In order to explore the relationship between DS, stability and size (which are all highly 
correlated with each other) further, I performed a double sort, as applied by Heflin, 
Moon and Wallace (2016:76), Kaniel et al. (2012:264) and Wang and Zhang 
(2015:494). This allows a researcher to create groups of the dependent variable based 
on increasing measures of two explanatory variables. For the present study, the DS 
was conditioned on size and stability. This should highlight at which levels of stability 
size has the greatest influence on the DS. First, I ranked the cases in ascending order 
based on the lagged 2003 to 2011 average stability ratio. The ranking was from low 
stability (short-horizon investors that trade often) to high stability (long-horizon 
investors that stay invested). The sample was then divided into three equal terciles, 
based on stability rank. Next, within each tercile, I sorted the data from large to small, 
based on size (market capitalisation in R billions). The data within each tercile was 
then divided into three equal terciles again, based on size. Nine groups were thus 
created, based on stability/size combinations. Next, I used a one-way ANOVA to 
determine whether there were significant differences in the DS of the groups. Table 
7.7 presents the mean DS of each group. There are wide variations in the DS of the 
groups. Group 11 (low stability and large size) had the highest DS (53.39 per cent), 
and Group 33 (high stability and small size) had the lowest DS (25.13 per cent). The 
DS of large, actively traded companies was therefore more than double the DS of 
stable small companies. The t-test reported a statistically significant difference at a 
0.001 level. 
 
Table 7.7: Mean disclosure score of double-sorted stability and size groups 
DS N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
11 22 0.5339046 0.10258916 0.02187208 0.27049 0.66393 
12 23 0.4713115 0.11744373 0.02448871 0.24590 0.66393 
13 22 0.4603204 0.11565932 0.02465865 0.23770 0.61066 
21 22 0.4649776 0.10506618 0.02240019 0.27869 0.61066 
22 23 0.3654669 0.12597893 0.02626842 0.11885 0.58607 
23 23 0.3082680 0.08240343 0.01718230 0.14754 0.44262 
31 22 0.3984724 0.11277804 0.02404436 0.11885 0.60246 
32 23 0.3262651 0.09828098 0.02049300 0.18443 0.54098 
33 22 0.2513040 0.09426981 0.02009839 0.04098 0.42213 
Total 202 0.3972164 0.13599201 0.00956836 0.04098 0.66393 
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The variances within groups were homogenous (Levene F(8, 193) = 1.027, p>0.01) 
and the one-way ANOVA test score indicated that there were indeed statistically 
significant DS differences between the groups (F(8, 193) = 16.602, p<0.05). I then 
used post-hoc tests (Tukey HSD) to identify between which groupings the significant 
differences occurred. For the sake of brevity, only the differences between terciles 
three and one are displayed here. The full output for the post-hoc tests for all nine 
groups is set out in Appendix D. Table 7.8 displays the mean DS in a three-by-three 
matrix.  
 
Table 7.8: Multiple comparisons: Disclosure score, stability and size 
Size terciles    
Large Medium Small Mean DS Difference Sig.
1 2 3 1-3 
 
Stability 
terciles 
Low 1 0.53390 0.47131 0.46032 0.48851 0.07358 0.357
Medium 2 0.46498 0.36547 0.30827 0.37957 0.15671 0.000
High 3 0.39847 0.32627 0.25130 0.32535 0.14717 0.000
Mean DS  0.46578 0.38768 0.33996 0.39781  
Difference 1-3 0.13543 0.14504 0.20902   
Sig.  0.001 0.000 0.000   
 
As can be seen from Table 7.8, as the stability of the shareholder profile increased 
(and there is less trading), the DS decreased, and the decrease was significant for all 
market capitalisation groupings (columns 1 to 3). Looking across stability profiles, 
disclosure scores decreased as the companies became smaller. However, these 
decreases were only significant for the medium and high stability terciles (rows 2 and 
3). The post-hoc test found no statistical difference between the disclosure scores of 
the largest companies and the smallest companies in the low stability (high turnover, 
active trading) tercile. The results imply that at low levels of stability (short-horizon 
investors), disclosure by companies was better, irrespective of companies’ sizes. 
Whilst Bushee and Noe (2000) documented that changes in disclosure quality led to 
changes in shareholder type (based on investment horizon), the present study found, 
cross-sectionally, that having more short-horizon investors (low stability), calculated 
over a lagged nine-year period, was associated with higher disclosure quality. This 
could be explained by the likelihood that short-horizon investors are not familiar with 
the company, and therefore pressure the company for more information (quantity and 
frequency). Long-horizon investors, on the other hand, are familiar with the company, 
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do not intend to make short-term trading gains and invest in their own information 
gathering, therefore the pressure on companies to increase voluntary disclosure is 
less. The associations of all the independent variables are assessed together in the 
multivariate analyses below. 
7.5. Multivariate analyses 
The purpose of the OLS regression was to test the hypothesis of the present study. It 
is appropriate to present the form of the hypothesis again: 
H0 =  There is no association between voluntary communications quality (proxied by 
online IR quality) and shareholder familiarity (proxied by shareholder stability). 
 
Table 7.9 presents the results of the OLS regression containing the associations of all 
the independent variables in multivariate analysis (using the ‘Enter’ function). All the 
independent variables in the model explained 51.8 per cent jointly of the variability of 
the online IR DS. The F-statistic was large and the model was significant at a 0.001 
level. The adjusted R2 compared favourably with that in studies of comparative size, 
for example, by Abdelsalam et al.’s (2010:336) model for UK companies (35.8 per 
cent), Cormier et al.’s (2007:20) model for Canadian companies (45.3 per cent), 
Boubaker et al.’s (2012:144) model for French companies (51.3 per cent) and Dolinšek 
et al.’s (2014:853) model for Slovenian companies (38.9 per cent).  
 
In testing the shareholder familiarity hypothesis (proxied by the stability measure), it 
was pertinent to look at the t-statistic of -2.975 for FR_STAB9_lag_IDF, which was 
significant at a 0.005 level. For practical significance, I looked at the standardized 
coefficients: if FR_STAB9_lag_IDF improves (deteriorates) with one standard 
deviation, voluntary disclosure quality decreases (improves) by 0.191 x 0.136 = 
0.0259, or 2.6 percentage points. That was a change of 6.5 per cent on the mean DS 
of the 202 companies of 39.72 per cent. The significance of stability found in the 
univariate correlation analyses was also confirmed in the multivariate analyses. The 
significance of stability as a predictor also survived the inclusion of size as a predictor. 
This confirmed the findings in Table 7.8; differences in DS of the ‘High’ and ‘Low’ 
stability groupings were significant across all three size groupings, whilst size 
(difference between ‘Large’ and ‘Small’ groupings) was only significant in the ‘Medium’ 
and ‘High’ stability groups.  
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As the OLS results indicate a significant relationship between the two proxies, DS and 
shareholder stability, I therefore rejected the null hypothesis of no relationship between 
shareholder familiarity and voluntary communications quality. Furthermore, the 
negative sign of the coefficient was consistent with the theory of shareholder familiarity 
– the higher the stability in the investor profile, the lower the voluntary disclosure 
quality. Shareholder stability was therefore a significant predictor of online IR quality in 
JSE-listed companies and the association was negative. 
 
Table 7.9: Full regression model 
Dependent Variable: 
DS 
ENTER 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval for B  
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound VIF 
Constant -0.211 0.100 -2.119 0.035 -0.462 -0.011 
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF -0.026 0.009 -0.191 -2.975 0.003 -0.043 -0.009 1.721
LNCAP062012 0.029 0.005 0.480 6.251 0.000 0.020 0.039 2.459
Controlled -0.009 0.019 -0.028 -0.504 0.615 -0.026 0.043 1.260
One or more >25% -0.008 0.017 -0.025 -0.486 0.628 -0.061 0.076 1.128
Consumer goods -0.038 0.026 -0.086 -1.440 0.151 -0.089 0.014 1.505
Consumer services -0.010 0.023 -0.030 -0.447 0.655 -0.055 0.035 1.926
Financials -0.055 0.025 -0.161 -2.200 0.029 -0.105 -0.006 2.236
Industrials -0.018 0.023 -0.055 -0.786 0.433 -0.062 0.027 2.065
Technology -0.008 0.033 -0.014 -0.243 0.808 -0.074 0.058 1.408
LNAGE -0.021 0.008 -0.131 -2.516 0.013 -0.038 -0.005 1.132
RoaA_win -0.001 0.001 -0.069 -1.103 0.271 -0.002 0.001 1.623
LNDE_Pub 0.008 0.006 0.071 1.314 0.191 -0.004 0.020 1.211
Big4 Auditors 0.050 0.020 0.140 2.531 0.012 0.011 0.089 1.284
Dual Listed 0.050 0.018 0.158 2.728 0.007 0.014 0.087 1.399
ISSUE -0.007 0.015 -0.023 -0.453 0.651 -0.037 0.023 1.088
Adjusted R2  0.518   
F-statistic (15, 186)  15.429   
P-value  0.000   
 
It comes as no surprise that size (market capitalisation) was a significant predictor. 
It was highly significant at a 0.001 level. The positive sign of the association was in 
accordance with theory. Prior literature found size to be significantly positively 
associated with any voluntary disclosure, be it in annual reports, ESG or CSR reports 
or IR. Larger companies have more slack resources to devote to disclosure practices 
and therefore their disclosure quality is higher. Secondly, larger companies are also 
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under more public scrutiny and therefore have a greater need to prove legitimacy and 
ensure stakeholder engagement. Market capitalisation was also a significant positive 
predictor of online IR for Debreceny et al. (2002), Bollen et al. (2006), Marston and 
Polei (2004), Kelton and Yang (2008), AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012), Samaha et al. 
(2012), Bozcuk (2012), as well as Ghasempour and Yusof (2014). For practical 
significance, look at the standardized coefficients; if the natural log of market 
capitalisation increases (decreases) with one standard deviation, voluntary disclosure 
quality will improve (decrease) by 0.480 x 0.136 = 0.0653, or 6.5 percentage points. 
That was a change of 16.4 per cent on the mean disclosure score of the 202 companies 
of 39.72 per cent. Therefore, market capitalisation was a significant predictor of online 
IR quality of JSE-listed companies. The association was positive. Table 7.8 shows that 
the size effect was most noticeable in ‘Medium’ and ‘High’ stability companies. In highly 
traded (low stability) companies, market capitalisation had no effect on disclosure 
quality. 
 
The multivariate finding for ownership concentration was in agreement with findings 
in the univariate analyses, which indicated no significant differences in the disclosure 
score of the three ownership groups. Ownership concentration was not a significant 
predictor of online IR quality of JSE-listed companies. This agrees with the finding of 
Abdelsalam et al. (2010:20) of no significance for block-holdings greater than five per 
cent. Other studies reported contradictory findings for ownership concentration, as 
summarised in Table 7.10. Cormier et al. (2010:336), Kelton and Yang (2008:77), 
Dâmaso and Lourenço (2011:352), Dolinšek et al. (2014:850) as well as Turrent and 
Ariza (2012:21) all found significant negative associations. By contrast, AbuGhazaleh 
et al. (2012:220), Alali and Romero (2012:166) and Andrikopoulos et al. (2013:149) 
reported significant positive associations for ownership concentration and online 
disclosure quality. 
 
One possible explanation for the conflicting findings for ownership concentration and 
disclosure quality lies in the investment horizon of institutional investors, as originally 
classified by Bushee (1998). Bear in mind that in most equity markets the large 
shareholders are represented by institutional shareholders such as pension funds and 
other asset management funds, and not by individuals or other companies. A growing 
number of studies have found that the impact on companies’ policies and actions 
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differs, based on the investment horizon of its institutional investors and not so much 
on the size of the holdings (Bushee, 1998, 2001; Wang, 2011; Derrien, Kecskés & 
Thesmar, 2013; Ramalingegowda, 2014; Huang & Petkevich, 2016). In robustness 
tests, Huang and Petkevich (2016:1046/7) found that in concentrated ownership 
companies and dispersed ownership companies, there are still significant differences 
between the coefficients for long-horizon and short-horizon investors, when they 
modelled the investing and financing behaviour of companies.  
 
Table 7.10: Comparison of ownership concentration findings in prior studies 
Authors Country Measure of 
concentration 
Sample mean: 
% of shares held 
Significance
Abdelsalam et al. 
(2007:20) 
UK Block-holding 
> 5% 
31 None 
Cormier et al. 
(2010:336) 
Canada Block-holdings 
> 10% 
59 Negative 
Kelton and Yang 
(2008:77) 
US Block-holding 
> 5% 
20 Negative 
Dâmaso & Lourenço 
(2011:352) 
UK Largest 
shareholder 
16 Negative 
Dolinšek et 
al.(2014:850) 
Slovenia Largest 10 
shareholders 
87 Negative 
Turrent & Ariza 
(2012:21) 
Mexico 
Spain 
Controlling 
shareholding 
54 
49 
Negative 
AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2012:220) 
Jordan Institutional 
shareholders 
>5% 
37 Positive
Alali & Romero 
(2012:166) 
Argentina Majority 
shareholdings 
68 Positive
Andrikopoulos et al. 
(2013:149) 
Shipping 
companies  
(US, UK, 
Singapore and 
Norway) 
Largest 
shareholder 
33 Positive
 
The univariate analyses set out in Table 7.6 show that the correlation between 
ownership concentration and shareholder stability (the present study’s measure for 
shareholder familiarity, which can also double as a measure of investment horizon) is 
low (r=-0.203)36, but significantly negative at a 0.01 level. To explore this relationship 
further, I ran a one-way ANOVA on stability per ownership concentration category.  
                                             
36 The coding in the dataset for ownership concentration was 1 = Controlled, 2 = One or more >25%, 
and 3 = None >25%. The negative correlation therefore means that as the companies becomes less 
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From Table 7.11, it is clear that the mean stability for the ‘Controlled’ category is 1.722, 
compared to the ‘None >25%’ category’s 1.584. The assumption of homogenous 
variances in each group was thus accepted (Levene F(2,199) = 3.028, p>0.01). The 
one-way ANOVA test score (F(2,199) = 3.402, p<0.05) indicated that there were 
significant differences between the average stability ratios of the different ownership 
concentration categories. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests were conducted to establish 
where the differences lay. It was found that ‘Controlled’ and ‘None >25%’ were 
significantly different from each other, but ‘One or more >25%’ was not different from 
the other two categories. I therefore concluded that for JSE-listed companies, 
ownership concentration was not a significant driver of online IR quality, as the 
predictive value lay in the stability measure (or investment horizon). 
 
Table 7.11: Mean stability per ownership concentration category 
 
Table 7.9 also reveals that none of the industries was significant, except ‘Financials’. 
As these are dummy variables, with ‘Basic materials’ as a reference category, the 
practical implication is that the average DS of ‘Financials’ companies was 1 x -.055 = 
-0.055 or 5.5 percentage points lower, ceteris paribus, than ‘Basic materials’ 
companies, and was significant at a 0.05 level. This significance for the ‘Financials’ 
industry was somewhat different from the univariate results, as the one-way ANOVA 
indicated no significant difference between the industry categories. It seems that the 
presence of the other predictors raised the negative significance of ‘Financials’. 
Although insignificant, the coefficients of the other four industries were also negative. 
The finding from the multivariate analyses was thus that the quality of the online IR 
practices of ‘Basic materials’ companies was higher than that of other industries. This 
                                             
concentrated, the stability measure decreases –there is more trading or change in the identity of 
shareholders. This is consistent with the claim that more dispersed shareholdings improve liquidity or 
turnover of the share. 
STAB9_lag N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
Controlled  (1) 41 1.7217493 0.29656661 0.04631592 0.73830 1.99867
One or more >25%  (2) 42 1.6449488 0.22710307 0.03504276 1.01865 1.92822
None >25%  (3) 119 1.5838408 0.31856304 0.02920263 0.58716 1.99857
Total 202 1.6245377 0.30099046 0.02117762 0.58716 1.99867
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can be explained by legitimacy theory, as extractive industries are much more reliant 
on society’s acceptance of their activities, and as a large contributor to the GDP, these 
companies are under scrutiny from the financial press and regulators.  
 
Listing age was also found to be a significant predictor of DS at a 0.05 level. The 
association was negative, meaning that companies that were listed more recently 
(initial public offering) were better at online IR practices. These companies had more 
recent exposure to dealing with sponsors, institutional shareholders and the press, and 
were therefore more likely to be attuned to the communication requirements. The 
present study’s findings are in agreement with those of Gandía (2008) and 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012). Looking at the standardized coefficients in Table 7.9, it is 
clear that if the natural logarithm of age increases (decreases) with one standard 
deviation, voluntary disclosure quality will decrease (improve) by 0.131 x 0.136 = 
0.0178, or 1.8 percentage points. This coefficient has no real life significance for 
company management, as a company cannot alter its listing date. The coefficient is 
more relevant for predictive purposes. I therefore concluded that for JSE-listed 
companies, listing age was a significant negative predictor of online IR practices. 
 
Table 7.9 also reflects that profitability is not significant in predicting online IR quality 
for JSE-listed companies. This finding is consistent with studies by Marston and Polei 
(2004), Abdelsalam et al. (2007), Gandía (2008), Desoky (2009), Dâmaso and 
Lourenço (2011), Uyar (2012), Nurunnabi and Hossain (2012), Turrent and Ariza 
(2012), and Ghasempour and Yusof (2014), who found no significance for profitability 
as a predictor of online disclosure quality. For JSE-listed companies, in the presence 
of other stronger predictors, profitability is not a significant predictor. 
 
Leverage was also not significant as predictor of online IR quality in the present study’s 
model. The prior literature reports conflicting findings for leverage as a predictor. This 
study’s findings of no significance agree with those of Alali and Romero (2012), 
Samaha et al., (2012), Turrent and Ariza (2012), Fuertes-Callén et al. (2014) and 
Mohamed and Basuony (2014). For JSE-listed companies, in the presence of other 
stronger predictors, leverage was not a significant predictor. 
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Having a Big4 auditor was a significant positive predictor for DS in the present study’s 
model. As shown in Table 7.9, it was significant at a 0.05 level. This confirmed the t-
test finding of significant differences (14 percentage points) between the disclosure 
scores of the two categories of auditors and the moderate correlation in the univariate 
analyses in Table 7.6. However, this was still an unusual finding, as JSE-listed 
companies can only appoint auditors from the Schedule 15 list of accredited auditors 
and advisors (JSE, 2011b). A probable explanation for this is the fact that the 
accredited auditors and advisors are appointed based on factors such as their skills 
and their IFRS knowledge. IFRS knowledge pertains to prescriptive disclosures and 
not voluntary disclosures, which is the area investigated for this study. It therefore 
seems that non-Big4 audit firms are less successful at exerting influence on their 
clients to improve voluntary disclosure practices (the question of whether non-Big4 
audit firms even see this as a mandate is perhaps an area for further investigation). 
Furthermore, normative isomorphism can explain why the disclosure scores of Big4 
clients were significantly better, as the local Big4 audit firms follow the practices of their 
international offices. The present study’s findings agree with those of Bonsón and 
Escobar (2006), Kelton and Yang (2008), Boubaker et al. (2012), and Nurunnabi and 
Hossain (2012), who found positive associations for Big4 audit firms. From a practical 
point of view, ceteris paribus, changing from a non-Big4 auditor to a Big4 auditor 
(categorical dummies) should improve the disclosure score with five percentage points 
(1 x 0.05). I therefore conclude that for JSE-listed companies, having a Big4 auditor 
was a significant positive predictor of online IR quality. 
 
Having a listing on another exchange was also found to be a significant positive 
predictor of the disclosure score. This was also in agreement with the t-test, which 
found significant differences between the two categories. Dual-listed companies have 
to comply with the additional disclosures required by foreign exchanges, especially 
those in the US. Furthermore, these companies have to deal with information requests 
from foreign institutional investors, analysts and the press, who expect the same level 
of service as from the other companies listed on those exchanges. The present study’s 
findings agree with those of Debreceny et al. (2002), Bollen et al. (2006), Desoky 
(2009), Cormier et al. (2010), and Fuertes-Callén et al. (2014). Ceteris paribus, listing 
on another exchange (categorical dummies) appeared to improve the disclosure score 
with five percentage points (1 x 0.05). However, practically, management should 
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consider another listing for other reasons (improved liquidity, improved price 
informativeness, increased analyst following, access to capital), rather than merely to 
improve their disclosure (which would follow), which may come at an increased cost, 
even for large companies. I therefore conclude that for JSE-listed companies, having 
another listing is a significant positive predictor of online IR quality. 
 
Listing additional shares (seasoned equity offering) during the previous 24 months 
was found to be an insignificant factor in predicting the online IR practices of JSE-listed 
companies. This agreed with the t-test finding of no significant differences between the 
two categories. The prior literature on the significance of this predictor is inconclusive. 
The present study’s findings agree with those of Kelton and Yang (2008), Cormier et 
al. (2010), AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012), as well as Jankensgård (2015), who found no 
significant relationship with new issues of shares. For JSE-listed companies I found 
that, in the presence of other stronger predictors, listing a new issue of shares was not 
a significant predictor of online IR quality. 
7.6. Final model 
As a last step, I ran the regression model in ‘Stepwise’ mode to determine a final 
reduced model, which includes only the predictors that remained statistically significant 
at a 0.05 level or better, with a 95 per cent confidence level. A similar process was 
followed by Bonsón and Escobar (2006), Bozcuk (2012), Dolinšek et al. (2014), Gandía 
(2008), and Samaha and Abdallah (2012). The final model is set out in Table 7.12.  
 
Table 7.12 contains all the statistically significant predictors from the full model, except 
that ‘Financials’ was now omitted. In the final model, industry was therefore not a 
significant predictor. The adjusted R2 of the model was 0.524, with an F-statistic 
(5, 196) of 45.32. The F-statistic was large and the model was significant at a 0.001 
level. 
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Table 7.12: Stepwise reduced regression model 
Dependent Variable: DS 
STEPWISE 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta VIF 
Constant -0.168 0.088 -1.906 0.058 
LNCAP062012 0.026 0.004 0.417 6.335 0.000 1.833
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF -0.032 0.008 -0.236 -3.972 0.000 1.490
Dual Listed 0.058 0.017 0.182 3.444 0.001 1.178
Big4 Auditors 0.049 0.019 0.139 2.606 0.010 1.210
LNAGE -0.019 0.008 -0.119 -2.446 0.015 1.005
Adjusted R2 0.524 
F-statistic (5, 196) 45.32 
P-value 0.000 
 
The final model for online IR practices of JSE-listed companies is therefore the 
following: 
 
DS =  α + β1FR_STAB9_lag_IDF + β2LNCAP062012 + β5LNAGE + β8Big4Auditor + 
β9DualListed + ε 
 
For the present study’s sample of JSE-listed companies, it therefore seems that larger, 
younger, dual-listed companies that are audited by a Big4 auditor and that have a 
profile of unstable investors (which is less familiar with the company) had higher quality 
online IR practices. 
 
In the next section, I present additional robustness tests to test the veracity of the 
model and its predictors. 
7.7. Robustness tests 
7.7.1. Only JSE-listed (excluding dual-listed) companies 
Dual-listed companies by nature have foreign investors whose trading behaviour on 
the JSE might be different from that of investors in South Africa; for example, they 
might buy into or sell out of South African companies for political risk reasons, or to 
gain a portfolio spread between developing and emerging markets that does not apply 
equally to local investors. I therefore ran another regression for companies that were 
listed on the JSE only. The number of companies in the sample listed on the JSE only 
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was 157, less three companies that had been trading for less than one year in 2010/1, 
which was excluded. There were enough data points, so the full model was run without 
the dual-listed variable. The results are presented in Table 7.13. 
 
The model lost some of its strength compared to the original model in Table 7.9. It 
explained 39.1 per cent of the variability in the online IR practices of companies listed 
only on the JSE. The F-statistic was 8.018, which was also lower than that of the full 
model, but it was still significant at a 0.001 level. More importantly though, shareholder 
stability was still a significant negative predictor of voluntary disclosure practices at a 
0.05 level. The other significant variables in the final model (Table 7.12) were also 
significant, namely market capitalisation, listing age and using a Big4 auditor. 
 
Table 7.13: Regression model for companies listed on the JSE only 
Dependent Variable: 
DS 
ENTER 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta VIF 
Constant -0.100 0.117 -0.857 0.393  
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF -0.026 0.012 -0.189 -2.260 0.025 1.764 
LNCAP062012 0.026 0.006 0.419 4.552 0.000 2.124 
Controlled 0.004 0.022 0.014 0.199 0.842 1.277 
One or more >25% -0.023 0.021 -0.073 -1.083 0.281 1.156 
Consumer Goods -0.052 0.033 -0.132 -1.594 0.113 1.724 
Consumer Services -0.010 0.029 -0.033 -0.346 0.730 2.347 
Financials -0.049 0.033 -0.151 -1.485 0.140 2.601 
Industrials -0.016 0.028 -0.059 -0.585 0.559 2.525 
Technology -0.022 0.039 -0.045 -0.568 0.571 1.612 
LNAGE -0.035 0.012 -0.204 -2.914 0.004 1.232 
RoaA_win -0.001 0.001 -0.085 -1.058 0.292 1.623 
LNDE_Pub 0.001 0.007 0.009 0.140 0.889 1.161 
Big 4 Auditors 0.059 0.021 0.200 2.803 0.006 1.275 
Issued New Shares 
prev 24 months -0.004 0.018 -0.016 -0.235 0.814 1.118 
Adjusted R2  0.391  
F-statistic (14, 139)  8.018  
P-value  0.000  
Selecting only cases for which ‘Dual-Listed’ = Only JSE 
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When the regression was run in ‘Stepwise’ mode (untabulated), the R2 increased 
slightly to 0.408, but the F-statistic (4, 149) increased to 27.309, which was large and 
significant at a 0.001 level. In the reduced model for companies listed on the JSE only, 
stability, market capitalisation, using Big4 auditors and listing age were significant 
predictors, all at a 0.01 level. These were the same predictors as in the final model, 
excluding dual-listing status. 
7.7.2. Excluding companies in the financial industry 
Many studies have excluded companies in the financial industry from their analyses, 
as these companies are subject to different reporting regimes and have different capital 
structures (Gandía, 2008; Kelton & Yang, 2008; Desoky, 2009; Cormier et al., 2010; 
Boubaker et al., 2012; Fuertes-Callén et al., 2014; Ghasempour & Yusof, 2014; 
Jankensgård, 2015). A separate robustness test was run without financial industry 
companies in the regression. The number of companies in the sample excluding such 
companies was 165, less two non-financial companies that had been trading for less 
than one year in 2010/1, which were excluded. There were enough data points, so the 
full regression model was run, without the ‘Financials’ variable. The results are 
presented in Table 7.14. 
 
The model increased in strength compared to the original model in Table 7.9. It now 
explained 53.1 per cent of the variability in the online IR practices of JSE-listed 
companies that are not in the financial industry. The F-statistic (14, 148) was 14.121, 
which is slightly lower than that of the full model, but it was still significant at a 0.001 
level. In this robustness test, shareholder stability was once again a significant 
negative predictor of voluntary disclosure practices at a 0.01 level. Market 
capitalisation, listing age and using a Big4 auditor remained significant.  
 
Interestingly, leverage became a significant predictor at a 0.05 level. The association 
was positive, which conforms to the theory that more highly leveraged companies 
disclose more voluntarily to retain investors’ confidence and to reduce their cost of debt 
(Sengupta, 1998). The present study’s finding is also consistent with the finding of 
Andrikopoulos et al. (2013) for shipping companies. The practical significance, based 
on the standardized coefficient, is that as the natural logarithm of the debt-equity ratio 
increases (decreases) with one standard deviation, the disclosure score increases with 
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0.137 x 0.137 = 0.0188, or 1.9 percentage points. That is a 4.7 per cent increase on 
the mean disclosure score of 39.79 per cent, of all companies, excluding companies 
in the financial industry. 
 
Table 7.14: Regression model excluding companies in the financial industry 
Dependent Variable: DS 
ENTER 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta VIF 
Constant -0.190 0.111 -1.717 0.088 
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF -0.025 0.009 -0.184 -2.597 0.010 1.741
LNCAP062012 0.030 0.005 0.486 5.805 0.000 2.422
Controlled -0.020 0.020 -0.059 -0.979 0.329 1.250
One or more >25% -0.012 0.020 -0.035 -0.608 0.544 1.149
Consumer Goods -0.045 0.027 -0.114 -1.710 0.089 1.524
Consumer Services -0.022 0.024 -0.070 -0.925 0.356 1.952
Industrials -0.026 0.023 -0.086 -1.115 0.267 2.079
Technology -0.021 0.034 -0.041 -0.625 0.533 1.470
LNAGE -0.026 0.009 -0.167 -2.914 0.004 1.142
RoaA_win -0.001 0.001 -0.054 -0.824 0.411 1.491
LNDE_Pub 0.019 0.009 0.137 2.238 0.027 1.295
Big4 Auditors 0.049 0.022 0.134 2.236 0.027 1.239
Dual-Listed 0.058 0.021 0.177 2.748 0.007 1.436
Issued New Shares prev 24 
months -0.020 0.018 -0.065 -1.130 0.260 1.139
Adjusted R2 0.531 
F-statistic (14, 148) 14.121 
P-value 0.000 
Selecting only cases for which ‘Financials’ = 0 
 
When the regression was run in ‘Stepwise’ mode (untabulated), the R2 reduced slightly 
to 0.524, but the F-statistic (4, 158) increased to 45.518, which is large and significant 
at a 0.001 level. In the reduced model, only stability, market capitalisation, being dual-
listed and listing age were significant predictors, all at a 0.01 level. Neither leverage, 
nor having a Big4 auditor was significant in the reduced model when companies in the 
financial industry were excluded. Insignificant findings for auditor type are not unusual, 
and agree with similar findings by Alali and Romero (2012), AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) 
and Samaha et al. (2012). 
 Chapter 7 – Results and discussion of the regression model 228 
 
 
7.7.3.  Consumer goods and services companies only 
In the description of the sample selection (Section 5.5 Sample), I indicated that the 
third tranche of companies selected for inclusion was all the consumer goods and 
services companies. The rationale was to have a census of one complete industry’s 
online IR practices in order to negate the effect of industry differences between 
companies. As the number of constituents in each industry was too low, I decided to 
group ‘Consumer goods’ and ‘Consumer services’ together, and this gave me 64 
companies to work with. One of the companies had been listed for less than a full year 
in 2010/1, and was excluded from the regression analyses. 
 
The number of independent variables in the full model, excluding industry, was ten. To 
avoid violating the OLS requirement of at least ten cases per independent variable (I 
would need 100 companies), I ran this robustness regression only on the variables 
indicated as significant in the final model (Table 7.12) in Section 7.6 Final model. 
 
From Table 7.15 it can be seen that the model decreased slightly in strength compared 
to the final model in Table 7.12. It now explained 42.7 per cent of the variability in the 
online IR practices of JSE-listed consumer goods and services companies. The F-
statistic (5, 57) was 10.222, and the model was still significant at a 0.001 level. In this 
robustness test, market capitalisation, listing age and being dual-listed remained 
significant.  
 
However, shareholder stability no longer met the criteria for statistical significance (p 
= 0.119), although the direction of the association (negative) was still consistent with 
the proposed theory of shareholder familiarity. For practical significance, if the 
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF decreases (increases) with one standard deviation, the 
disclosure score increases (decreases) with 0.181 x 0.135 = 0.0244 or 2.4 percentage 
points. That is a 6.1 per cent increase on the average DS of consumer goods and 
services companies of 40.28 per cent. The lack of significance for stability may 
probably be attributed to a lack of power in the analysis to find significance because 
the number of cases in the regression was too small, or there was a lack of variability 
in the stability profile of consumer goods and services companies. 
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Table 7.15: Regression model for consumer goods and services industries 
Dependent Variable: DS 
ENTER 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta VIF 
Constant -0.028 0.162 -0.173 0.864 
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF -0.022 0.014 -0.181 -1.582 0.119 1.412
LNCAP062012 0.022 0.007 0.378 3.042 0.004 1.669
LNAGE -0.041 0.014 -0.290 -2.999 0.004 1.010
Big 4 Auditors 0.041 0.039 0.111 1.060 0.294 1.194
Dual Listed 0.079 0.037 0.224 2.125 0.038 1.206
Adjusted R2 0.427 
F-statistic (5, 57) 10.222 
P-value 0.000 
Selecting only cases for which ‘Consumer goods’ and ‘Consumer services’ = 1 
 
Using a Big4 auditor was also not statistically significant for the prediction of online IR 
quality in the consumer goods and services industry, even though the sign of the 
association was in conformance with theory. The finding of insignificance was also 
reported by Alali and Romero (2012), AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) and Samaha et al. 
(2012). 
7.8. Summary and conclusion 
This chapter described the outcome for the second primary objective, namely to 
determine the drivers or predictors of the online IR practices of JSE-listed companies, 
and specifically whether shareholder stability is significantly associated with disclosure 
quality.  
 
Descriptive results were presented to provide a clear overview of the data. The average 
for shareholder stability (the proxy for familiarity) was 1.62, which indicated that, for 
this sample, the shareholder base was very stable.  This agrees with the finding of a 
low turnover on the JSE by the WEF (2012) and the JSE (2014). The average market 
capitalisation was R31 billion, and companies were listed for an average of 26 years. 
The sample companies had an average profitability of 8.4 per cent and debt was 2.5 
times the value of equity. A fifth of the companies were directly or indirectly controlled, 
whilst another fifth had one or more shareholders that held 25 per cent of the 
outstanding shares or more. There was a good distribution between the six industry 
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sectors. Big4 auditors audited 82 per cent of the companies and 23 per cent of the 
sample was listed on another stock exchange as well. Only 29 per cent of sample 
companies had issued new capital during the previous 24 months. 
 
One-way ANOVAs for the categorical variables in the model indicated no significant 
differences between the disclosure scores of the individual categories for ownership 
concentration, industry group and issuing new equity during the previous 24 months. 
However, auditor type and dual-listed status did display significant differences in 
disclosure scores. Large Pearson correlations were reported between disclosure 
scores, stability, and market capitalisation respectively that were significant at a 0.01 
level. Auditor type and dual-listed status had a medium strength correlation with 
disclosure score, significant at a 0.01 level. Weak correlations were found for industry 
and profitability, although still significant at a 0.05 level. A large correlation was 
reported between stability and market capitalisation, although this was still below 60 
per cent, which reduced the concern regarding collinearity. VIFs reported in the 
regression analyses confirmed no serious multi-collinearity between the independent 
variables.  
 
A further three-by-three analysis of the relationship between disclosure score, stability 
and market capitalisation was presented, together with one-way ANOVAs. The stability 
and market capitalisation variables were double sorted in ascending order and then 
grouped into terciles. Across all three market capitalisation groups, the mean 
disclosure score between the ‘High’ and ‘Low’ stability groups were statistically 
significant. However, in the ‘Low’ stability group (high share turnover) there was no 
significant difference between the mean disclosure score of the ‘Large’ and ‘Small’ 
market capitalisation groups. For the ‘Medium’ and ‘High’ stability groups, there was a 
significant difference once again between the ‘Large’ and ‘Small’ market capitalisation 
groups’ mean disclosure score. Size therefore influenced the disclosure scores only in 
the ‘Medium’ and ‘High’ stability groups. The average disclosure score of ‘Large’ 
companies with ‘Low’ stability was 53 per cent, compared to the average disclosure 
score of ‘Small’ companies with ‘High’ stability of 25 per cent (p<0.001). 
 
The OLS regression model developed for this study was significant at a 0.001 level 
and explained 51.8 per cent of the variability in JSE-listed companies’ online IR quality. 
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The OLS regression model was also used to test the hypothesis that shareholder 
stability is associated with voluntary disclosures, controlling for 14 other independent 
variables. The null hypothesis of no association was rejected, as stability was found to 
be a significantly negative predictor of online IR practices of JSE-listed companies (p 
= 0.005). This finding confirms the present study’s hypothesis that where the 
shareholder profile of a company is stable – most shareholders have a long investment 
horizon – the demand for a rich information environment is less intense, as 
shareholders are familiar with their investee company. This familiarity can be the result 
of the long relationship with the management, the cumulative information disclosed by 
the company over a long time and the capability of the investors to generate their own 
high-quality information on the investee and its market (reducing the need for public 
voluntary disclosure by the investee). Company management therefore have a 
reduced need to signal to, and concomitantly also cater to the lower need for 
information from long-horizon investors. 
 
Ownership concentration was not significant as a predictor. This confirms the findings 
of the univariate analysis, which found no significant differences between the 
disclosure score of the three ownership concentration categories. Prior literature found 
that institutional ownership (which mostly accounts for concentration) affects 
companies’ policies and behaviours differently, based on the institutional investor’s 
investment horizon. Significant differences in stability (which can proxy for investment 
horizon) were found between ‘Controlled’ and ‘None >25%’, but not between ‘One or 
more >25%’ and the other two categories. I therefore concluded that stability explains 
disclosure better than ownership concentration. 
 
A final model was generated by using a stepwise regression in order to crystalize the 
number of significant variables for a predictive model. For the present study’s sample 
of JSE-listed companies, it therefore seems that larger, younger, dual-listed companies 
that are audited by a Big4 auditor and that have an unstable profile of investors (short-
horizon investors who are less familiar with the company) have higher quality online IR 
practices. 
 
Lastly, robustness tests were conducted with three different regression models. In the 
stepwise model for companies listed on the JSE only, stability, market capitalisation, 
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Big4 auditors and listing age were significant predictors. These were the same 
predictors as the final model, excluding dual-listing status. In the stepwise model for all 
industry sectors excluding companies in the financial industry, only stability, market 
capitalisation, dual-listing and listing age were significant predictors. The last 
regression was run on all the companies in the consumer goods and services industry. 
Market capitalisation, listing age and dual-listing status were significant. The stability 
measure was no longer statistically significant, although it might still be practically 
significant. The negative sign for the stability variable was still consistent with the 
shareholder familiarity hypothesis. Furthermore, the low number of cases reduced the 
power of the analysis to pick up smaller significant differences. In the next chapter, I 
present the summary, conclusions, and recommendations for further study. 
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 CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1. Introduction 
In the final chapter, I present an overview of the research conducted for this study. The 
research problems are revisited briefly and the methodology employed to reach the 
research objectives is described. Thereafter I summarise the main findings and the 
conclusions reached. Next, I highlight the contributions of the study and make 
recommendations. I then conclude with suggestions for further study. 
8.2. Research problems and objectives 
Agency theory posits that managers of companies (agents) act in their own self-interest 
unless measures are instituted by shareholders (principals) to protect their interests. 
Shareholders therefore incur agency costs, for example, by employing auditors to 
monitor the behaviour of management, or by instituting bonus schemes linked to the 
share price. In any agency relationship, information asymmetry is also relevant – 
shareholders and other potential investors or capital providers do not have the same 
information about the company’s prospects and risks as management has. Adverse 
selection results from a situation where investors who have less credible information 
to their disposal offer lower prices when they buy. Management therefore has an 
incentive to disclose additional voluntary information about the company’s risks and 
prospects to the capital market, in an effort to reduce information asymmetry. A vast 
body of literature has empirically established that companies that reduce information 
asymmetry through increased voluntary disclosure experience reductions in their cost 
of capital, and increased liquidity and share prices. Increased visibility via good IR 
programmes also achieves the same benefits in terms of the investor recognition 
hypothesis and signalling theory.  
 
The investors’ investment horizon also plays an important role in companies’ actions. 
Companies with large groups of institutional shareholders with a short-term focus tend 
to manage earnings by cutting R&D and advertising spending in order to meet analysts’ 
quarterly earnings forecasts. They may overlook profitable long-term investments in 
favour of projects with quicker pay-back periods. Such a focus on the short-term by 
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management damages the long-term growth and health of companies. Prior research 
has found that increasing voluntary disclosure tends to attract short-horizon investors 
(transient investors), with a concomitant potential negative effect on the company’s 
long-term health. Companies with a short-term focus tend to underperform in returns, 
compared to those that focus on long-term sustainable growth. On the other hand, 
companies with more long-horizon (dedicated) investors, tend to have better 
governance structures, which in themselves may lead to improved communication, 
especially if one considers that normative isomorphism plays a role in the field of 
disclosure. Companies therefore need to strike a balance between reducing 
information asymmetry (with reduced cost of equity benefits) by increasing voluntary 
disclosure, and attracting the wrong type of shareholder. 
 
Most initial prior research on information asymmetry and voluntary disclosure was 
conducted on companies that were listed on exchanges in the US, the UK and Europe, 
and that are actively traded and have high free float percentages. Research that is 
more recent has emerged from Eastern Europe, the Indian subcontinent and other 
Asian countries. These emerging markets are smaller and less liquid, and there is 
greater shareholding by block-owners, families and governments. Investor protection, 
reporting standards and governance are low. 
 
The JSE is unique as an equity market in two ways: 
 In general, (excluding the blue chip companies), it has a high ownership 
concentration and low turnover compared to developed countries’ exchanges.  
 South Africa is consistently rated in the top three in the world by the WEF for the 
quality of its financial reporting, stock market regulation, governance and protection 
of investors’ rights (even higher than the UK, the US and other developed 
countries).  
Therefore, even though South Africa is an emerging market, its stock market, auditors 
and financial regulators operate in the same league as those in the G-20 countries. 
The JSE is therefore an interesting setting for studying voluntary disclosure behaviour. 
 
This study focuses on company websites and Internet-enabled communication tools 
as a channel for voluntary disclosure. The reason for focusing on company webpages 
is that they provide prima facie evidence of a company’s policy regarding transparency 
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and equitable access for all investors, not just for investment professionals and 
institutional shareholders. The JSE Listings Requirements and the Companies Act no. 
71 of 2008 allow for the dissemination of information to investors via company 
websites. The Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRC, 2013) also requires wider 
reporting in respect of the long-term sustainability of companies and their risk 
management. The OECD recommends that companies decide on a disclosure policy; 
especially large companies should employ an IR specialist to handle communications 
with investors and other stakeholders. The IRS in the UK proclaims that the role of IR 
officers is to ensure that the value creation process of the company is communicated 
properly to the capital market and thereby to ensure optimal pricing of the share. 
 
The following research problems were therefore identified: 
 The quality of IR practices of middle-tier and smaller companies in South Africa is 
unknown. 
 Download speeds for South Africa averaged 1,16 Mbps (megabits per second) in 
January 2008, after the prior last study by Nel and Baard (2007), versus 3,22 Mbps 
in June 2012 (Ookla, 2014), and 5.6 Mbps for South Africa in the second quarter of 
2016 (Akamai, 2016:40). The growth in bandwidth and online users means that 
companies can reach a wider audience of retail investors with their online IR 
programmes. Companies will be able to use bandwidth-intensive technologies such 
as videos, online conference calls with analysts, webcasts of presentations and 
interactive stock charting more widely and efficiently as bandwidth capacity 
increases for both companies and private investors. This is low-hanging fruit for 
reducing information asymmetry for the benefit of private (retail) investors. We do 
not know if companies have improved their online IR practices since the last study 
in 2007 to take advantage of the faster broadband speeds. 
 Prior literature on explanatory variables are based on research either in the US, the 
UK or Europe, or in countries in the Middle East, South Asia or South America, or 
China and Egypt. It is not clear whether existing models would sufficiently explain 
the behaviour of JSE-listed companies. 
 Empirical studies report that reductions in the cost of capital, improvements in 
liquidity and increased analyst following are associated with higher quality IR. 
However, evidence from prior studies on online IR practised by JSE-listed 
companies indicates that even amongst large companies, best practices for online 
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IR are largely ignored. We do not know what factors are present in the South African 
context that explain the lack of uptake of best practices in online IR (based on prior 
research). 
 
This study had two primary objectives: 
 to determine the quality of the voluntary communications of JSE-listed companies 
as manifested by their online IR practices. 
o as a secondary objective, to reach a conclusion regarding the stage of 
development of South African IR (using Hedlin’s model); and 
 to develop a regression model that explains the quality of the online IR practices of 
JSE-listed companies and to test the thesis hypothesis. 
 
After considering various factors (identified by the prior literature) that affect voluntary 
disclosure quality, I proposed another factor, namely investors’ familiarity with the 
investee company. This hypothesis was based on the argument that long-term 
shareholders might be satisfied with a poorer public disclosure environment because 
they are already familiar with the investee company’s risks and rewards, and 
management’s record of accomplishment over the long period of the investment 
relationship. Long-horizon investors’ information environment therefore consists of the 
information that they have gathered themselves, and that cumulatively provided 
publicly by the investee company.  
 
I proposed the following hypothesis in the null format: 
H0 =  There is no association between voluntary communications quality (proxied by 
online IR quality) and shareholder familiarity (proxied by shareholder stability). 
 
The next section summarizes the research methodology and findings for the research 
objectives. 
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8.3. Research methodology and main findings regarding the 
research objectives 
8.3.1. Quality of online investor relations practices of JSE-listed companies 
To determine the quality of JSE-listed companies’ online IR practices, content analysis 
of a sample of companies’ websites was conducted. The sample was selected from 
companies listed on the JSE’s main board in three tranches: companies listed for 
longer than 10 years, companies in the top 100 according to market capitalisation, and 
companies belonging to the consumer goods and services sector. The total number of 
companies with active websites in the composite sample was 205 companies of 
different sizes and in different industries. 
 
The content and formats of information on the websites were assessed using a 
checklist. The checklist was based on the guidelines of Loranger and Nielsen (2009), 
and was verified for validity and completeness against the IRS of the UK’s guidelines 
(2012) and a previous study on users’ information requirements for annual reports 
(Beattie & Pratt, 2002). The checklist consisted of 201 information, presentation format 
and usability items. For presentation formats unique to the Internet, such as HTML 
pages and videos, a higher score of ‘2’ was assigned if they were used. PDF format 
documents and information were scored ‘1’ if they were present. Due to the heavier 
weighting for newer technologies, the total available points was 244. The checklist was 
converted to a LimeSurvey online format. Various controls in the survey, as well as 
further guidance for certain items, ensured that errors in assessing the websites were 
minimised. The survey results were exported to MS Excel, which also eliminated 
capturing errors. 
 
Two factors determined the timing of the content analysis. Firstly, a systemic shock 
was given to the disclosure environment in South Africa, namely the implementation of 
the King III Code (IoD, 2009) which required that an integrated report be produced for 
all financial years beginning on or after 1 March 2010 on an apply-or-explain basis. I 
assumed that IR departments would leverage the information generating process for 
their Integrated Report and communicate the same information on the IR webpages of 
the company (if they had not been disclosing it before in any case). As with any new 
process, time is required to improve compliance. I therefore decided that 2011 would 
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be too soon to investigate the online IR practices of the JSE-listed companies after this 
regulatory change.  
 
Secondly, I had to find funding to carry out the content analysis. Prior studies in South 
Africa (Roberts, 1999; Venter, 2002; Barac, 2004; Nel & Baard, 2006, 2007) limited 
their studies to the largest 40 or 100 companies. In the present study, I wanted to 
capture behaviours across different sized companies. To increase the strength of the 
regression analyses, I wanted a much larger sample. Moreover, for comparative 
purposes, the website content analysis had to take place in as short a time as possible. 
Given the extensive checklist, this required more than one person to do the content 
analyses. The progress of the study was therefore delayed until funding could be 
obtained. In 2012, funding was received from Unisa’s Master and Doctoral Support 
Programme. The content analysis therefore took place from July 2012 to mid-
September 2012. 
 
The total average online IR score for all 205 companies was a disappointing 39.78 per 
cent, with a relatively large standard deviation (13.55 per cent), indicating a wide array 
of practices. The top 100 companies performed slightly better, with an average of 47.85 
per cent. However, it was unsatisfactory that 49 of the top 100 companies scored below 
50 per cent, with the lowest score reported as 11.89 per cent. The mean score for the 
top 50 companies per market capitalisation was 50.5 per cent versus 28.3 per cent for 
the bottom 55 companies. Companies with smaller market capitalisation did not seem 
to be making an effort to use their websites to communicate with investors. (Apart from 
size, further factors that are associated with disclosure quality were identified by the 
multivariate analyses.) Comparing results from this study to those of other international 
studies, South African companies performed better than companies in other emerging 
and developing economies, but performed worse than companies in advanced 
economies (much larger market capitalisation), where size is probably the main 
differentiator.  
 
There was also large variability in the compliance rate between the different categories. 
The categories that achieved the best scores were ‘Getting to corporate information’ 
(96 per cent) and ‘General usability’ (76 per cent). These categories contain guidelines 
that are synergized from the rest of the company’s website design, and the high scores 
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are therefore not surprizing. The low overall mean score is mostly due to low ratings 
for the categories ‘Presentations to investors’ (19 per cent), ‘Contacting the IR 
department’ (19 per cent), Calendar (31 per cent), and the ‘Shareholder information’ 
(33 per cent). These categories also had high standard deviations, reflecting wide 
dispersion in practices between companies. The top 100 companies performed 
between nine and 11 per cent better in these categories, but still scored below 50 per 
cent.  
 
A secondary objective was to form an opinion on the development stage of the online 
IR of JSE-listed companies. Despite advances in Internet technologies and available 
bandwidth, the findings indicated that many companies were still not using the unique 
features of the Internet for communication. PDF-format annual and integrated reports 
were almost twice as prevalent as their HTML equivalents. Four categories, which 
contained the most guidelines relating to technology and usability, actually had modes 
of zero for their frequency distribution: ‘Share charts’ (33 per cent), ‘Calendar of IR 
events’ (43 per cent), ‘Presentations to investors’ (15 per cent) and ‘Contacting the IR 
department’ (49 per cent). It was disappointing, given the low scores in the other 
categories, that just under half of the IR departments did not attempt to make 
themselves available for visitors to the website. Given the low adoption rate of Internet 
technology, I concluded that JSE-listed companies in the present study’s sample had 
not yet moved towards the third stage of Hedlin’s (1999) model for online IR practices. 
8.3.2. Regression model of online investor relations practices of JSE-listed 
companies 
The second primary objective was to determine what the drivers or predictors of the 
online IR practices of JSE-listed companies were, and specifically to test the 
hypothesis that shareholder familiarity (proxied by shareholder stability) is significantly 
associated with disclosure quality. For this purpose, an OLS regression model was 
specified. The dependent variable, online IR DS, was obtained from the content 
analysis part of the study. Shareholder stability was the test variable, and control 
variables were identified from prior studies. All the continuous independent variables 
needed to be transformed to obtain a better distribution. Information about the 
companies was obtained from INETBFA and Bureau van Dijk.  
 
 Chapter 8 – Summary, conclusions and recommendations 240 
 
 
One-way ANOVAs were presented for the DS and the categorical variables in the 
model. Ownership concentration, industry group, and issuing new equity during the 
previous 24 months did not appear to drive significant differences between the 
disclosure scores of the individual categories. However, differences in auditor type and 
dual-listed status did display significant differences in disclosure scores. Large 
Pearson correlations were reported between DS, stability, and market capitalisation 
respectively, and these were significant at a 0.01 level. Auditor type and dual-listed 
status had a medium strength correlation with DS, significant at a 0.01 level. Weak 
correlations were found for industry and profitability, although these were still 
significant at a 0.05 level. A large correlation was reported between stability and market 
capitalisation, albeit still below 60 per cent, which reduced the concern for collinearity. 
VIFs reported in the regression analyses confirmed no serious multi-collinearity 
between the independent variables.  
 
A further three-by-three analysis of the relationship between DS, stability, and market 
capitalisation was presented, together with one-way ANOVAs. Across all three market 
capitalisation groups, the difference in the mean DS between the most stable and least 
stable groups was statistically significant. However, within the least stable group (high 
share turnover) there was no significant difference between the mean DS of the three 
market capitalisation groups. For the ‘Medium’ and ‘High’ stability groups, there was 
once again a significant difference between the ‘Large’ and ‘Small’ market 
capitalisation groups. Size therefore influenced the disclosure scores only in the 
‘Medium’ and ‘High’ stability groups. 
 
The hypothesis that shareholder stability is associated with voluntary disclosures was 
tested in the OLS regression in the presence of 14 other control variables. The null 
hypothesis of no association was rejected, as stability was found to be a significantly 
negative predictor of the online IR practices of JSE-listed companies. The full model 
explained 51.8 per cent of the variation in the disclosure score of JSE-listed companies 
and was significant at a 0.001 level. The regression also indicated that having a large 
market capitalisation, not being in the financial sector, having a more recent initial 
listing, being audited by a Big4 firm and multiple stock exchange listings are associated 
with better online IR practices.  
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Ownership concentration was not significant in the model. This was in line with the 
univariate analyses, which found that ownership concentration had almost no 
correlation with the disclosure score (7.9 per cent) and was only weakly correlated with 
stability (-20.3 per cent). In most stock exchanges, institutional shareholders, such as 
pension funds and asset managers, constitute the bulk of the ownership concentration 
statistics. However, prior literature has found that institutional owners’ investment 
horizon affects companies’ policies and behaviours differently, and not the size of their 
holding per se. In the present study’s model, the stability measure (a nine-year 
average) could also proxy for investment horizon. The one-way ANOVA results 
indicate that there were significant differences between the average stability ratios of 
the three ownership concentration categories. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests found that 
‘Controlled’ and ‘None >25%’ were significantly different from each other, but ‘One or 
more >25%’ was not different from the other two categories. I concluded that stability 
(or long-horizon investors) explained disclosure better than ownership concentration.  
 
The regression was then run with the ‘Stepwise’ method in order to crystalize the 
number of significant variables for a predictive model. For the present study’s sample 
of JSE-listed companies, it seemed that larger, younger, dual-listed companies that 
were audited by a Big4 auditor and that had a profile of unstable investors (which are 
less familiar with the company) had higher quality online IR practices. Ownership 
concentration was once again not a significant predictor. The final model explained 
52.4 per cent of the variability of the disclosure score, significant at a 0.001 level. 
 
Lastly, robustness tests were conducted with three different regression models. In the 
‘Stepwise’ model for companies listed on the JSE only, stability, market capitalisation, 
the use of Big4 auditors, and listing age were significant predictors. These are the 
same predictors as those in the final model, excluding dual-listing status. In the 
stepwise model for all industry sectors, excluding ‘Financials’, only stability, market 
capitalisation, dual-listing and listing age were significant predictors. The last 
regression was run on all the companies in the consumer goods and services industry. 
Market capitalisation, listing age and dual-listing status were significant. The stability 
measure was no longer statistically significant, although it might still be practically 
significant. Furthermore, the low number of cases reduced the power of the analysis 
to pick up smaller significant differences. 
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8.4. Contribution 
This study’s primary contribution is in extending knowledge about the association 
between investors’ investment horizon and voluntary disclosure quality. The 
association between investment horizon and other areas of company behaviour (R&D, 
takeovers, investing in certain assets) has been confirmed in prior studies. This study 
investigated the association between long-horizon investors and companies’ voluntary 
disclosure behaviour. Bushee and Noe (2000) also investigated this relationship, but 
from the other direction. Their study’s hypothesis was that disclosure quality attracts 
different investor clientele (based on horizon). Bushee and Noe (2000) found that 
increasing disclosure quality attracts short-horizon speculative investors. They argued 
that dedicated long-horizon investors are neutral to public information quality, due to 
private channel access (at the time of their study). In the post-Reg FD environment 
(prohibiting private channel disclosure), Serafeim (2015) found a positive association 
between integrated reporting quality (a form of voluntary disclosure for countries other 
than South Africa) and long-horizon investors. Furthermore, FCLT (2015) and Huang 
and Petkevich (2016) argue that long-horizon investors also engage in their own 
superior information-gathering and are therefore not solely reliant on management’s 
disclosures. The literature is therefore inconclusive regarding the association between 
investment horizon and voluntary disclosure quality (disclosures made by company 
management). 
 
This study attempted to provide a tentative answer to the question of whether long-
horizon investors (such as pension funds and asset managers), in the post-Reg FD 
era with reduced/no access to private information from companies, with their own 
information gathering processes, are still highly dependent on information provided 
publicly by companies. The present study’s hypothesis was that long-horizon investors 
are familiar with the investee company and its management and therefore I addressed 
the relationship from the other direction, namely from investment horizon to disclosure 
quality. Stability (or having a preponderance of long-horizon investors) was found to 
be negatively associated with disclosure quality, whilst controlling for a host of other 
company characteristics associated with disclosure quality. This confirmed the 
hypothesis that the more long-horizon investors the company has, the weaker its public 
information milieu.  
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Although it is always difficult to prove causality, the use of a lagged stability measure 
that created a temporal difference between the shareholder profile and the disclosure 
behaviour demonstrated a plausible relationship from investment horizon (stability) to 
disclosure quality. In addition, the stability measure was calculated over nine years, 
which gives a better indication of the long-term shareholder profile of a company. As 
South Africa’s legal system is highly rated for the protection of minority shareholders 
and the JSE is highly rated for its efficiency, I have assumed that private disclosures 
did not occur on a large scale (if at all). Furthermore, due to long-horizon investors’ 
longstanding investment relationship with the investee company, they are familiar with 
the investee company’s risks and rewards, and management’s record of 
accomplishment. Long-horizon investors’ own information gathered and that 
cumulatively provided by the investee company over the years reduced their demands 
on management for ever-increasing public disclosures. If one considers that long-
horizon institutional investors, such as pension funds and asset managers are 
sophisticated investors, the present study’s findings that they are satisfied with a 
poorer public information environment also agree with that of Kalay (2015:994) who 
found that more Newswire disseminations and higher IR scores were positively related 
to higher levels of less sophisticated investors. 
 
Despite the findings of extensive research on the economic benefits of increased 
voluntary disclosure in general (see Section 2.2.1 Economic motives), and of online IR 
in particular (see Section 3.6 Benefits for the company from having an IR programme), 
these benefits may not hold true in all circumstances. From a cost-benefit perspective, 
this gives support to boards of directors to resist demands for increased public 
disclosure, as the cost (the gathering cost as well as the proprietary cost) may be 
greater than the benefits from lower cost of equity or improved liquidity of the share. 
Therefore, the boards (with the help of their IR officer) should determine what type of 
investment horizon clientele they wish to attract (see Section 2.2.5.2 Shareholders’ 
investment horizon) as well as the information needs of their target or ideal institutional 
shareholders and other block-holders.  
 
Another theoretical contribution of this study is the finding that ownership concentration 
is not significant as a predictor of voluntary disclosure behaviour. In the South African 
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setting, with its high ownership concentrations, it is more important to look at the 
investor horizon (stability of ownership). 
The study also adds to the general literature regarding voluntary disclosure (online or 
not), the extent to which companies practise it, and empirical evidence of factors driving 
this disclosure behaviour. Lastly, it is the first study that covered mid-tier and small 
companies of the JSE in a study on disclosure behaviour, which provides a better 
overview of behaviour than just focusing on the largest companies. 
8.5. Practical recommendations from the study 
The following practical suggestions are offered: 
 Financial managers should liaise closely with the company’s IR practitioners. An 
analysis should be done according to Bushee’s (1998) classification of the types of 
investors that the company current has. Considering the effect on cost of equity 
and price volatility, the company should then decide what type of investor clientele 
it wants to attract – transient or dedicated investors and/or quasi-indexers. 
 IR practitioners should then engage with the target or ideal shareholders to 
determine what information should be provided, in what format and how regularly, 
keeping in mind that selective, private disclosures are not allowed. The target 
shareholders’ information needs should be balanced against the cost of producing 
and publishing the information. If long-horizon investors are satisfied with existing 
disclosure levels, it might not be necessary to improve disclosure. By catering to 
the target shareholders’ information needs, their stake in the company should 
increase (assuming sound underlying investment fundamentals) and the holdings 
of the ‘undesirable’ shareholders should decrease. 
 Where improved disclosure is requested by investors, the developers of corporate 
websites could ensure that they harness all the capabilities of the Internet and 
hardware and software technologies in order to facilitate the assimilation of 
information in the most effective and efficient way for investors and at the same 
time in a cost-effective manner for companies as the preparers. 
8.6. Suggestions for future research 
This was a cross-sectional study based on 2011/2 data. The initial findings can be 
enhanced by repeating the content analysis and then following a difference-in-
differences design by comparing the results between the two periods (Bushee & Miller, 
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2012; Ittner, 2014; Li & Yang, 2015). This approach could provide further corroborative 
evidence for the shareholder familiarity hypothesis and could strengthen claims of 
causation in future studies.  
 
Another reason to repeat the content analysis is that information technology continues 
to change rapidly, and companies may have adjusted their practices since 2012. Such 
a future study should focus especially on companies in the low stability (i.e. high share 
turnover) tercile and those in the top size tercile, as they scored better in the current 
study and are less susceptible to influence by long-horizon shareholders. 
 
The current study only investigated the disclosure behaviour of companies listed on 
the JSE’s main board. The study could be extended to companies listed on the JSE’s 
Alternative Exchange, the Venture Capital board and the Development Capital board. 
Their disclosure behaviour might be different, as they are still growing (and need 
capital), are deemed riskier investments, and need to establish a reputation with the 
capital market. 
 
Investor familiarity was proxied by a rough inverted measure of the nine-year average 
annual turnover of the company’s shares. Future studies could endeavour to obtain 
detailed information about the length of time that individual investors (or at least the 
largest ones) are invested in a company. This will provide a more refined measure of 
the investor stability or investment horizon. 
 
As discussed in Section 7.5 Multivariate analyses, having a Big4 auditor had a 
significant positive association with the sample companies’ IR disclosure scores, even 
though this study focused on voluntary disclosure. The views of JSE-accredited 
auditors can be obtained on whether they play a role in their clients’ preparation of 
voluntary information provided on the IR website of a company, and how they influence 
the process, if at all. 
 
Lastly, the results of the content analysis (see Section 6.3 Main findings per category) 
highlighted various areas were companies generally underperformed, such as 
‘Presentations to investors’ and ‘Contacting the IR department’. It seemed that IR 
departments were reluctant to engage with investors and other stakeholders on their 
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company website. This study’s findings could be enhanced with a qualitative follow-up 
study. IR officers of companies that had a DS lower than the median score could be 
surveyed to elicit views on their role in communicating the company’s investment case. 
An investor clientele approach could be taken to confirm whether the lower DS arose 
from the need or desire to cater only to long-horizon investors’ reduced information 
needs, or to a lack of IR resources and support from top management. 
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TICKE
R 
FULL NAME TICKER FULL NAME 
1 1TM 1TIME HOLDINGS LTD 48 CKS CROOKES (CROOKES BROS LTD) 
2 ABL ABIL (AFRICAN BANK INVESTMENTS) 49 CLH CITYLDG (CITY LODGE HTLS LTD ORD) 
3 ACL ARCMITTAL (ARCELORMITTAL SA LTD) 50 CLS CLICKS (CLICKS GROUP LTD) 
4 ACP ACUCAP (ACUCAP PROPERTIES LTD) 51 CMH CMH (COMBINED MOTOR HLDGS LTD) 
5 ADH ADVTECH (ADVTECH LTD) 52 CML CORONAT (CORONATION FUND MNGRS LD) 
6 ADI ADAPTIT (ADAPTIT HOLDINGS LTD) 53 CND CONDUIT (CONDUIT CAPITAL LTD) 
7 ADR ADCORP (ADCORP HLDGS LTD ORD) 54 CNL CONTROL (CONTROL INSTRUMENTS GRP) 
8 AEG AVENG (AVENG LTD) 55 COH CURRO HOLDINGS LIMITED 
9 AFE A E C I (A E C I LTD ORD) 56 COM COMAIR (COMAIR LTD) 
10 AFR AFGRI (AFGRI LTD) 57 CPI CAPITEC (CAPITEC BANK HLDGS LTD) 
11 AFX AFROX (AFRICAN OXYGEN LTD ORD) 58 CRG CARGO (CARGO CARRIERS LTD) 
12 AGL ANGLO (ANGLO AMERICAN PLC) 59 CRM CERAMIC (CERAMIC INDUSTRIES LTD) 
13 AIP ADCOCK (ADCOCK INGRAM HLDGS LTD) 60 CSB CASHBIL (CASHBUILD LTD) 
14 ALT ALTECH (ALLIED TECHNOLOGIES) 61 CUL CULINAN (CULLINAN HOLDINGS ORD) 
15 AMA AMAPS (AMALGAMATED APPL HLD LTD) 62 CVN CONVERGE (CONVERGENET HOLDINGS 
LTD) 
16 AME AME (AFRICAN MEDIA ENTERTAIN) 63 CZA COAL (COAL OF AFRICA LTD) 
17 AMS AMPLATS (ANGLO AMERICAN PLAT LTD) 64 DAW DAWN (DISTRIBUTION AND WAREHSG) 
18 ANG ANGGOLD (ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LTD) 65 DCT DCENTRIX (DATACENTRIX HOLDINGS LTD) 
19 APK ASTRAPAK (ASTRAPAK LTD) 66 DGC DIGICORE (DIGICORE HOLDINGS LTD) 
20 APN ASPEN (ASPEN PHARMACARE HLDGS.) 67 DLV DORBYL (DORBYL LTD ORD) 
21 AQP AQUARIUS (AQUARIUS PLATINUM LTD) 68 DRD DRDGOLD (DRDGOLD LTD) 
22 ARI ARM (AFRICAN RAINBOW MINERALS) 69 DST DISTELL (DISTELL GROUP LTD) 
23 ARL ASTRAL (ASTRAL FOODS LTD) 70 DSY DISCOVERY (DISCOVERY HOLDINGS LTD) 
24 ART ARGENT (ARGENT INDUSTRIAL LTD) 71 DTA DELTA (DELTA EMD LTD) 
25 ASA ABSA (ABSA GROUP LIMITED) 72 DTC DATATEC (DATATEC LTD) 
26 ASR ASSORE (ASSORE LTD) 73 EHS EHSV (EVRAZ HIGHVELD STEEL & V) 
27 ATN ALTRON (ALLIED ELECTRONICS CORP) 74 ELR ELBGROUP (ELB GROUP LTD ORD) 
28 AVI A V I (AVI LTD) 75 EOH EOH (EOH HOLDINGS LTD) 
29 AVU AVUSA LTD (NOW TIMES MEDIA GROUP) TMG 76 EPS EASTPLATS (EASTERN PLATINUM LTD) 
30 BAT BRAIT (BRAIT SE) 77 EXL EXCELL (EXCELLERATE HLDGS LTD) 
31 BAU BAUBA (BAUBA PLATINUM LTD) 78 EXX EXXARO (EXXARO RESOURCES LTD) 
32 BAW BARWORLD (BARLOWORLD LTD) 79 FBR FAMBRANDS (FAMOUS BRANDS LTD) 
33 BDM BUILDMAX (BUILDMAX LTD) 80 FSR FIRSTRAND (FIRSTRAND LTD) 
34 BEL BELL (BELL EQUIPMENT LTD) 81 FVT FAIRVEST (FAIRVEST PROPERTY HLDGS) 
35 BIL BHPBILL (BHP BILLITON PLC) 82 GDO GOLDONE (GOLD ONE INTERNATIONAL L) 
36 BLU BLUETEL (BLUE LABEL TELECOMS LTD) 83 GFI GFIELDS (GOLD FIELDS LTD) 
37 BRT BRIMSTON (BRIMSTONE INVESTMNT CORP) 84 GGM GOLIATH (GOLIATH GOLD MINING LTD) 
38 BSR BASREAD (BASIL READ HLDGS LTD) 85 GIJ GIJIMA (GIJIMA GROUP LTD) 
39 BTI BATS (BRITISH AMERICAN TOB PLC) 86 GND GRINDROD (GRINDROD LTD) 
40 BVT BIDVEST (BIDVEST LTD ORD) 87 GRF GROUP 5 (GROUP FIVE LTD ORD) 
41 CAC CAFCA (CAFCA LTD) 88 GRT GROWPNT (GROWTHPOINT PROP LTD) 
42 CAT CAXTON (CAXTON CTP PUBLISH PRINT) 89 HAR HARMONY (HARMONY G M CO LTD) 
43 CBH COUNTRY BIRD HLDGS LTD 90 HCI HCI (HOSKEN CONS INVEST LTD) 
44 CCL COMPCLEAR (COMPU CLEARING OUTS LTD) 91 HDC HUDACO (HUDACO INDUSTRIES LTD) 
45 CCO CAPCO (CAPITAL&COUNTIES PROP PL) 92 HWA HWANGE (HWANGE COLLIERY LD ORD) 
46 CDZ CADIZ (CADIZ HOLDINGS LTD) 93 HWN HOWDEN (HOWDEN AFRICA HLDGS LTD) 
47 CFR COMPAGNIE FIN RICHEMONT 94 HYP HYPROP (HYPROP INVESTMENTS LTD) 
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95 IFH IFA HOTELS AND RESORTS 143 PHM PHUMELELA (PHUMELELA GAME LEISURE) 
96 ILA ILIAD (ILIAD AFRICA LTD) 144 PIK PICKNPAY (PIK N PAY STORES LTD) 
97 ILV ILLOVO (ILLOVO SUGAR LTD) 145 PMM PREMIUM (PREMIUM PROPERTIES LTD) 
98 IMP IMPLATS (IMPALA PLATINUM HLGS LD) 146 PMV PRIMESERV (PRIMESERV GROUP LTD) 
99 ING INGENUITY (INGENUITY PROPERTY INV L) 147 PNC PINNACLE (PINNACLE TECH HLDGS LTD) 
100 INL INVLTD (INVESTEC LTD) 148 PPC PPC (PRETORIA PORT CEMNT) 
101 IPL IMPERIAL (IMPERIAL HOLDINGS LTD) 149 PPE PURPLE (PURPLE CAPITAL LTD) 
102 ITE ITLTILE (ITALTILE LTD) 150 PSG PSG (PSG GROUP LIMITED) 
103 IVT INVICTA (INVICTA HOLDINGS LTD) 151 RBP RBPLAT (ROYAL BAFOKENG PLATINUM) 
104 JDG JDGROUP (JD GROUP LTD) 152 RBW RAINBOW (RAINBOW CHICKEN LTD) 
105 JSC JASCO (JASCO ELECTRONICS HLDGS) 153 RDF REDEFINE (REDEFINE PROPERTIES LTD) 
106 JSE JSE (JSE LTD) 154 REI REINET (REINET INV SOC ANON) 
107 KAP KAP (KAP INTERNATIONAL HLDGS) 155 REM REMGRO (REMGRO LTD) 
108 KGM KGMEDIA (KAGISO MEDIA LTD) 156 RLO REUNERT (REUNERT ORD) 
109 KIO KUMBA (KUMBA IRON ORE LTD) 157 RMH RMBH (RMB HOLDINGS LTD) 
110 LBH LIB HOLD (LIBERTY HOLDINGS LTD ORD) 158 RMI RMIH (RAND MERCHANT INS HLDGS) 
111 LEW LEWIS (LEWIS GROUP LTD) 159 RNG RANGOLD (RANDGOLD AND EXP CO) 
112 LHC LIFEHC (LIFE H CARE GRP HLDGS LT) 160 RTO REX TRUE (REX TRUEFORM CLOTH ORD) 
113 LON LONMIN (LONMIN P L C) 161 SAB SAB (SABMILLER PLC) 
114 MAS MASNITE (MASONITE AFRICA LTD ORD) 162 SAP SAPPI (SAPPI LTD) 
115 MDC MEDCLIN (MEDICLINIC INTERNATIONAL) 163 SBK STANBANK (STANDARD BANK GROUP LTD) 
116 MFL METROFILE (METROFILE HOLDINGS LTD) 164 SBV SABVEST (SABVEST LTD) 
117 MMG MICROMEGA (MICROMEGA HOLDINGS LTD) 165 SCL SACOIL (SACOIL HOLDINGS LD) 
118 MMI MMI HLDGS (MMI HOLDINGS LTD) 166 SDH SECDATA (SECUREDATA HOLDINGS LTD) 
119 MND MONDILTD (MONDI LTD) 167 SER SEARDEL (SEARDEL INVEST CORP LTD) 
120 MPC MR PRICE (MR PRICE GROUP LTD) 168 SFN SASFIN (SASFIN HOLDINGS LTD) 
121 MRF MERAFE (MERAFE RESOURCES LTD) 169 SHF STEINHOFF (STEINHOFF INTERNTL HLDGS) 
122 MSM MASSMART (MASSMART HOLDINGS LTD) 170 SHP SHOPRIT (SHOPRITE HLDGS LTD ORD) 
123 MST MUSTEK (MUSTEK LTD) 171 SKJ SEKUNJALO (SEKUNJALO INVESTMENTS LD) 
124 MTA METAIR (METAIR INVESTMENTS ORD) 172 SLM SANLAM (SANLAM LTD) 
125 MTN MTN GROUP (MTN GROUP LTD) 173 SNT SANTAM (SANTAM LTD) 
126 MUR M&R HLD (MURRAY AND ROBERTS H ORD) 174 SNU SENTULA (SENTULA MINING LTD) 
127 NCS NICTUS (NICTUS BEPERK) 175 SNV SANTOVA (SANTOVA LIMITED) 
128 NED NEDBANK (NEDBANK GROUP LTD) 176 SOL SASOL (SASOL LTD) 
129 NHM NORTHAM (NORTHAM PLATINUM LTD) 177 SOV SOVFOOD (SOVEREIGN FOOD INVEST LD) 
130 NPK NAMPAK (NAMPAK LTD ORD) 178 SPA SPANJAARD (SPANJAARD LTD) 
131 NPN NASPERS-N- (NASPERS LTD -N-) 179 SPG SUPRGRP (SUPER GROUP LTD) 
132 NT1 NET1UEPS (NET 1 UEPS TECH INC) 180 SPP SPAR (THE SPAR GROUP LTD) 
133 NTC NETCARE (NETCARE LIMITED) 181 SUI SUNINT (SUN INTERNATIONAL LTD) 
134 NWL NUWORLD (NU-WORLD HOLDINGS LTD) 182 SUR SPURCORP (SPUR CORPORATION LTD) 
135 OCE OCEANA (OCEANA GROUP LTD) 183 TAS TASTE HLDGS LTD 
136 OCT OCTODEC (OCTODEC INVEST LTD) 184 TBS TIGBRANDS (TIGER BRANDS LTD ORD) 
137 OML OLDMUTUAL (OLD MUTUAL PLC) 185 TFG TFG (THE FOSCHINI GROUP LTD) 
138 OMN OMNIA (OMNIA HOLDINGS LTD) 186 TKG TELKOM (TELKOM SA LTD) 
139 PAM PALAMIN (PALABORA MINING CO ORD) 187 TMT TREMATON (TREMATON CAPITAL INV LTD) 
140 PET PETMIN (PETMIN LTD) 188 TON TONGAAT (TONGAAT HULETT LTD) 
141 PFG PNR FOODS (PIONEER FOODS GROUP LTD) 189 TPC TRNPACO (TRANSPACO LTD) 
142 PGR PERGRIN (PEREGRINE HOLDINGS LTD) 190 TRE TRENCOR (TRENCOR LTD) 
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191 TRU TRUWTHS (TRUWORTHS INTERNATIONAL) 
192 TSH TSOGO SUN (TSOGO SUN HOLDINGS LTD) 
193 TSX TRNSHEX (TRANS HEX GROUP LTD) 
194 UUU URONE (URANIUM ONE INC) 
195 VIL VILLAGE (VILLAGE MAIN REEF LTD) 
196 VLE VALUE (VALUE GROUP LTD) 
197 VMK VERIMARK HOLDINGS LTD 
198 VOD VODACOM (VODACOM GROUP LTD) 
199 WBO WBHO (WILSON BAYLY HLM-OVC ORD) 
200 WHL WOOLIES (WOOLWORTHS HOLDINGS LTD) 
201 WIL WILDERNESS HOLDINGS LTD 
202 WNH WINHOLD (WINHOLD LTD ORD) 
203 YRK YORK (YORK TIMBER HLDGS LTD) 
204 ZCI ZCI (ZCI LTD) 
205 ZSA ZURICH SA (ZURICH INSURANCE CO S A) 
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APPENDIX C – CHECKLIST 
Context unit: Website of  
URL address:  
Date accessed:  
Analysis by:  
 
Recording units:  Source   N/A Count Max 
points 
Getting to Corporate Information         7 9
The company’s Web address is easy to 
guess/intuitive, e.g. it is XYZ.com or XYZ.co.za. 
LN       1 1 
It is the company's own site (i.e. NOT hosted on 
third party platform). 
LE       1 1 
The company’s website ranking on Google is: LN/IRS       1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
first (2)         
second (1)         
third or lower (0)         
Investor Relations (IR) area is separated from 
Selling, PR and Employment pages of website. 
IRS/LN/ 
Bowen 
      1 1 
One click to IR ‘Home’ page from site ‘Home’ 
page. 
IRS       1 1 
The link to IR is easily noticeable on the ‘Home’ 
page, not hidden by surrounding visual elements 
e.g. main tab horizontally or main menu item 
vertically. 
LN       1 1 
There is a direct link to IR on every page of the 
site (outside the IR pages). (2) 
LN       1 
 
2 
 
Otherwise, place this link in the ‘About Us’ section. (1) LN       
Company Information       32 43
The corporate overview ('Overview', 'About us', 
'Who we are' or on 'Home' page) explicitly states 
what the organisation does in plain language. 
LN       1 1 
Key corporate facts in the company overview are 
visually scanable, e.g. locations, number of 
employees etc. 
LN       1 1 
More detailed company facts are available under 
'Fact Sheet' or 'Company Snapshot'. 
LN       1 1 
‘Fact Sheet’ or ‘Snapshot’ is downloadable.         1 2 
The history of the company is explained. IRS       1 1 
High-level, easy-to-understand information about 
the breadth of the company’s products and 
services (segments) is provided. 
LN       1 1 
Virtual tour (video) of facilities. IRS       1 2 
Contains information about the organization’s 
high-level executives:  
LN       
Person's name         1 1 
Job title         1 1 
 Picture         1 1 
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Recording units:  Source   N/A Count Max 
points 
 Biography (CV) or link to biography         1 1 
Age         1 1 
Academic qualifications         1 1 
Professional memberships         1 1 
Directorship(s) in other companies         1 1 
Short career history         1 1 
The biography pages for executives should have 
links to: 
LN       
 
Downloadable pictures         1 2 
Transcripts of speeches given         1 2 
Presentations given         1 2 
Defines the term “corporate governance” 
because most people don’t know what it means. 
LN       1 1 
Emphasizes what the company does that’s 
valuable from an investor’s point of view (e.g. 
future plans, new products, business outlook). 
LN       1 1 
Provide access to financial coverage of 
subsidiaries, major businesses, and geographic 
regions (segmental report) on own site or 
hyperlink to subsidiaries' site containing 
summary. NO if you found it by own search only 
in Annual Report. 
LN       1 1 
Acknowledge the challenges/risks the company 
faces and explain the company’s plan to address 
them. 
LN       1 1 
Separate News/Press/Media centre. LN/IRS       1 1 
News releases clearly dated. IRS       1 2 
Breaking news on ‘Home’ page. IRS       1 2 
Posts time-sensitive content (for example, 
financial reports, webcasts, and press releases, 
excl. SENS) regularly and quickly (site does not 
look outdated, i.e. it's June 2012 but the last 
uploaded item in news is e.g. Sept 2011).  
LN       1 2 
JSE SENS news filings: LN/IRS       
 
SENS announcements on site         1 1 
Link to SENS announcements on JSE site         1 2 
Link to company blog. IRS       1 2 
Links to Social media (e.g. Facebook, twitter, 
Diggthis, etc. list) 
IRS       1 2 
Options to subscribe to email, RSS or SMS alerts. IRS       1 1 
Shareholder information     28 31
Stock/Share Quote in highly visible place in the 
website’s IR sections (or ‘Home’). 
LN       1 2 
Provides the following information:       
Share/stock symbol (ticker) clearly labelled         1 1 
Latest trading price         1 1 
Update date         1 1 
Update time         1 1 
High and low         1 1 
Volume traded         1 1 
Explains how people can buy the share. LN       1 1 
Shareholder calculator (number of shares or 
value entered). 
IRS       1 1 
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Recording units:  Source   N/A Count Max 
points 
Information about shareholders of the company: IRS       
 
% by size of holdings (e.g. 1 - 500, 501 - 5 000, etc)         1 1 
% by nature of shareholder, e.g. institutional, private, 
etc) 
        1 1 
% held by of principle shareholders, IRS & 
B&P 
      1 1 
Identity of controlling shareholders. IRS & 
B&P 
      1 2 
Dividend policy is described, e.g. high dividend 
yields, payout ratio, growing etc. 
IRS       1 1 
Provides a summary table for ‘Dividend History’ 
that shows the amounts and dates. 
LN       1 1 
Contains ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ (FAQ) 
relating to shares. 
        1 1 
Contact details of share registrar or transfer 
secretaries. 
IRS       1 1 
Details of analysts covering the company is 
provided in a dedicated area.  
LN       1 1 
The following details of the analysts covering the 
company are provided: 
      
Name         1 1 
Analyst's firm/brokerage         1 1 
Telephone number         1 1 
International format of telephone number, i.e. +27 11 
xxx xxxx 
        1 1 
Email address         1 1 
Provides link to Brokers' Consensus on reputable 
site i.e. INETBFA or iNet-Bridge. 
IRS       1 2 
Names of corporate advisors (legal and 
investment banks, sponsors). 
IRS       1 1 
Contact details of corporate advisors. IRS       1 1 
Details of external auditors:         
Name of Firm         1 1 
Contact details         1 1 
Share Charts         18 21 
Offers share charts, i.e. named ‘Share/Stock 
Chart’ on own or hosted site (Sharenet, iNet-
bridge) 
LN       1 1 
Has chart on own website, AND/OR (2) LN       1 2 
Linked to hosted chart on another site (the information 
on the chart page is specific to the company, i.e. not 
the general page of the host site) (click through to 
confirm). (1) 
LN       1 
For own or hosted interactive charts (moving the 
cursor displays information): 
        
Provides a way to graph the stock over one, five, and 
10 years. 
LN       1 1 
Allows comparison to popular market indices, such as 
ALSI, the resources indices, etc. 
LN       1 1 
Trading volumes can be plotted. IRS       1 1 
Make sure that important graphing elements and 
options appear above the fold (i.e. visible without 
having to scroll down). 
LN       1 1 
Avoids having too many complex and detailed 
graphing options, e.g. specialist/technical analysis 
(moving averages, trend lines) tools not required. 
LN       1 1 
Shows the PRICE chart first (user then change to 
volume or % change chart). 
LN       1 1 
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Recording units:  Source   N/A Count Max 
points 
Allows comparison to several competitors. LN       1 1 
Share price history downloadable in spreadsheet. IRS       1 2 
Chart usability:         
 
Makes sure that graph line colours are distinguishable 
by most colour-blind users (bold, high contrast). 
LN       1 1 
Positions chart legends close to the parts they 
correspond to. 
LN       1 1 
Labels each axis on the chart e.g. cents, dates, 
volume etc. It is easy to understand what each axis 
represents. 
LN       1 1 
Rounds off numbers on charts (remove clutter), 
unless interactive. 
LN       1 1 
Last updated - date         1 1 
Last updated - time         1 1 
Dates for historical time period, e.g. specific date of 1 
month ago, or 3 years ago 
        1 1 
Actual dates listed for historical high/low, averages         1 1 
Financial and other Reports         26 48
Places financial reports in the IR section under a 
descriptive category, such as “Annual Reports” or 
‘Financials’, not vague names, e.g. 
‘Performance’. 
LN       1 1 
Offers a snapshot/highlights page that’s easy to 
understand and gives people a quick overview of 
the company’s basic historical financial 
information, e.g. turnover/sales, earnings, assets, 
etc. On its own webpage (menu item) or click to 
item elsewhere. 
NO if only contained in annual report or some 
presentation (found by chance). 
LN       1 1 
5 - 10 year histories of key data and rations. IRS       1 1 
Downloadable spreadsheet for historical key 
data. 
IRS       1 2 
Offers comparisons of facts and numbers to help 
people gain a perspective on the relative sizes of 
the numbers (competitors or industry statistics). 
LN       1 1 
Group similar reports together.         1 1 
Gives the latest earnings release, and annual and 
quarterly/half-yearly reports high rankings (listed 
first). 
LN       1 1 
 Posts at least five years of annual and 
quarterly/half-yearly reports. 
LN       1 1 
Availability of real time of monthly reporting. J&X       1 2 
When reporting financial figures indicates: LN       
Reporting currency         1 1 
Figures are rounded off to the nearest thousand, 
million or billion 
        1 1 
When rounded off, monetary units, e.g. millions, 
billions is provided 
        1 1 
Units is spelled out e.g. millions, not abbreviated, e.g. 
'm' or 'b'. 
        1 1 
Reports key financial figures in currency other than 
Rand: 
IRS       1 1 
Indicates conversion/exchange rate used, e.g. R8,42 
= $1 
        1 1 
Date of conversion/exchange rate or period for which 
average used 
        1 1 
Annual report formats:  IRS       1 
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Recording units:  Source   N/A Count Max 
points 
HTML         
 
2 
PDF         
 
1 
Other, e.g. electronic book         
 
1 
Half-year results formats:  IRS       1 
HTML         2 
PDF         1 
Other, e.g. electronic book         
 
1 
Quarterly results formats:  IRS       1 
HTML         
 
2 
PDF         
 
1 
Other, e.g. electronic book         
 
1 
Integrated report formats:          1 
HTML         
 
2 
PDF         1 
Other, e.g. electronic book         1 
Sustainability/Corporate Social 
Responsibility/Environmental report formats: 
        1 
HTML         2 
PDF         1 
Other, e.g. electronic book         1 
The following financial statements is 
downloadable in Excel or similar format: 
IRS       
Statement of comprehensive income       1 2 
Statement of financial position         1 2 
Statement of changes in equity         1 2 
Statement of cash flows         1 2 
Customisation of reports by users for 
downloading. 
J&X       1 2 
HTML and PDF reports          14 14 
When offering reports in several formats, the 
HTML version is the primary option (listed first) 
and other formats (PDF, Word, Excel) are 
secondary.  
LN       1 1 
Doesn’t describe files as PDF or HTML only. PDF 
is described as e.g. ‘Print version’/‘Offline’ OR 
HTML as e.g. ‘Online’. (Either one is described.) 
LN       1 1 
HTML: Offers a table of contents at the beginning 
of each report, or navigate with menu/tabs  
LN/IRS/
RL 
      1 1 
Keeps the features in the HTML Report basic. 
Flash and multimedia not required INSIDE the 
HTML Report itself.  
LN       1 1 
HTML pages avoid horizontal scrolling. LN       1 1 
ONE HTML page contains all the information and 
the Next button points to next menu item (HTML 
pages not split artificially to resemble print copy). 
LN       1 1 
If HTML page offers a ‘Next’ button (e.g. News 
items), total number of HTML pages and means 
to skip pages, e.g. clicking on list of page 
numbers, beginning, end etc. 
LN       1 1 
PDF files, provides a description of the file 
content.  
LN       1 1 
File size (megabytes) indicated for PDF files. LN       1 1 
Large PDF files (>5MB), can be downloaded in 
sections.  
LN       1 1 
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Recording units:  Source   N/A Count Max 
points 
Smaller sections are described and size of each file 
provided. 
LN       1 1 
File size (megabytes) indicated for these smaller PDF 
files. 
LN       1 1 
PDF documents opens at a legible font size (no 
need to use Zoom to increase visibility).  
LN       1 1 
PDF: Offers a table of contents at the beginning 
of each report 
LN/IRS/
RL 
      1 1 
Calendar of IR Events LN       6 7
Provides a ‘Financial Calendar’ or ‘Calendar of 
Events’ that shows the dates of past and future 
investor events.  
LN       1 1 
If new event dates aren’t available, gives 
expected dates, or tells people when to check 
back. 
LN       1 1 
Offers Alerts facility to be informed of future 
events. 
        1 1 
Future events: offers a short explanation of the 
event’s agenda, who’s invited, the time and 
location, and how people can participate. 
LN       1 1 
For the calendar of events, list the most recent 
year first, but show events in chronological order 
within each year (i.e. Jan – Dec).  
LN       1 1 
Calendar event can be uploaded to MS Outlook 
or Novell 
IRS       1 2 
Presentations to investors         34 35 
Contains webcasts (audio and/or video) of events 
for communicating with shareholders and 
investors. 
LN       1 1 
Explains what webcasts (podcast, videocast) are. LN       1 1 
Results announcements available in the following 
format: 
IRS       
Audio (podcast)         1 1 
Video         1 1 
Audio track transcribed         1 1 
MS Powerpoint slides (or PDF of it)         1 1 
PDF of official press announcement         1 1 
HTML of official press announcement         1 1 
Roadshows/analyst/investor days available in the 
following format: 
IRS       
Audio (podcast)         1 1 
Video         1 1 
Audio track transcribed         1 1 
MS Powerpoint slides (or PDF of it)         1 1 
PDF of booklet/handout         1 1 
Offers a dial-in number (listening per telephone) 
for conference calls with analysts. 
LN       1 1 
Offers a dial-in number (listening per telephone) 
for other webcast events as an alternative to 
watching/listening on the Internet. 
LN       1 1 
Conference calls available in the following format 
after the event:  
IRS       
Audio (podcast)         1 1 
Audio track transcribed         1 1 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) available in the 
following format:  
IRS       
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Recording units:  Source   N/A Count Max 
points 
Audio (podcast)         1 1 
Video         1 1 
Audio track transcribed         1 1 
MS Powerpoint slides (or PDF of it)         1 1 
PDF of booklet/handout         1 1 
AGM: votes for and against each resolution. IRS       1 1 
Provides for each webcast event a: LN       
 
Detailed description (or link to detailed description)         1 1 
Who should attend         
 
Date         1 1 
Time of webcast         1 1 
Length (duration)         1 1 
Divides long webcasts into sections, so that people 
can go directly to the section of interest. 
LN       1 1 
Doesn’t require people to choose files formatted for 
different plug-ins and video players (i.e. Windows 
Media Player or QuickTime). Uses auto-detect to 
detect player installed on user’s computer. 
LN       1 1 
Sets the presentation slides to match/synchronise the 
webcast audio track as it plays. (Drag dial on audio 
track to see if slides 'move'). 
LN       1 2 
Places materials related to same events (for 
example, webcasts, presentations, and 
transcripts) in the same area. 
LN       1 1 
Slide Presentations (MS Powerpoint or PDF of 
PPT)/Handout booklets: 
LN       
Test print the presentations/booklets to make sure 
that they’re legible when printed as well as on the 
computer screen (using print preview). 
LN       1 1 
Shows the presentation’s length (total number of 
slides/pages) and the user’s current progress (pg no.) 
toward completing it 
LN       1 1 
Avoids dark background colours for presentations (it 
takes longer to print, waste ink). 
LN       1 1 
Contacting the IR department         16 16 
Includes IR contact information on the company’s 
main 'Contact Us' page. 
LN       1 1 
Provides IR contact information in the IR section 
of the website. 
LN       1 1 
Features prominent links to IR Contact on each 
IR webpage, e.g. part of menu/tabs. 
LN       1 1 
Offers a Contact Form in addition to a telephone 
number, not as a replacement. 
LN       1 1 
Invites investors to contact the board and high-
level executives. 
LN       1 1 
Provides full IR contact information in the IR 
section: 
LN       
Full name         1 1 
Title/speciality area, e.g. Manager Events         1 1 
International IR officer(s)         1 1 
Telephone number         1 1 
International format of telephone number, i.e. +27 11 
xxx xxxx 
        1 1 
Contact (working) hours         1 1 
Time zone differences, e.g. GMT + 2h         1 1 
Address         1 1 
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Recording units:  Source   N/A Count Max 
points 
Email address         1 1 
Specific email address with person's name (not 
generic, e.g. IR@company.com) 
        1 1 
For email requests, tells people when to expect a 
response. 
LN       1 1 
General usability         18 18 
Provides facts. Doesn’t place advertisements for 
products/pop-ups in the IR area of the site. 
LN       1 1 
Speaks the users’ language by avoiding fancy or 
technical terms - provide glossary of standard and 
industry specific terms on the website as 
link/menu. 
NO if ‘Glossary’ only in financial reports.  
LN/IRS       1 1 
Provides printer-friendly versions of content 
people would normally want to reference offline, 
such as simplified versions of financial reports, 
press releases, and manager biographies, 
indicated with a 'Printer icon'. 
LN       1 1 
Site map provided. IRS       1 1 
Search box provided. Test to see if it generates 
results. 
IRS       1 1 
Page tracking, e.g. bread crumbs 
(Home>>IR>>Reports>2011) or highlighted 
tabs/menu items to indicate to the user where 
they are in the site. 
IRS       1 1 
Provides a consistent navigational structure, i.e. 
tabs on top or menu to the left. 
LN       1 1 
Minimizes complexity by featuring a link only once 
on a page.  
LN       1 1 
Designates a visited link colour (from blue to 
purple) that’s visibly distinct from both unvisited 
links and text. 
LN       1 1 
Names hyperlinks clearly, avoiding names that 
are vague, generic, or have overlapping 
meanings, e.g. Financial Reports  vs. Financial 
Documents  or Latest Figures  vs. Latest 
Information . 
LN       1 1 
Lists navigational elements (menu items) in 
priority (order of relevance), not alphabetical, 
order.  
LN       1 1 
Uses dropdown menus (only first option listed can 
be seen) sparingly. 
LN       1 1 
Uses revolving content (images moving around) 
sparingly in IR pages. (Content is mostly static.) 
LN       1 1 
If a link will open a PDF (or another application), 
the user is told what to expect before they click it.
LN       1 1 
Doesn’t give plug-in icons (e.g. Adobe PDF) more 
prominence (substantially larger) than the links 
they reference. 
LN       1 1 
Opens new browser windows when clicking a 
hyperlink ONLY for non-Web applications (i.e. 
PDF, MS Office as the Back button are disabled 
when new window opens). Clicking a link changes 
the CURRENT page to the new content. 
LN       1 1 
Accessibility options for disabled users (e.g. voice 
assistance, larger font etc) 
IRS       1 1 
Legal disclaimer / Terms and Conditions of Use. IRS       1 1 
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Recording units:  Source   N/A Count Max 
points 
International Considerations         2 2 
Internationalize the site if you have an 
international audience e.g. multiple languages 
(English, Afrikaans, German, etc). 
LN/IRS       1 1 
Spells out the month or uses month 
abbreviations, not numbers, e.g. Feb not 02 to 
avoid confusion regarding MMDDYYYY and 
DDMMYYYY formats. 
LN       1 1 
TOTAL   201 244   
Sources legend: 
  
IRS = Investor Relations Society of the UK 
  
B&P = Beattie & Pratt, 2002 
  
LE = Author's own contribution 
Bowen = Bowen, D. 2006 
J&X = Jones & Xiao, 2004 
RL = Report Leadership Consortium (CIMA, PwC, 
Radley Yeldar), 2007 
LN = Loranger & Nielsen, 2009 
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Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
DS .069 205 .018 .975 205 .001 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Large sample!! >200 
 
Descriptives  
 Statistic Std. Error  
DS Mean .3978009 .00946247  
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound .3791441   
Upper Bound .4164577   
5% Trimmed Mean .3995124   
Median .3975410   
Variance .018   
Std. Deviation .13548196  
Minimum .04098   
Maximum .66393   
Range .62295   
Interquartile Range .22131   
Skewness -.036 .170 0.212 
Kurtosis -.848 .338 2.51 
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Oneway ANOVAs 
Oneway: DS by OC 
 
Descriptives 
DS N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Controlled 42 .3743169 .13924917 .02148661 .3309238 .4177100 .04098 .61066 
One or more >25% 43 .4027831 .13902051 .02120043 .3599989 .4455673 .14754 .66393 
None >25% 120 .4042350 .13311304 .01215150 .3801738 .4282962 .08197 .66393 
Total 205 .3978009 .13548196 .00946247 .3791441 .4164577 .04098 .66393 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
DS   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
.001 2 202 .999 
 
 
ANOVA 
DS Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .029 2 .015 .794 .454 
Within Groups 3.715 202 .018   
Total 3.744 204    
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Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   DS   
 
(I) Ownership Concentration (J) Ownership Concentration
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Tukey HSD Controlled One or more >25% -.02846613 .02942196 .598-.0979349 .0410027 
None >25% -.02991803 .02431438 .437-.0873272 .0274911 
One or more >25% Controlled .02846613 .02942196 .598-.0410027 .0979349 
None >25% -.00145190 .02410405 .998-.0583645 .0554607 
None >25% Controlled .02991803 .02431438 .437-.0274911 .0873272 
One or more >25% .00145190 .02410405 .998-.0554607 .0583645 
Bonferroni Controlled One or more >25% -.02846613 .02942196 1.000-.0994932 .0425609 
None >25% -.02991803 .02431438 .660-.0886150 .0287789 
One or more >25% Controlled .02846613 .02942196 1.000-.0425609 .0994932 
None >25% -.00145190 .02410405 1.000-.0596411 .0567373 
None >25% Controlled .02991803 .02431438 .660-.0287789 .0886150 
One or more >25% .00145190 .02410405 1.000-.0567373 .0596411 
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Homogeneous Subsets 
DS 
 
Ownership Concentration N 
Subset for alpha 
= 0.05 
 
1 
Tukey HSDa,b Controlled 42 .3743169 
One or more >25% 43 .4027831 
None >25% 120 .4042350 
Sig.  .486 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 54.153. 
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error 
levels are not guaranteed. 
 
Means Plots 
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Oneway: DS by Industry 
Descriptives 
DS N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum Maximum
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Basic Materials 42 .4360851 .14439780 .02228106 .3910876 .4810826 .15984 .66393 
Consumer Goods 22 .3891580 .12659495 .02699013 .3330289 .4452870 .14754 .61066 
Consumer Services 42 .4088603 .13887545 .02142895 .3655836 .4521369 .11885 .61475 
Financials 40 .3943648 .13024294 .02059322 .3527110 .4360185 .08197 .59426 
Industrials 47 .3730380 .13283640 .01937618 .3340358 .4120402 .04098 .66393 
Technology 12 .3493852 .12184206 .03517277 .2719705 .4268000 .20902 .58197 
Total 205 .3978009 .13548196 .00946247 .3791441 .4164577 .04098 .66393 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
DS   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
.563 5 199 .728 
 
ANOVA 
DS Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .126 5 .025 1.383 .232 
Within Groups 3.619 199 .018   
Total 3.744 204    
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Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   DS   
 
(I) Industry (J) Industry Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
Tukey HSD Basic Materials Consumer Goods .04692712 .03548998 .772 -.0552022 .1490565
Consumer Services .02722482 .02942674 .940 -.0574563 .1119060
Financials .04172034 .02979230 .727 -.0440128 .1274535
Industrials .06304707 .02863342 .242 -.0193512 .1454453
Technology .08669984 .04414010 .367 -.0403219 .2137216
Consumer Goods Basic Materials -.04692712 .03548998 .772 -.1490565 .0552022
Consumer Services -.01970229 .03548998 .994 -.1218316 .0824270
Financials -.00520678 .03579367 1.000 -.1082100 .0977965
Industrials .01611995 .03483502 .997 -.0841246 .1163645
Technology .03977273 .04839375 .963 -.0994897 .1790352
Consumer Services Basic Materials -.02722482 .02942674 .940 -.1119060 .0574563
Consumer Goods .01970229 .03548998 .994 -.0824270 .1218316
Financials .01449551 .02979230 .997 -.0712376 .1002287
Industrials .03582225 .02863342 .811 -.0465760 .1182205
Technology .05947502 .04414010 .758 -.0675467 .1864968
Financials Basic Materials -.04172034 .02979230 .727 -.1274535 .0440128
Consumer Goods .00520678 .03579367 1.000 -.0977965 .1082100
Consumer Services -.01449551 .02979230 .997 -.1002287 .0712376
Industrials .02132674 .02900898 .977 -.0621523 .1048057
Technology .04497951 .04438465 .913 -.0827460 .1727050
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(I) Industry (J) Industry Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
Industrials Basic Materials -.06304707 .02863342 .242 -.1454453 .0193512
Consumer Goods -.01611995 .03483502 .997 -.1163645 .0841246
Consumer Services -.03582225 .02863342 .811 -.1182205 .0465760
Financials -.02132674 .02900898 .977 -.1048057 .0621523
Technology .02365277 .04361523 .994 -.1018586 .1491641
Technology Basic Materials -.08669984 .04414010 .367 -.2137216 .0403219
Consumer Goods -.03977273 .04839375 .963 -.1790352 .0994897
Consumer Services -.05947502 .04414010 .758 -.1864968 .0675467
Financials -.04497951 .04438465 .913 -.1727050 .0827460
Industrials -.02365277 .04361523 .994 -.1491641 .1018586
Bonferroni Basic Materials Consumer Goods .04692712 .03548998 1.000 -.0585155 .1523698
Consumer Services .02722482 .02942674 1.000 -.0602036 .1146533
Financials .04172034 .02979230 1.000 -.0467942 .1302349
Industrials .06304707 .02863342 .432 -.0220244 .1481185
Technology .08669984 .04414010 .763 -.0444428 .2178425
Consumer Goods Basic Materials -.04692712 .03548998 1.000 -.1523698 .0585155
Consumer Services -.01970229 .03548998 1.000 -.1251449 .0857404
Financials -.00520678 .03579367 1.000 -.1115517 .1011382
Industrials .01611995 .03483502 1.000 -.0873768 .1196167
Technology .03977273 .04839375 1.000 -.1040077 .1835532
Consumer Services Basic Materials -.02722482 .02942674 1.000 -.1146533 .0602036
Consumer Goods .01970229 .03548998 1.000 -.0857404 .1251449
Financials .01449551 .02979230 1.000 -.0740190 .1030101
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(I) Industry (J) Industry Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
Industrials .03582225 .02863342 1.000 -.0492492 .1208937
Technology .05947502 .04414010 1.000 -.0716676 .1906177
Financials Basic Materials -.04172034 .02979230 1.000 -.1302349 .0467942
Consumer Goods .00520678 .03579367 1.000 -.1011382 .1115517
Consumer Services -.01449551 .02979230 1.000 -.1030101 .0740190
Industrials .02132674 .02900898 1.000 -.0648605 .1075140
Technology .04497951 .04438465 1.000 -.0868897 .1768487
Industrials Basic Materials -.06304707 .02863342 .432 -.1481185 .0220244
Consumer Goods -.01611995 .03483502 1.000 -.1196167 .0873768
Consumer Services -.03582225 .02863342 1.000 -.1208937 .0492492
Financials -.02132674 .02900898 1.000 -.1075140 .0648605
Technology .02365277 .04361523 1.000 -.1059305 .1532360
Technology Basic Materials -.08669984 .04414010 .763 -.2178425 .0444428
Consumer Goods -.03977273 .04839375 1.000 -.1835532 .1040077
Consumer Services -.05947502 .04414010 1.000 -.1906177 .0716676
Financials -.04497951 .04438465 1.000 -.1768487 .0868897
Industrials -.02365277 .04361523 1.000 -.1532360 .1059305
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Homogeneous Subsets 
DS 
 
Industry N 
Subset for alpha = 0.05
 1 
Tukey HSDa,b Technology 12 .3493852 
Industrials 47 .3730380 
Consumer Goods 22 .3891580 
Financials 40 .3943648 
Consumer Services 42 .4088603 
Basic Materials 42 .4360851 
Sig.  .176 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 26.944. 
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used.
Type I error levels are not guaranteed. 
 
Means Plots 
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T-tests 
T-TEST GROUPS=Big4Auditor(0 1) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=DS 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Big 4 Auditors N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error
Mean 
DS Non-Big 4 Auditor 36 .2811931 .09951160 .01658527 
Big 4 Auditor 169 .4226404 .12919451 .00993804 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
DS Equal variances assumed 
7.501 .007 -6.185 203 .000 -.14144733 .02286856 -.18653771 -.09635696 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -7.316 62.955 .000 -.14144733 .01933483 -.18008545 -.10280921 
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T-TEST GROUPS=Dual_List(0 1) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=DS 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Dual Listed N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean 
DS Only JSE 
157 .3696878 .12429015 .00991943 
Dual listed 48 .4897541 .13084472 .01888581 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower Upper 
DS Equal variances assumed 
.049 .825 -5.785 203 .000 -.12006630 .02075480 -.16098894 -.07914367 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  -5.628 74.794 .000 -.12006630 .02133234 -.16256444 -.07756817 
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T-TEST GROUPS=IssuedNew(0 1) 
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS 
  /VARIABLES=DS 
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95). 
 
Group Statistics 
 Issued New Shares prev 24 
months N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
DS No additional equity listed 146 .4021727 .13791730 .01141412 
Additional equity listed 59 .3869825 .12976948 .01689455 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
DS Equal variances assumed 
.983 .323 .726 203 .469 .01519020 .02092474 -.02606750 .05644790 
Equal variances not
assumed 
  .745 113.568 .458 .01519020 .02038891 -.02520173 .05558213 
 
  
 APPENDIX D – STATISTICAL OUTPUT CONT.  
302 
 
SORT CASES BY STAB9_lag (A). 
SORT CASES BY Ticker (A). 
ONEWAY DS BY STABcondMCAPb 
  /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES HOMOGENEITY 
  /PLOT MEANS 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS 
  /POSTHOC=TUKEY BONFERRONI ALPHA(0.05). 
 
Oneway 
 
Descriptives 
DS N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
11 22 .5339046 .10258916 .02187208 .4884191 .5793901 .27049 .66393 
12 23 .4713115 .11744373 .02448871 .4205250 .5220980 .24590 .66393 
13 22 .4603204 .11565932 .02465865 .4090399 .5116009 .23770 .61066 
21 22 .4649776 .10506618 .02240019 .4183939 .5115614 .27869 .61066 
22 23 .3654669 .12597893 .02626842 .3109895 .4199442 .11885 .58607 
23 23 .3082680 .08240343 .01718230 .2726341 .3439019 .14754 .44262 
31 22 .3984724 .11277804 .02404436 .3484694 .4484754 .11885 .60246 
32 23 .3262651 .09828098 .02049300 .2837653 .3687650 .18443 .54098 
33 22 .2513040 .09426981 .02009839 .2095071 .2931009 .04098 .42213 
Total 202 .3972164 .13599201 .00956836 .3783491 .4160836 .04098 .66393 
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Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
DS   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
1.027 8 193 .417 
 
ANOVA 
DS   
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.515 8 .189 16.602 .000 
Within Groups 2.202 193 .011   
Total 3.717 201    
 
Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   DS   
 (I) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles 
(J) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
Tukey HSD 11 12 .06259314 .03185350 .570 -.0373423 .1625286
13 .07358420 .03220548 .357 -.0274555 .1746239
21 .06892697 .03220548 .449 -.0321128 .1699667
22 .16843776* .03185350 .000 .0685023 .2683732
23 .22563662* .03185350 .000 .1257012 .3255721
31 .13543219* .03220548 .001 .0343925 .2364719
32 .20763947* .03185350 .000 .1077040 .3075749
33 .28260060* .03220548 .000 .1815609 .3836403
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   DS   
 (I) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles 
(J) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
12 11 -.06259314 .03185350 .570 -.1625286 .0373423
13 .01099106 .03185350 1.000 -.0889444 .1109265
21 .00633383 .03185350 1.000 -.0936016 .1062693
22 .10584462* .03149758 .026 .0070258 .2046634
23 .16304348* .03149758 .000 .0642247 .2618623
31 .07283905 .03185350 .355 -.0270964 .1727745
32 .14504633* .03149758 .000 .0462275 .2438651
33 .22000745* .03185350 .000 .1200720 .3199429
13 11 -.07358420 .03220548 .357 -.1746239 .0274555
12 -.01099106 .03185350 1.000 -.1109265 .0889444
21 -.00465723 .03220548 1.000 -.1056970 .0963825
22 .09485356 .03185350 .078 -.0050819 .1947890
23 .15205242* .03185350 .000 .0521170 .2519879
31 .06184799 .03220548 .601 -.0391917 .1628877
32 .13405527* .03185350 .001 .0341198 .2339907
33 .20901639* .03220548 .000 .1079767 .3100561
21 11 -.06892697 .03220548 .449 -.1699667 .0321128
12 -.00633383 .03185350 1.000 -.1062693 .0936016
13 .00465723 .03220548 1.000 -.0963825 .1056970
22 .09951079 .03185350 .052 -.0004246 .1994462
23 .15670965* .03185350 .000 .0567742 .2566451
31 .06650521 .03220548 .500 -.0345345 .1675449
32 .13871250* .03185350 .001 .0387771 .2386479
33 .21367362* .03220548 .000 .1126339 .3147133
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   DS   
 (I) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles 
(J) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
22 11 -.16843776* .03185350 .000 -.2683732 -.0685023
12 -.10584462* .03149758 .026 -.2046634 -.0070258
13 -.09485356 .03185350 .078 -.1947890 .0050819
21 -.09951079 .03185350 .052 -.1994462 .0004246
23 .05719886 .03149758 .672 -.0416199 .1560177
31 -.03300557 .03185350 .982 -.1329410 .0669299
32 .03920171 .03149758 .945 -.0596171 .1380205
33 .11416283* .03185350 .013 .0142274 .2140983
23 11 -.22563662* .03185350 .000 -.3255721 -.1257012
12 -.16304348* .03149758 .000 -.2618623 -.0642247
13 -.15205242* .03185350 .000 -.2519879 -.0521170
21 -.15670965* .03185350 .000 -.2566451 -.0567742
22 -.05719886 .03149758 .672 -.1560177 .0416199
31 -.09020443 .03185350 .113 -.1901399 .0097310
32 -.01799715 .03149758 1.000 -.1168160 .0808217
33 .05696397 .03185350 .690 -.0429715 .1568994
31 11 -.13543219* .03220548 .001 -.2364719 -.0343925
12 -.07283905 .03185350 .355 -.1727745 .0270964
13 -.06184799 .03220548 .601 -.1628877 .0391917
21 -.06650521 .03220548 .500 -.1675449 .0345345
22 .03300557 .03185350 .982 -.0669299 .1329410
23 .09020443 .03185350 .113 -.0097310 .1901399
32 .07220728 .03185350 .368 -.0277281 .1721427
33 .14716841* .03220548 .000 .0461287 .2482081
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   DS   
 (I) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles 
(J) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
32 11 -.20763947* .03185350 .000 -.3075749 -.1077040
12 -.14504633* .03149758 .000 -.2438651 -.0462275
13 -.13405527* .03185350 .001 -.2339907 -.0341198
21 -.13871250* .03185350 .001 -.2386479 -.0387771
22 -.03920171 .03149758 .945 -.1380205 .0596171
23 .01799715 .03149758 1.000 -.0808217 .1168160
31 -.07220728 .03185350 .368 -.1721427 .0277281
33 .07496112 .03185350 .316 -.0249743 .1748966
33 11 -.28260060* .03220548 .000 -.3836403 -.1815609
12 -.22000745* .03185350 .000 -.3199429 -.1200720
13 -.20901639* .03220548 .000 -.3100561 -.1079767
21 -.21367362* .03220548 .000 -.3147133 -.1126339
22 -.11416283* .03185350 .013 -.2140983 -.0142274
23 -.05696397 .03185350 .690 -.1568994 .0429715
31 -.14716841* .03220548 .000 -.2482081 -.0461287
32 -.07496112 .03185350 .316 -.1748966 .0249743
Bonferroni 11 12 .06259314 .03185350 1.000 -.0407408 .1659271
13 .07358420 .03220548 .843 -.0308916 .1780600
21 .06892697 .03220548 1.000 -.0355488 .1734028
22 .16843776* .03185350 .000 .0651038 .2717717
23 .22563662* .03185350 .000 .1223027 .3289706
31 .13543219* .03220548 .001 .0309564 .2399080
32 .20763947* .03185350 .000 .1043055 .3109734
33 .28260060* .03220548 .000 .1781248 .3870764
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   DS   
 (I) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles 
(J) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
12 11 -.06259314 .03185350 1.000 -.1659271 .0407408
13 .01099106 .03185350 1.000 -.0923429 .1143250
21 .00633383 .03185350 1.000 -.0970001 .1096678
22 .10584462* .03149758 .034 .0036653 .2080240
23 .16304348* .03149758 .000 .0608641 .2652228
31 .07283905 .03185350 .839 -.0304949 .1761730
32 .14504633* .03149758 .000 .0428670 .2472257
33 .22000745* .03185350 .000 .1166735 .3233414
13 11 -.07358420 .03220548 .843 -.1780600 .0308916
12 -.01099106 .03185350 1.000 -.1143250 .0923429
21 -.00465723 .03220548 1.000 -.1091330 .0998186
22 .09485356 .03185350 .118 -.0084804 .1981875
23 .15205242* .03185350 .000 .0487185 .2553864
31 .06184799 .03220548 1.000 -.0426278 .1663238
32 .13405527* .03185350 .001 .0307213 .2373892
33 .20901639* .03220548 .000 .1045406 .3134922
21 11 -.06892697 .03220548 1.000 -.1734028 .0355488
12 -.00633383 .03185350 1.000 -.1096678 .0970001
13 .00465723 .03220548 1.000 -.0998186 .1091330
22 .09951079 .03185350 .074 -.0038232 .2028447
23 .15670965* .03185350 .000 .0533757 .2600436
31 .06650521 .03220548 1.000 -.0379706 .1709810
32 .13871250* .03185350 .001 .0353786 .2420464
33 .21367362* .03220548 .000 .1091978 .3181494
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   DS   
 (I) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles 
(J) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
22 11 -.16843776* .03185350 .000 -.2717717 -.0651038
12 -.10584462* .03149758 .034 -.2080240 -.0036653
13 -.09485356 .03185350 .118 -.1981875 .0084804
21 -.09951079 .03185350 .074 -.2028447 .0038232
23 .05719886 .03149758 1.000 -.0449805 .1593782
31 -.03300557 .03185350 1.000 -.1363395 .0703284
32 .03920171 .03149758 1.000 -.0629776 .1413811
33 .11416283* .03185350 .015 .0108289 .2174968
23 11 -.22563662* .03185350 .000 -.3289706 -.1223027
12 -.16304348* .03149758 .000 -.2652228 -.0608641
13 -.15205242* .03185350 .000 -.2553864 -.0487185
21 -.15670965* .03185350 .000 -.2600436 -.0533757
22 -.05719886 .03149758 1.000 -.1593782 .0449805
31 -.09020443 .03185350 .184 -.1935384 .0131295
32 -.01799715 .03149758 1.000 -.1201765 .0841822
33 .05696397 .03185350 1.000 -.0463700 .1602979
31 11 -.13543219* .03220548 .001 -.2399080 -.0309564
12 -.07283905 .03185350 .839 -.1761730 .0304949
13 -.06184799 .03220548 1.000 -.1663238 .0426278
21 -.06650521 .03220548 1.000 -.1709810 .0379706
22 .03300557 .03185350 1.000 -.0703284 .1363395
23 .09020443 .03185350 .184 -.0131295 .1935384
32 .07220728 .03185350 .882 -.0311267 .1755412
33 .14716841* .03220548 .000 .0426926 .2516442
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   DS   
 (I) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles 
(J) Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
32 11 -.20763947* .03185350 .000 -.3109734 -.1043055
12 -.14504633* .03149758 .000 -.2472257 -.0428670
13 -.13405527* .03185350 .001 -.2373892 -.0307213
21 -.13871250* .03185350 .001 -.2420464 -.0353786
22 -.03920171 .03149758 1.000 -.1413811 .0629776
23 .01799715 .03149758 1.000 -.0841822 .1201765
31 -.07220728 .03185350 .882 -.1755412 .0311267
33 .07496112 .03185350 .706 -.0283728 .1782951
33 11 -.28260060* .03220548 .000 -.3870764 -.1781248
12 -.22000745* .03185350 .000 -.3233414 -.1166735
13 -.20901639* .03220548 .000 -.3134922 -.1045406
21 -.21367362* .03220548 .000 -.3181494 -.1091978
22 -.11416283* .03185350 .015 -.2174968 -.0108289
23 -.05696397 .03185350 1.000 -.1602979 .0463700
31 -.14716841* .03220548 .000 -.2516442 -.0426926
32 -.07496112 .03185350 .706 -.1782951 .0283728
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
  
 APPENDIX D – STATISTICAL OUTPUT CONT.  
310 
 
 
Homogeneous Subsets 
DS 
Stability conditioned on 
MCap by terciles N 
Subset for alpha = 0.05 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Tukey HSDa,b 33 22 .2513040     
23 23 .3082680 .3082680    
32 23 .3262651 .3262651    
22 23  .3654669 .3654669   
31 22  .3984724 .3984724 .3984724  
13 22   .4603204 .4603204 .4603204 
21 22   .4649776 .4649776 .4649776 
12 23    .4713115 .4713115 
11 22     .5339046 
Sig.  .318 .114 .053 .357 .343 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 22.433. 
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not
guaranteed. 
 
Means Plots 
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ONEWAY STAB9_lag BY OwnCon.BvD 
  /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES HOMOGENEITY 
  /PLOT MEANS 
  /MISSING ANALYSIS 
  /POSTHOC=TUKEY BONFERRONI GH ALPHA(0.05). 
 
Oneway: Stability by ownership concentration 
 
Descriptives 
Stability lag 9 years   
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean
Minimum Maximum Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Controlled 41 1.7217493 .29656661 .04631592 1.6281413 1.8153572 .73830 1.99867 
One or more >25% 42 1.6449488 .22710307 .03504276 1.5741785 1.7157191 1.01865 1.92822 
None >25% 119 1.5838408 .31856304 .02920263 1.5260116 1.6416699 .58716 1.99857 
Total 202 1.6245377 .30099046 .02117762 1.5827789 1.6662965 .58716 1.99867 
 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Stability lag 9 years   
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
3.028 2 199 .051 
 
ANOVA 
Stability lag 9 years   
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .602 2 .301 3.402 .035 
Within Groups 17.608 199 .088   
Total 18.210 201    
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Post Hoc Tests 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   Stability lag 9 years   
 
(I) Ownership Concentration (J) Ownership Concentration
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound
Tukey HSD Controlled One or more >25% .07680046 .06530494 .469 -.0774096 .2310105
None >25% .13790851* .05386643 .030 .0107092 .2651079
One or more >25% Controlled -.07680046 .06530494 .469 -.2310105 .0774096
None >25% .06110805 .05338735 .488 -.0649600 .1871761
None >25% Controlled -.13790851* .05386643 .030 -.2651079 -.0107092
One or more >25% -.06110805 .05338735 .488 -.1871761 .0649600
Bonferroni Controlled One or more >25% .07680046 .06530494 .723 -.0808710 .2344719
None >25% .13790851* .05386643 .034 .0078541 .2679630
One or more >25% Controlled -.07680046 .06530494 .723 -.2344719 .0808710
None >25% .06110805 .05338735 .761 -.0677897 .1900058
None >25% Controlled -.13790851* .05386643 .034 -.2679630 -.0078541
One or more >25% -.06110805 .05338735 .761 -.1900058 .0677897
Games-Howell Controlled One or more >25% .07680046 .05807891 .387 -.0620749 .2156758
None >25% .13790851* .05475361 .037 .0069562 .2688608
One or more >25% Controlled -.07680046 .05807891 .387 -.2156758 .0620749
None >25% .06110805 .04561566 .377 -.0474033 .1696195
None >25% Controlled -.13790851* .05475361 .037 -.2688608 -.0069562
One or more >25% -.06110805 .04561566 .377 -.1696195 .0474033
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Homogeneous Subsets 
Stability lag 9 years 
 
Ownership Concentration N 
Subset for alpha = 0.05 
 1 2 
Tukey HSDa,b None >25% 119 1.5838408  
One or more >25% 42 1.6449488 1.6449488 
Controlled 41  1.7217493 
Sig.  .542 .381 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 53.001. 
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I
error levels are not guaranteed. 
 
Means Plots
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Rank transformation of STAB 
COMPUTE FR_STAB9_lag_IDF_0_1=IDF.NORMAL(RFR001,0,1). 
EXECUTE. 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=STAB9_lag RFR001 FR_STAB9_lag_IDF_0_1 
  /STATISTICS=SKEWNESS SESKEW KURTOSIS SEKURT 
  /HISTOGRAM NORMAL 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
RENAMED FR_STAB9_lag_IDF_0_1 to FR_STAB9_lag_IDF 
 
Frequencies 
Statistics 
 Stability lag 9 years Fractional Rank of STAB9_lag FR_STAB9_lag_IDF_0_1
N Valid 202 202 202
Missing 3 3 3
Skewness -1.095 .000 .049
Std. Error of Skewness .171 .171 .171
Kurtosis .574 -1.201 -.172
Std. Error of Kurtosis .341 .341 .341
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Histogram 
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Residuals of model 
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Breusch-Pagan heteroscedasticity tests 
SPSSINC BREUSCH PAGAN DEPENDENT = DS 
  ENTER = FR_STAB9_lag_IDF LNCAP062012 Controlled Blockholders ConsG ConsS Fin Industrials Tech 
    LNAGE ROaA_win LNDE_Pub Big4Auditor Dual_List IssuedNew 
  /OPTIONS MISSING=LISTWISE 
  /SAVE. 
 
Residual Heteroscedasticity Test Full sample 
lm(formula = DS ~ 
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF+LNCAP062012+Controlled+Blockholders+ConsG+ConsS+Fin+Industrials+Tec
h+LNAGE+ROaA_win+LNDE_Pub+Big4Auditor+Dual_List+IssuedNew, na.action = na.omit)  
Residual standard error: 0.09437 
Degrees of freedom: 186 
R-Squared: 0.5544 
Adjusted R-Squared: 0.5185 
 
Non-constant Variance Score Test 
 ChiSquare D.f Sig. 
Test Result .020 1.000 .887
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Residual Heteroscedasticity Test Alternative: residual regressed on predictors 
SPSSINC BREUSCH PAGAN DEPENDENT = DS 
  ENTER = FR_STAB9_lag_IDF LNCAP062012 Controlled Blockholders ConsG ConsS Fin Industrials Tech 
    LNAGE ROaA_win LNDE_Pub Big4Auditor Dual_List IssuedNew 
  VARIANCEMODEL=FR_STAB9_lag_IDF LNCAP062012 OwnCon.BvD Industry LNAGE ROaA_win LNDE_Pub 
    Big4Auditor Dual_List IssuedNew 
  /OPTIONS MISSING=LISTWISE 
  /SAVE. 
 
lm(formula = DS ~ 
FR_STAB9_lag_IDF+LNCAP062012+Controlled+Blockholders+ConsG+ConsS+Fin+Industrials+Tec
h+LNAGE+ROaA_win+LNDE_Pub+Big4Auditor+Dual_List+IssuedNew, na.action = na.omit)  
Residual standard error: 0.09437 
Degrees of freedom: 186 
R-Squared: 0.5544 
Adjusted R-Squared: 0.5185 
 
 
Non-constant Variance Score Test 
 ChiSquare D.f Sig. 
Test Result 11.761 15.000 .697
 
 
